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Daily Report

Central Eurasia

FBIS-SOV-95-231
Friday
1 December 1995

Daily Report
Central Eurasia

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Key Developments

Yeltsin, Filatov Discuss Campaign, Chechnya

*LD3011153395 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1445 GMT 30 Nov 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Nov 30 (INTERFAX) — Presidential Chief of Staff Sergey Filatov told a press conference in Moscow Thursday that he had met with President Yeltsin to discuss the current election campaign.

He said that he had informed Yeltsin of the all-Russia teleconference on parliamentary elections held jointly with the Central Electoral Commission in Moscow Tuesday [28 November].

Filatov also said that the pre-election situation in Chechnya had also been discussed. The sooner legitimate authorities are shaped in Chechnya the sooner peace and accord will be restored in that republic, he said.

He said his talks with Yeltsin also dealt with personnel-related issues.

President Yeltsin welcomed the idea of holding a youth meeting in Moscow on December 12, said Filatov.

He also announced that he would visit Novgorod on December 2 and 3.

Reportage of 'Elections '95' Campaign Coverage

Ossetian Leader Touts NDR

LD0112120495

[FBIS Editorial Report] Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian at 0630 GMT on 1 December carries on the "Elections '95" program a 7-minute election broadcast by the Russia Is Our Home [NDR] party. The party's broadcast starts with a commercial that shows party leaders at work with the captions "a director who knows how to make cinema films", "a general who knows how to wage war", and "a prime minister who knows how to govern." A general scene of a crowded street is shown with a caption "Russia Is Our Home — we know how to work".

Akhzarbek Galazov, president of the Republic of North Ossetia, is then shown seated, facing the camera. He says the following:

"Every state experiences times when it becomes necessary to gather all forces together to save the state. I am the head of a small republic, North Ossetia-Alaniya, a republic where a multiethnic nation lives, which voluntarily joined Russia 221 years ago. I know for certain that there is not a single person in the republic today who could imagine the future of his family, his people, or his republic outside Russia. The roof of our Russian home, Russia Is Our Home, suits me, both as a person and as a politician. And my republic lives in this multiethnic home."

Galazov goes on to talk about the movement Our Ossetia, set up in his republic, and its multi-ethnic basis. He says:

"The Our Ossetia movement has joined Russia Is Our Home on a collective basis. The Russian soccer champions, Spartak-Alaniya, have joined Russia Is Our Home as collective members. I think that all sensible people in the republic of North Ossetia-Alaniya, people who cannot imagine their futures outside Russia, will vote for Russia Is Our Home candidates."

Video footage is then shown of a soccer match; Spartak chairman Nikolay Ozerov speaks about the team's victories and how proud he is of Spartak-Alaniya's successes; he says both Spartak teams should be collective members of NDR and says he has chosen NDR because Chernomyrdin is such a decent man.

CPRF's Romanov Interviewed

*LD3011191795 Moscow Russian Public Television
First Channel Network in Russian
0525 GMT 30 Nov 95*

[From the "Elections '95" program, hosted by Georgiy Kuznetsov; program lasts seven minutes]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Georgiy Kuznetsov] The Communist Party of the Russian Federation [CPRF]. Petr Vasiliyevich Romanov, general director of the major Krasnoyarsk Yenisey chemical combine, or to put it more simply, the missile fuel factory, it might be thought that you would miss the times when your factory had a most favored status regime; when you got whatever you asked for. Things are probably more difficult now?

[Romanov] I do not agree with the wording of the question because, among other things, I miss the times when all of Russia or the entire former Soviet Union was working. [passage omitted]

To live, we all need to roll up our sleeves and start working. I miss the time when all of Russia, teachers and doctors, collective farmers and workers, the technical intelligentsia, when all of Russia worked. I really miss those times. But while missing them, we in the Communist Party of the Russian Federation are people who are connected with production and understand well we can only move forward. There is no way back. Even in my speech at the congress of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, I finished with the statement that what Lenin's said — one step forward and two steps back — no longer fits. No step backwards, only forwards. Even if they are only half steps, we need to move forwards. [passage omitted]

[Kuznetsov] You grew up in a gulag. Your father was put in the camps by the communists but you are campaigning for the Communist Party. How can you reconcile this?

[Romanov] You know, it was not just my father; My mother also led a very difficult life connected with the Krasnoyarsk camps. I was born and grew up there. And I am speaking to you now and paying my respects to my parents, my mother, and father, who despite everything managed to bring me up as a citizen of a great state. And the main thing is they showed me something very interesting which is very much lacking in everyone today. They taught me to love and respect my own history. This is our history, it is not the history of the United States of America, it is not the history of Germany, or any other country. It is the history of Russia, the history of our people. [passage omitted]

[Kuznetsov] What suggestions do you have for the legislative assembly?

[Romanov] We think that eleven issues need to be resolved at one and the same time in order to emerge from the crisis which Russia faces: six economic and five political issues. But you know, over the past 10 years, Russia has been shaken so much that no one can resolve problems by charging straight at them. Some people are promising to solve all problems within two years, others are saying three. I say we need to create conditions where everyone can start to work. [passage omitted]

Glazyev Presents KRO's Program

LD3011181795

[FBIS Editorial Report] Moscow Russian Public Television First Channel Network in Russian at 0525 GMT on 30 November broadcasts an "Elections '95" program hosted by Georgiy Kuznetsov allotted to the Congress of Russian Communities with Sergey Glazyev. The program lasts seven minutes.

The report starts with a commercial with the camera moves slowly into focus to show a Russian church in a country setting. The caption "Congress of Russian Communities" appears on screen. A voiceover says: "Russia will recover. The Congress of Russian Communities."

Sergey Glazyev, one of the party's leaders, was then shown in his office, with a voiceover giving biographical details about him and describing his career to date.

A commercial shows stills of Yuriy Skokov, Aleksandr Lebed, and Sergey Glazyev in turn. Then the video switches to footage of them strolling along a tree-lined avenue together. A voiceover announces: "Yuriy Skokov, Aleksandr Lebed, Sergey Glazyev: They know how to strengthen the state in the interests of its citizens, how to provide order in the country and defend its citizens, bring peace and prosperity back to Russian homes. Greatness to Russia! A peaceful and worthy life to its families." The caption "Congress of Russian Communities" then appears on screen.

Video switches to a Glazyev seated at a desk in his office addressing the camera. He says:

"Our program is based on the demands and appeals which we have received from a great number of enterprises, labor collectives, trade unions, scientific organizations, from the public in various towns and regions in our country. Our program is based on the principle of protecting interests: protecting the interests of our people, protecting interests at our enterprises, protecting the interests of our culture. And we have submitted the appropriate laws based on your demands and proposals. We are now raising the issue of amending the Constitution and are suggesting that there should be a referendum on the issue of the authorities answering to society. We are convinced that if the government is not in a position to bring about an increase in people's well-being, an increase in standards of living, an increase in quality of life, and in life expectancy, then this government should not remain in power. Those who are resolving our fates for us now are concerned with completely different matters. They are concerned with serving interests which are alien to us. Interests which are closely interwoven with the interests of foreign capital and mafia structures. So no one apart from us, with your help, will be able to guarantee that our common program is implemented."

A cartoon map of Russia is then shown being hit by an apple, a building, and a hammer and sickle — references to the Yabloko party, Russia Is Our Home, and the communists. The screen is engulfed with cartoon smoke which clears, showing the words "Russia" on the map and the caption "Congress of Russian Communities" underneath. The camera switches back to Glazyev, who continues:

"You know, the policies of Chernomyrdin and Chubays mean maximizing our dependence on the West. For them, the irreversibility of the reforms does not mean the irreversibility of positive, social, and economic changes and the irreversibility of economic growth. What does Chubays mean by the irreversibility of the reforms? He means that there will not be any changes in the redistribution of property which he organized. And he means that his status will not be changed. For Chernomyrdin, it means there will be no changes to the state within a state which he has built under the name of Gazprom. This is a state within a state with its own huge infrastructure, with huge privileges, and with the huge advantages of a monopoly. That is what irreversibility means for them: Do not touch what we have done, what we have taken, you must not touch it."

The video then shows empty factories, idle machinery, Chernomyrdin and Chubays at work and holding news conferences, Glazyev walking along a Moscow street. A commentator speaks about the dire state of the Russian economy and criticizes the current government for selling Russia out to the West. A series of people are then shown praising Glazyev and his honesty. Back in his office Glazyev says:

"We wish to achieve a mechanism for bringing people to account which will make it quite clear that if the welfare of each resident of our country grows, if per capita incomes increase, if life expectancy increases, then the work is being done properly. If all these indices fall, there is no need to whip up fresh crises, there is no need to argue. People who are not up to their jobs simply need to be sacked. And if they have broken laws as well, then they must be prosecuted too."

A ticking clock is then shown, carrying the Congress of Russian Communities' initials and the party number, 31. A voiceover says: "Number 31 on the electoral list." Skokov, Lebed, and Glazyev are shown walking toward a moving picture of a crowd and turning to face the camera. Caption and voiceover said "Congress of Russian Communities".

Zhirinovskiy Makes LDPR Address

LD3011180495 Moscow Russian Public Television First Channel Network in Russian 0525 GMT 30 Nov 95

[Election broadcast on behalf of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia — recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Esteemed citizens of Russia! The main issue is that of our state. The USSR has died, and the former ruling party, which ruled until 1991, is to blame. Those who for the last four years have been trying to knock together the CIS are even worse than the USSR [as heard]. And in each case Russia becomes the loser because the USSR existed at the expense of Russia, impoverishing the latter and enriching the outlying national republics, and now when the CIS has been created people live better over there at Russia's expense even though war has been under way over there. But this war is a source of profits. They all have fled from there to Russia and are sitting out here. It has become even worse because they are all sitting out in Russia, trading in our markets, and they have taken control of the key posts in administration, even in education and culture.

Therefore, the state has become the main issue. And who has been dealing with it for all the six years? It is the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia [LDPR] alone that has been saying: Russia, a Russian republic, otherwise we'll perish. But unfortunately, other parties have not supported us, neither those of the left — Communists and Agrarians — nor democratic parties. All the slogans that they are putting forward proclaim the promotion of sovereignty, further splits in our state, and ongoing attempts to help national regions while neglecting the Russian people. The LDPR faction has raised the issue of Russia, of Russians, and of the Orthodox religion dozens of times but not a single time did they put it on the agenda.

Sometimes you ask questions indignantly: Why is it that we voted for the LDPR but up to this day many of the things promised by Zhirinovskiy have not been implemented? There is only one reason: We don't have a majority in parliament. We have only 12 percent of the votes. You number 100 million. Only if at least 80 million of you come on 17 December and of half cast their votes for us will we be able to become the ruling party and implement our program. And the program is very simple: a Russian republic within its natural historical borders.

Already today Tajikistan, Armenia, Abkhazia, the Dniester Region and a number of other regions want to rejoin us. Only those who would wish to rejoin Russia voluntarily to make an integral part of Russia will be accepted. But some regions should not be admitted to our state even if they apply for it, in order to avoid any further bloodshed, swindling, corruption, dirt, and depravity. I'm speaking about the Transcaucasian region. All those who want to set up independent states in North Caucasus can be counted in single figures whilet 95 percent of the population of North Caucasus want to live together with Russia forever because they like it. But if there are 200,000 or 300,000 fanatics they can set up an independent state, be it Ichkeria [Chechnya] or any other but only beyond the Caucasian ridge. I spoke about this with Dudayev two years ago: choose south Azerbaijan or another region but North Caucasus is Russian territory and no state will ever be set up over there. Russia's southern borders include Makhachkala and Adler today and perhaps Sukhumi tomorrow because Abkhazia wants to join the Russian state, and the day after tomorrow our borders will perhaps stretch up to Tiraspol because the Dniester Region, southern and eastern Ukraine, and Belarus wish to join the Russian state, too, as well as parts of the Baltic states.

But we have problems within our country today. We're being constantly cheated. Hundreds of laws adopted by the State Duma aren't working because no money has been allocated to enforce them. Money is being stolen, transferred to foreign banks or not collected as taxes because the new tax police are being hampered, and a taxation system has been developed which everyone is evading. As a result, we have no borders, no money, nor a normal political team. Only a new, united political team with a majority in the parliament and in government — that is, if most ministers are members of this party and if a member of the party becomes president on 16 June — only then will changes for the better start happening in our country.

Today, however, we have the most dismal statistical data. Today, all the people of Russia, and not only Russians but all those who live with us have been practically forced into prostitution, they are selling their bodies, souls, and possessions because they can't survive otherwise. You get miserable salaries which are sometimes not paid and you're cheated. Having eliminated our deposits in the savings banks in January 1992 Gaydar's government robbed the whole people. All those fictitious joint-stock companies have robbed you, too. There's no need to name them. The Russkiy Dom Selenga alone has taken 1.4 trillion rubles from you and will not return them under the current leadership and State Duma. Is there any other parliament where one deputy gets killed every six months? No, there isn't and why? Because it's led by comrade Rybkin. It's one and the same party. They've been unable to rule since 1917. The Bolsheviks seized power in 1917 and in place of the great Russian empire they created the Soviet Union. It was created in blood because hundreds and tens of millions of people had to be put to death. There could have been 300 or 400 million of us, healthy and good. Half of them would have been Russian and the other half would have been other, smaller peoples.

Our party has the single slogan: Russia is a fatherland for everybody. We profess no chauvinism nor nationalism. We support the idea that everybody who lives in Russia, who wishes Russia well, and who regards themselves as Russians in geographical terms should live in Russia. We will never permit any resettlement of peoples or discrimination. But we will never permit any infringement of the rights of the Russians. Now that you're listening to me this broadcast is being shown only in the Russian Federation. In Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev has switched off [Russian] television. In Uzbekistan, Karimov has done the same. Here are democrats for you! Former Communists turned democrats have become absolute rulers [khans] today because they were such in essence. They only pretended to be Communists. Beware of turncoats and werewolves! Beware of disloyal generals who fly to Foros to save their general secretary who betrayed his party! They should have drowned that general secretary but instead they brought him here. I'm speaking about General Rutskoy, hero of Afghanistan. Who downed him in Afghanistan, after all? A Pakistani boy pilot in an An-2 aircraft whilst Colonel Rutskoy was flying the most powerful Soviet MiG. The same goes for General Lebed. He lost everything in Afghanistan and the Dniester Region and today, like a token general, is helping Skokov who is our new young Gorbachev. Or take Zyuganov. It's not a Communist Party any longer, they're using the name in order to attract those who were born with a Communist Party card and want to die with it. So beware of cheats! I beg you: think, and keep turncoats, werewolves and traitors away from power. The LDPR is the most honest and pure party!

Yarygina Speaks on Yabloko

LD3011204795 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 0630Z 30 Nov 95

[From the "Elections '95" program]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Unidentified correspondent] And now, live on air, one of the leaders of Yabloko bloc, Tatyana Vladimirovna Yarygina. Go ahead.

[Yarygina] Good morning, television viewers. As mentioned, I represent the Yabloko bloc. I am an economist and have been working with Grigoriy Yavlinskiy since his 500 Days program. For the past two years, I have represented our movement's view on social problems on the State Duma Committee for Labor and Social Support. I would like to say that our movement is profoundly convinced that we cannot judge what is happening in our country by what is happening in Moscow. [passage omitted]

We are convinced that the situation which has developed is intolerable. We do not think that there can be a strong government when industry is weak, agriculture is disintegrating, the Army is hungry and humiliated, doctors and teachers are on strike. We think that we have reached a watershed when we should change the priorities in our economy and in our policy. And we must replace those in power who defend these old priorities.

Our bloc feels that the main tasks today are:

— first, not to support the ruble but the producers, production, workers;

— second, tax reform: Taxes should not kill off those who want to work but should get them interested in developing production;

— third, the Army should be strong, respected and should respect itself;

— fourth, income reform: Everyone who works should receive a proper and adequate wage, including teachers, doctors and those working in science and culture;

— and finally, pensions, grants, allowances which should be paid at an adequate level and on time.

That is our program, the main stances in it, which will enable the reform for the select few to be turned into a reform for the majority. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] Yabloko has been in the Duma for two years. What would not have happened if Yabloko had not been there? What specific things have you done which happened only or mainly because of you?

[Yarygina] There would not have been a great many very important amendments to the budget which have been some help to the military, public sector organizations and a number of branches of industry, even if they have not helped them as much as we would have liked. There would not have been employment laws, changes to the employment code or the law on resolving collective labor disputes. There would not have been a great many laws on self-government, which are important to us, or many important amendments to laws connected with defense. There would not have been amendments to the law on ecology. And finally, there would not have been some very serious amendments and addenda to laws connected with the privatization of the economy.

Members of the Yabloko faction have been working in all of the committees dealing with the economy and we have tried to exert an influence wherever we could.

[Correspondent] Very many blocs and associations are promising strong social policies. Moreover, we have had strong social policies over the past 70 or 75 years. What basis does Yabloko see for these policies — appropriating everything and then distributing it?

[Yarygina] No, that is not our method. Yabloko is in favor of social policy being an important link in the general economic policy. We should produce and we should have.

[Correspondent] So, each of us should have the opportunity to earn a lot?

[Yarygina] Everyone who can work should have the conditions and the opportunity to work and rules guiding how the work is done. As for those who cannot work, they are the concern of the state and the state must give guarantees of help for those who cannot work.

[Correspondent] In any case, in order to have an adequate health service and education, to have adequate pension provision you will have to collect taxes. How do you reconcile strong social policies with the promise to lower taxes?

[Yarygina] Well, you were quite right to say that taxes need to be collected. And everyone must be equal with regard to taxation. We do not have equality when some branches of industry, such as the gas industry, do not pay taxes or a number of major enterprises do not pay and the remainder do.

[Correspondent] But nevertheless when you have a situation like we have today where the state has little money, tax reductions...

[Yarygina] That is a myth. The state does not have that little money. The state funds far too many privileges which have been granted to people whom the state or, rather, the executive authority has considered should be granted privileges. We believe there should be equal conditions for everyone.

[Correspondent] Should land continue to be bought and sold or categorically not?

[Yarygina] No. Land may continue to be bought and sold but we must approach this very slowly and carefully. It should be a process, a process including a whole series of actions.

[Correspondent] The Army?

[Yarygina] First and foremost, the Army should defend the citizens and should on no account take part in disagreements between the authorities. And the Army should be strong and well provided for.

Rutskoy Featured in Derzhava Video

LD0112000595

[FBIS Editorial Report] St. Petersburg Fifth Channel Television Network in Russian at 1800 GMT on 24 November carries a 15-minute election broadcast on behalf of the Derzhava movement in the framework of the "Elections '95" program.

The presentation begins with a video. A full-screen caption "Instead of a foreword" is shown followed by footage of Yeltsin coming to power as Russian president in 1991 and the White House coming under fire during the dispute between the executive and legislative powers in October 1993. A full-screen caption "Derzhava's faith and hope" appears followed by video of Rutskoy holding a baby at a church christening. A male narrator says: "The great Russian philosopher Fedor Aleksandrovich Ilyin put it beautifully when he said a man can do whatever he likes with faith. He can betray it or manipulate it. The only thing he cannot do is live without faith."

The narrator outlines Rutskoy's biography over still photographs and video footage of Rutskoy. The Derzhava leader then speaks directly from his office. He says: "Until people believe that it is these political forces that will lead to problems being resolved, if everyone has the attitude toward authority prevalent today, if people do not know specifically what they will get, that is their families and society as a whole, as a result of their work, as a result of the whole of society's work, it is senseless for us to talk about this topic, although opportunities may be evident, real opportunities which will resolve these problems. What is needed is to gain the most important thing, faith."

A full-screen caption "Moscow, The House of the Unions' Hall of Columns, 2 April 1995, the first all-Russia congress of the Derzhava sociopatriotic movement" is followed by footage of the congress. Rutskoy continues: "The need to create the sociopatriotic movement Derzhava is obvious: there is a lack of unity in sociopolitical movements, there is a lack of solidarity, there is no organization that can unite people of different ideological views for the sake of a goal. There is one goal at the present moment, salvation of the fatherland. Parties which are formed from one or another place on the ideological spectrum cannot unite everyone in a single goal. So the very idea of a movement, a sociopatriotic movement, envisages uniting people of different ideological opinions, different ideological convictions and views in order truly to achieve this goal, to save the country and follow the road not to the latest chimera, the latest slogan, but the road to a worthy life.

"Once I prepared and published these books [video shows Rutskoy's collected works], once I put to society the road it can and should follow, I travelled the country from June 1994, began to travel to the country's regions — the geography is so broad. If you look at the map, you see these black circles shaded in, these are branches where the movement has 2,000 or more members, where the circles are not shaded in, the organization there has 300 to 500 people, and there are regions where I haven't been, that is, I have managed to travel round 53 regions of the Russian Federation, to create and strengthen branches of the Derzhava sociopatriotic movement. [Video shows a map but has footage of Rutskoy on his trips superimposed so none of the black circles are visible]

"One more significant advantage of these trips is personal contact with people, studying the specifics of the region as one region is not like another, in its desires, climatic peculiarities, economic peculiarities, national peculiarities, and social problems; everything is different everywhere.

"Our membership has been recorded. An official statement has been submitted which shows all the passport details, types of work, places of work, addresses, telephone numbers. All this is put into a computer database, and today these statements have been submitted by 1,158,000 people. What does this tell us? It tells us that this is the largest political organization in the Russian Federation today."

A full-screen caption then says: "The priority tasks of the Derzhava socio-patriotic movement."

Rutskoy says there can be no stability until the priority tasks are solved. He lists the tasks: "Housing, food, health, culture and sport are a single goal because sickness needs to be prevented; where is education going — science and culture — there can be no education without science and culture; clothing, everyone needs to be neatly and well clothed; ecology, the environment, and personal and collective security. These are priority tasks for everyone. If they are sorted out, then society will be stable."

A full-screeen caption says, "The Derzhava sociopatriotic movement on the question of power". Rutskoy continues: "If the Derzhava sociopatriotic movement does not have an absolute parliamentary majority then we will have to take part again in these groups, factions, consensuses, hearings, what else do they have, conciliation commissions, and the result will be zero.

"We will adopt the laws which we have drawn up, first a law on taxes because taxes in current politics are an open, state racket which have put both the economy as a whole and industrial production and agricultural production and enterprise, we could say in a humiliating position.

"Further, a law on the law-enforcement system in the Russian Federation. Just look, a lot of shooting, massive shooting takes place. There were 30 people on the roundtable of Russian entrepreneurs, between one and nine have been shot in just one year. Whom do entrepreneurs support? They support the power that doesn't kill them.

"What else? A law on motherhood and childhood. Look, today's mortality rate exceeds the birth rate by 1.2 million. In the year 2018 we will have 50 million left. A law on motherhood and childhood is essential. This law is essential to stimulate the birth rate.

"A law on education is essential. People in the west have already entered the 21st century but we are still in the 20th century in terms of the school and preschool education system." "Children know that computers exist only because they have seen them in the movies."

"And look at the state of health care. It is terrible. We have a system requiring payment with the result that people can't even afford medicine."

"And a law on ecology is essential. How long can we spend in idle talk?

"A law on banks and banking activity, a law on securities. MMM, Russkiy Dom Selenga, where are they all? They have robbed people and disappeared. An inventory of Russian property is essential because under privatization the people's property has been looted.

"This package of laws has been prepared. All this should be adopted, not over four years but in sequence in the immediate future. We need an absolute parliamentary majority in order to put a stop to all this lawlessness. If the people demonstrate their trust in Rutskoy and his team, if they vote for us and we get an absolute parliamentary majority, yes, I guarantee that all this will be implemented."

The video then shows Rutskoy addressing the Derzhava congress. He says that Russia is being looted while one after another factories are stopping work and workers are not being paid.

The narrator concludes by saying that the elections will show whether or not "we have enough faith". The video shows more footage of Rutskoy holding a baby at a church christening.

Representing Derzhava in the studio, Duma Deputy Valentin Marychev appeals to the electorate to put their trust in Rutskoy.

Regional Activities

Yavlinskiy Cancels Briefing After Bomb Threat

LD3011141595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1056 GMT 30 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vladivostok, Nov 30 (INTERFAX-Eurasia) — An anonymous telephone threat of a bomb explosion in Vladivostok's sea terminal made leader of the Yabloko faction Grigoriy Yavlinskiy cancel his press conference in that city.

Yavlinskiy arrived in the Maritime territory as part of his pre-election tour of the Far East. He was to give a press conference in the railway terminal located near the sea port.

The threat was made on Thursday morning [30 Nov], presumably by a child, sources in the territorial Interior Ministry department told INTERFAX-Eurasia. By the time Yavlinskiy arrived in Vladivostok, the sea terminal building and adjacent districts had been blocked by the police. No explosive device was found.

Lebed Cuts Short Trip to Volga; Returns to Moscow

LD3011225995 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1800 GMT 30 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] General Aleksandr Lebed, one of the leaders of the Congress of Russian Communities [KRO], cut short his campaign trip to the Volga area and flew to Moscow. This is not linked with any leadership split that has allegedly emerged in the bloc, a RIA journalist was told at the KRO press center. The other leader of the Congress of Russian Communities, Yuriy Skokov, will finish the visit to the Volga on his own.

Rutskoy Campaign Trip Disrupted By Threats

LD3011210095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1644 GMT 30 Nov 95

[By Roman Zadunaisky]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW November 30 (ITAR-TASS) — A trip of Aleksandr Rutskoy, leader of Derzhava socio-patriotic movement, to Yekaterinburg was disrupted by threatening telephone calls. There were several anonymous telephone calls with threats to Rutskoy, Andrey Sidelnikov, one of leaders of the movement, told ITAR-TASS on Thursday [30 Nov]. "Rutskoy wished to go to Yekaterinburg, but all of us, his team, decided that he should not take risks," Sidelnikov said. He added that the decision was influenced by the assassination the other day of Duma deputy Sergey Markidonov in Petrovsk-Zabaikalskiy. Rutskoy's trip was planned for November 28. Yekaterinburg police was informed on threatening telephone calls and tried to identify the callers but was unable to do so, Sidelnikov said.

Dudayev Demands Halt to 'Illegal Elections'

MK0112074395 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 30 Nov 95 p 3

[Unattributed, untitled report]

[FBIS Translated Text] Chaired by Dzhokhar Dudayev, a session of the Chechen State Defense Committee took place with the participation of administration heads, military commandants, and commanders of all fronts and sectors in the republic. The session approved a final plan of measures to prevent illegal elections in the republic, said Movladi Udugov, information and press minister in the Dudayev government. The State Defense Committee adopted a resolution about the illegitimacy of any elections until Russian troops are pulled out. The document notes that "any actions by the occupation forces to organize fictitious elections are invalid and have no legal force." Documents were displayed showing that federal forces have already prepared filled-out ballot papers in Groznyy using passport information of village residents. This information, the document says, was obtained by bribing friends, neighbors, and relatives of incumbent Chechen leaders. A conference by Nadterechnyy District commanders was held under the chairmanship of General Aslan Makskhadov, Dudayev army chief of staff. Commanders reported on the military-political situation in the district and measures being taken to prevent illegal elections in it.

The Assembly of Sociopolitical Parties and Movements of Chechnya held a conference where it was officially announced that in 283 communities of the republic public committees had been set up to explain why illegal elections must not be held. In the very near future such committees are expected to be formed in all of the republic's villages.

Forecasts & Commentary

Daily Views Prospects for Zhirinovskiy, LDPR

MM2911163295 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 28 Nov 95 pp 1-2

[Article by ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI Analysis Service: "Farewell to Liberal Democratic party of Russia; Russian Democracy's 'Firstborn' Consigned to Museum of Russian Political History"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Emerging, even before the collapse of the USSR and the CPSU's self-isolation, as a legal noncommunist political formation, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's Liberal Democratic Party after a relatively short period of noisy, shocking, and even frightening success, can now lay claim only to the honorary role of the increasingly senile patriarch of the perestroyka stage of Russian politics (or the unique result of Gorbachev's experiment in the field of pluralism and democratization).

Since the moment of its registration in 1990 Zhirinovskiy's party has twice surprised analysts by achieving substantial results during the Russian presidential elections in July 1991 (9 percent of the votes) and the State Duma deputies' elections in December 1993 (23 percent of the votes on party lists). After success at the last parliamentary elections the LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia] had (seemingly) firmly entered the "top three" political parties and movements and formed a powerful and at one stage quite monolithic faction in the State Duma and it still controls several Duma committees and commissions while Aleksandr Vengerovskiy, a member of its leadership, became vice speaker of the lower chamber of the Federal Legislative Assembly. Russian and foreign publications, radio, and television until recently steadily paid the figure of V. Zhirinovskiy not only heightened but in some places even excessive attention, obviously not considering the specific situation and political hopelessness of this phenomenology [as published]. And even now many specialists through inertia are continuing to predict another success for the "liberal democrats" at the forthcoming parliamentary elections, allocating them in advance (and rashly) at least 15-20 percent of the votes.

Let us try to understand how realistic this is and whether it is realistic at all. A detailed analysis of the LDPR's history and the dynamics (or to be more precise the lack of dynamics) of its program provisions, strategy, slogans, and tactical methods makes it possible to draw the directly opposite conclusion: This only recently still popular (but no more) political formation is in fact not viable: The circle of the party's supporters is constantly narrowing and interest in its now stereotypical propaganda ploys is increasingly declining.

The sources of the present and now last crisis of the "liberal democrats" can be detected in their past victories. The party created five years ago under utterly different sociohistorical conditions and undoubtedly considering the specific features of the mentality of the population at the time, has found itself utterly unable to evolve and is now unfit for the present situation. Everything has changed since 1990 and only Vladimir Zhirinovskiy has remained the same. And not as a result of a competitive struggle but by the most natural means he is being displaced from political life, remaining in its history merely as the most characteristic example of the "leader of the troubled times" of the era of perestroyka and glasnost.

What Secured LDPR's Success at the Stage of Its Establishment?

Above all the unprecedented ability for publicity, the unbending desire for victory and the oratorical abilities of one man — Zhirinovskiy. But he is the Lenya Golubkov of the political scene. Party structures, although essential, are as lossmaking for Vladimir Volfovich as shareholders are for MMM and the influence of the party mass on the formation of the program documents and tactical decisions of LDPR-VVZh [Vladimir Volfovich Zhirinovskiy] is even less. In actual fact this political party, despite its influential faction in the State Duma, simply does not exist. There is only one specific man —

Vladimir Volfovich Zhirinovskiy — who exists and his quite ramified "support group" whose main functions are enraptured worship of their leader, the publication and distribution of his speeches and works, and preparation for his propaganda tours and visits and the ensuring of their comfort.

His specific talent as the creator of a political formation of a new type like this enabled Zhirinovskiy until recently to react in an ultramobile manner (but in no more than the form of a kind of echo) to particular changes in the situation in the country while retaining his own personal (supraparty) "structural unity." Remaining the undoubted leader, he is not leading the masses but leading a unique psychotherapeutic process, getting his charge from the mass and charging it in turn with its own emotions. And his role as a kind of safety valve for public displeasure cannot be underestimated.

But now the LDPR leader obviously fails to understand that the party's main shock reserve — the formerly relatively popular group of regional leaders (Kobelev, Marychev, General Ustinov, and so forth) and even he himself — belong to the category of disposable political phenomena. Here the very modest personal reserves of second-rate leaders after overcoming the latest stage of the "march to power" were repeatedly jettisoned as unnecessary since they presented a real threat to the further conservation of the LDPR party monolith geared toward executing the will of just one leader. Thus, there was a gradual degradation of the personal and intellectual standard of the party cadres. The principle of irreproachable personal loyalty promoted to the rank of a basic principle of the "liberal democrats'" party building is emphasized by the fact that the party list is headed not only by many members of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's clan but also by a whole clutch of relations of his party fellows (the Zhernovskiy, Sadchikov, Karpanyu families and others). This could also have a different interpretation: In fact the last reserve, whose loyalty has unconditional and, undoubtedly, nonpolitical foundations, has been put into battle. Here, naturally, there is no question of competence or political experience.

The orientation toward the attainment of supreme power is essentially the only strategic aim and predetermines the readiness for any tactical maneuvers on this path. Zhirinovskiy's party has not had and does not have any fundamental restrictions on the permissibility of particular practical steps and ideological transformations. Openly proclaiming a strategy of justified deception of the mass of voters who, like a woman, "should be told only what she wants to hear," he has been following this strategy throughout his political career, demonstrating his cynical philosophy with regard to future political prospects: "If they trust me, good. If not, they will believe someone else."

All this creates the image of a pragmatic and unprincipled politician whose popularity is determined by his polemic talent which for a long time had no worthy adversary since such an adversary could not actually take shape among the perestroyka and post-perestroyka "leaders" educated in the traditions of nomenklatura restraint and apparatus games of closed political systems.

In fact it was Zhirinovskiy who discovered and first demonstrated to the country both the phenomenon itself and the dangers and advantages of public politics and it was on the basis of his experience that a whole generation of dilettante loudmouths and professional politicians was formed. He himself is neither one of the former nor of the latter. He has remained a self-taught amateur who still basks in the attention of the mass media and fails to notice how the last talented people are leaving his party and the television spotlights are going out one after the other.

About LDPR Program

The LDPR program slogans were always entirely short-term and their range of transformation was restricted by virtually nothing (except the leader's will): from the initial idea of "liberal democracy" which sounded fine against the background of the CPSU's political monopoly to Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's present antiliberal and antidemocratric statements. Careful analysis makes it possible easily to single out in the torrents of verbiage of any of the revelations by the chief "liberal democrat" some repetitions obviously the product of his own personality which largely comprise the LDPR's program principles.

First of all there is the utterly unrestrained (limitless) criticism, the global negativism with regard to the existing model of rule at a precise moment, whatever it might be. Vladimir Volfovich himself once called program principles of this kind a "political drug" and he was absolutely right. Psychologically "feeding" his audience, which now consists of people who are on the sidelines of life, who are embittered and almost without hope of any real improvement, and engaged in transmitting their feelings from the lofty state rostrum, Zhirinovskiy like no one else helped the formation in the masses of an orientation toward negativism or, in the language of one of his party members, he gave instructions for a masochistic "sweet despair." The main method for exerting propaganda influence and attracting attention to the LDPR was and remains appealing to the most primitive feelings — the need for love and hatred — and also the necessary projection of guilt for any misfortunes outside. The thrust of the explanatory system of all his speeches could be reduced to the following thesis: You are poor and miserable not because you work badly and hope for a fairy godmother and are failing to display initiative but because you have been robbed and duped by (then there follow options: the Communists, the Zionists, the democrats, and so forth). Hysterics, the fueling of alarmism, negativism and a sense of catastrophe from which he alone can save people comprise the main subject matter. These public politics methods undoubtedly have an analogy in V.I. Lenin, whom M. Gorkiy called "an intimidating and didactically inclined gentleman."

Here the main connecting link in the LDPR's slogans is the idea of being chosen ("we alone have the right....) based on social ("we have suffered so long in poverty and without rights....") and national slogans ("we are being humiliated and oppressed solely for being Russians").

On LDPR's Place in the Russian Political Spectrum

Initially, in 1990-1991, Zhirinovskiy's party laid claim to virtually the entire width of the political field, legally setting itself against the CPSU (as the "party of power") within the framework of the entire spectrum of slogans popular at the time from the "struggle against nomenklatura privileges" to "freedom for market relations," from "the yid-masonic plot against the Russian people" to "the defense of freedom and human rights."

As the political spectrum filled with a number of parties and movements which were really seeking to implement the ideas of the democratization and liberalization of Russian society ("democratic Russia" and so forth), Zhirinovskiy's party by 1992 had gradually moved to the left flank of the opposition and kept its popularity rating by criticizing the radical reforms which were being carried out in the country form the positions of the illusory principle of social justice and the demand for order to be introduced in the country. At this stage of the program transformation it was gripped by the whirlwind of the events of October 1993, nonparticipation in which allowed the LDPR to reap the fruit intended for the entire bloc of opposition parties.

Here it was discovered that in Russia as it was undergoing reforms the idea of blaming outside forces (and above all those enjoying Zhirinovskiy's special "love" — the CIS and Mossad) and their "agents of influence" for all our troubles was being accepted and acclaimed by the mass with unprecedented enthusiasm whereas in 1991 when this same idea was suggested by KGB head V. Kryuchkov it generated only widespread mirth. Everything has its season. V. Zhirinovskiy's talent consists in being half a step of the rest with an apposite tactical slogan and arrogating it to the whoops of mockery from the entire political beau monde and then using it to increase his own popularity until it becomes a commonplace and has been attached to some different political formation. His tactic when he finds a rich seam of gold is not to arrogate it but rapidly to take the nuggets on the surface and leave for the professionals following behind the right to organize the planned extraction of their own "percentage of the electorate." For instance, his old idea of the "aggressive nature of the NATO bloc" against Russia as it is undergoing reforms which he played with for so long is now becoming one of the main components of Russian foreign policy.

That is the strength of Zhirinovskiy the politician, but it is also his weakness.

Having taken the cream from the idea of "power nationalism" which today is being firmly used and with serious intent by the leaders of the Congress of Russian Communities, Zhirinovskiy's party is faced with a sorry choice: either settling down and playing by the common rules, finally choosing a basic ideological scheme, or again departing for the virgin territory of political radicalism, which under the present conditions of the tense election campaign is tantamount to turning the party into some marginal force increasingly sliding to the sidelines of political life. So far Zhirinovskiy has obviously not decided and is biding his time, passively maintaining interest in his person with constant scandals, lawsuits, and new brands of alcohol. In addition to "Zhirinovskiy" vodka there is beer of the same name and "President" champagne with a portrait of VVZh on the label is about to appear. And although this can be assessed as Vladimir Volfovich's usual clowning it is very symbolic: The proof strength is declining, but the amount of froth is increasing.

What Can We Expect in the Near Future?

[We can expect] The undoubted relative defeat of the LDPR (there can be no question of victory) that is the achievement of the cherished 5 percent level by the traditional method of the "party steamroller" but with enormous difficulty and on condition that substantial efforts are made to active the remains of his old electorate (there is simply no new electorate). Single-seat districts will hardly add seats to the LDPR's asserts since, geared toward the declining inertia of the imperial consciousness, Zhirinovskiy at this stage of his political career, is ignoring almost totally the problems of the Russian regions, obviously failing to withstand the competition from the Congress of Russian Communities. The party list of candidates for single-seat districts relies mainly on workers in the LDPR central apparatus, coordinators, deputies' assistants, specialists and experts, and so forth, and does not include any people of importance or renown at federal level (the only exception is the singer Yuriy Antonov). But by using only the increasingly strictly measured out central television you cannot incline Russia toward you today. The time of simple and universal slogans like "a man for every woman and a bottle for every man" has disappeared irrevocably. Russia has changed.

Several factors can serve as objective grounds for an adverse forecast of this kind.

First, the gradual cooling off of leading Russian and foreign mass media with regard to the figure of the chief "liberal democrat" which has accelerated since his scandalously frank and widely published interview with PLAYBOY. In practice there is nothing more for him to say. Moreover, today the press and television have found new idols (General A. Lebed, for instance) who have not become too familiar like Vladimir Volfovich and who are generating great interest among readers and viewers. The country is entering a new phase of its history and as a leader the mass will require not some inflammatory critic but a soldier and guard, a guarantor of stability and order. Moreover, the open conflict between Zhirinovskiy and the mass media and what is, to put it mildly, his shortsighted position ("I feel the same about all journalists: They make me sick") sooner or later had to make the LDPR leader the outcast of the information area. Zhirinovskiy's own information potential (publications like PRAVDA ZHIRINOVSKOGO and LIBERAL and SOKOLY ZHIRINOVSKOGO) have remained at the embryonic stage; the party's press service, headed by Viktor Filatov, has grown accustomed to no more than a passive role as the controller of the mass media's unremitting interest in its leader and thus lacking its own talented publicists is virtually inoperative. On the eve of the elections this fact alone at least halves the LDPR's potential.

Second, a serious problem for the "liberal democrats" is their relative victory at the previous parliamentary elections, which today they cannot exceed in quantitative terms. Then the LDPR was simply incredibly lucky — the events of October 1993 graphically demonstrating to Russians the threat of anarchy by the armed extremists and the authorities' weakness in restoring law and order literally threw the frightened mass of voters into the embraces of Zhirinovskiy's party since all the other radical opposition forces through the very fact that they had taken part in the confrontation were removed from the sphere of the legal political process and the Communists were demonstrating their fragmentation and were getting bogged down in mutual recriminations. Now the LDPR's past leadership in the majority districts in December 1993 is giving rise to a natural question among its previous and potential voters: "What have you actually done for me over these two years for me to find your party among over 40 others and vote for your election for a new term?"

Third, the originality of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's image and his manner of waging the political struggle ("our success is in our originality") which allowed him to perform miracles in the past during the very powerful final propaganda spurt, has now been partly adopted by all politicians without exception (even G. Yavlinskiy, as his recent scandalous battle with the Central Electoral Commission proved, is no stranger to tactical "Zhirinovskiy-style behavior" under the conditions of the decisive campaigning stage of the election campaign). Zhirinovskiy's usual tactics are now partly working against him. A politician who constantly makes personal attacks on his opponents in the course of public debates is at last reaping the inevitable fruit — a new generation of professional politicians is growing up who are no longer afraid to use his own public revelations as vulnerable subjects during polemics. And then Zhirinovskiy has only a glass of orange juice or something similar as a final argument against his rivals. But here, too, a bad example is contagious.

And finally the most important thing is that today Zhirinovskiy's party has virtually lost its electorate.

Electorate Problem

Servicemen who voted in their mass for the LDPR list in 1993 have a completely different attitude today toward the politician who supported the war in Chechnya and received for his last birthday the unwarranted rank of reserve lieutenant colonel. One is even a little sad that the "liberalissimus" on checking has turned out to be a "lieutenant colonel" in politics too. The figures of Generals B. Gromov and A. Lebed are incomparably higher and far more attractive to the rebellious military while officers loyal to the present authorities also have a choice: from the Russia Is Our Home movement (with General L. Rokhlin) to Polevanov's "For the Motherland!" bloc (with General Ye. Podkolzin and Admiral E. Baltin). The decision made by the government in October to increase officers' salaries and military pensioners' pensions by 50 percent is now greatly in excess of what Zhirinovskiy only promises. Pensioners who also voted for the LDPR are now entirely satisfied with the return to the ballot papers of a wide range of parties and movements of the communist and closely related patriotic spectrum traditional for them.

Groups of the population whose specific dissatisfaction with the authorities' policy could in the past have added votes for the "liberal democrats" (duped investors, Russian citizens in the near abroad, workers in stagnant sectors, and so forth) have formed their own political will in the shape of specific electoral formations and lobbying organizations defending exclusively their group interests.

Students and pupils who were formerly inspired by V. Zhirinovskiy's nontraditional self-presentation have in part (naturally) abandoned political activity and in part the political initiative has objectively been seized here by the "party of power" (Russia Is Our Home) as shown by the effect of V. Chernomyrdin's speech to students and teachers at the Moscow State University in September.

Radically minded patriots are now choosing between the Congress of Russian Communities and the "Union of Patriots" bloc. Empire restorers are inspired by the Communist Party of the Russian Federation's desire gradually to reunite the republics of the former Soviet Union and are by no means burning with the desire to "wash their boots in the Indian Ocean," beating their way across Afghanistan, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan.

The vagueness of the party's present electoral platform does not help to consolidate and relatively separate the LDPR electorate. If you remove Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's signature from the "liberal democrats'" propaganda manifesto then it is hard for a nonspecialist to guess that he has before him a document prepared in the LDPR ideological kitchen (except for the fact, unusual in political documents of republican form, that the author refers to himself in the singular). The critical part of the platform ending with the words: "I urge you, my compatriots, to say outright: enough" is unusually weak and abounds in accusations against "mad professors" and "foreign Adventists" and sometimes attacks the voters themselves who "believed their false promises." The positive part tries to present attractively the latest propaganda invention of the "liberal democrats": the ideology of the "back to the soil" movement, the defense of Russia's interests outside any forms of forcibly implanted Western influence (right up to Byzantine orthodoxy). But that idea is of itself quite vulnerable. And the party ideologists to all appearances have nothing else in reserve.

Who is left in the camp of Zhirinovskiy's potential voters?

What is left is the most undereducated and marginalized section of the population, that is people who have no specific personal or group interests and who vote exclusively because of the personal sympathy and antipathy they have formed for an image which although it has disappeared from the television screen is still encountered on bottle labels. This relatively small but on the scale of the country quite large social groups consists primarily of people who have nothing left to lose: the unemployed of pre-pension age, workers with low qualifications unable to acquire a new specialty, refugees from the trouble spots of Russia and the near abroad to whom the country can as yet give nothing except Russian citizenship and the right to vote. They comprise the electorate which may help Zhirinovskiy's party overcome the 5 percent barrier this time but on one condition — if the LDPR leader is able to give a positive account of himself to them.

Zhirinovskiy has no other way out: Behind him there are no longer social, territorial, or financial and industrial groups and he is no longer the expresser of the feelings of the broad masses. His party lives while he wins the elections. As soon as he loses it disappears and the LDPR will be forgotten in six months.

Article Discusses NDR Origins, Policies, Prospects

MM2911162295 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
25 Nov 95 p 4

[Article by IZVESTIYA Analysis Center under the "Elections-95: Portrait of a Hopeful" rubric: "The Kind of Home That Chernomyrdin Wants To Build"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "We started with the roof, and now our chief task is to create the foundations...." Viktor Chernomyrdin in conversation with journalists.

Emblem — the Russian tricolor forming a gable roof above the text "Russia is our home. On firm foundations of responsibility and experience." Clearly not a hut nor, contrary to Chernomyrdin's idea about "my home being my castle" for every Russian, a stockade, but a perfectly modern, reliable dwelling. The symbol was suggested by the leader himself, who put his palms together to form a "little house." The ruling right hand proved quite inventive.

Slogan — "Into the future with us."

Motto — "If you value your home." Key words: "Free individual. Protected people. Strong state. Order. Development. Stability."

Strength. Accurate data are lacking. According to very rough estimates — a few tens of thousands of activists. Fewer than in the LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia] or, even more so, than in the CPRF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation]. But the majority of these are the elite: the managerial, economic, entrepreneurial, cultural elite. People of real power. The "leadership" list of the NDR [Russia Is Our Home] is a complete gallery of "top persons" at the federal and regional levels. The collective portrait of the NDR is "powerful" in the highest degree.

A brief history course of the NDR could well be fitted into a few lines. In April of this year they adopted the decision, in May they gathered and founded the "Home," in September they approved the lists of candidates and the program documents, and in October they collected signatures in support of themselves. But these were just "passing episodes" in a far more lengthy and complex process than it seems at first sight.

After the breakup of the USSR Russia appeared before the world as a very strange state formation. With a full legacy of rights, sovereignty, and permanent membership of the UN Security Council, but without a real management apparatus, its own armed forces, or even border protection. What is more, without any system for regulating the economy. As a result of the " sovereignty bandwagon" and the abolition of party committees tied to the sectoral departments of the CPSU Central Committee, the administrative system also ceased functioning. The market economy, which in the late-Soviet epoch was headed in the direction of the most efficient business — the transition from "noncash" to "cash" — was threatened with collapse in the Ukrainian style, but adjusted for the Russian scale.

Initiatives in Russia were rigorously punishable, and in December 1992 the first, Gaydar reform government fell. But the ranks of the "builders of capitalism" were growing rapidly, attracting those representatives of the former elites and the newly emerged elites who were least devoted to communist orthodoxy.

The second (Chernomyrdin) reform government assumed the form of an odd conglomerate of recent "red directors" and fragments of Gaydar's team. The reforms deviated from the classic precepts and headed in the direction of redistributing property, not increasing production. A section of the party and soviet nomenklatura "turned pink" with pleasure at being a legitimate "private owner," while another section turned crimson with the righteous anger of a deprived owner. Russian capitalism was being strengthened on the basis of a unique system of nomenklatura and apparatus entrepreneurship interspersed with builders of "pyramids" and with clans of shady secondhand dealers. To set themselves up as the regime of power, they made full use of the destatization of property, the breaches in the incomplete legislation, and the chances of the "sale of the century" — Russian privatization, which they perpetrated in order somehow to bring "into the law" the raging passions of the belated epoch of primitive accumulation. But when this "basic instinct" was satisfied, the instinct for self-preservation arose, and the category of stability, inviolability of the established order of things, and definiteness became the key. But not only for the upper echelons. Despite all their dissatisfaction with the course of the reforms, the lower echelons — the emergent middle class — who were tired of nationwide vendettas, also craved stability. The corporative interest partly coincided with the public interest. The premier's idea of a strong electoral movement which would give political extremism no chance was perceived as a desire to prevent a new redistribution of power and property with all the ensuing consequences. "We do not want steep economic turns mixed up with politics," the leaders of the NDR staff declared. This idea elicited the support of leaders in the capital and the regions, of the "Great Volga" interregional association, the unions of landowners and oil industrialists of Russia, and the "Stability" deputies' group, which came together in the NDR.

The parliamentary elections that were announced and the left-wingers' offensive accelerated the process of consolidation among the powers that be.

The weakness of B. Yeltsin's electoral potential, which had become apparent by the spring of 1995, did not make it possible to form the "party of power" as a purely presidential party. This gave rise to a plan for a "two-bloc structure," control over which was to belong to the president. But the "Gold Fish" bloc was netted by Rybkin with great difficulty, whereas Chernomyrdin's "little house" was built quite quickly.

The term "party of power" elicits rebukes from the movement's leaders and has been "cranked up" by the mass media. It really is inaccurate: There is no monolithic unity of elites in present-day Russia, there is a complex and frequently collapsing conglomerate of them. But it is gravitating toward consolidation at present. Some leaders, particularly North Ossetian President Akhsarbek Galazov, urge people "not to fear" the term. For it is far more dangerous to restore the "party of power" which promises a return to the past. Stable order in the country is by no means only the whim of those who wish to hold on to power. Despite all the negative nuance of the definition, we should ask ourselves this question: The party of which power is it preferable for the country to have at its helm?

Leaders. Premier V. Chernomyrdin, the director N. Mikhalkov, and General L. Rokhlin are the "first numbers" on the NDR's federal list.

Viktor Stepanovich Chernomyrdin, born in 1938 in the Cossack village of Chernyy Ostrog, Saraktashskiy Rayon, Orenburg Oblast, started work at the age of 17. In 1966 he graduated from Kuybyshev Polytechnical Institute, and in 1972 from the economics faculty of the All-Union Correspondence Polytechnical Institute.

A pupil and alumnus of the party apparatus and a "typical representative" of that part of it which displayed enviable pragmatism and agility in adapting to the postcommunist situation, he held leading posts in the gas sector. When corporations started to be created on the basis of the major sectors of the state economy, he headed the "Gazprom" Concern. On heading the Russian Government in December 1992, he strengthened its positions in the system of organs of executive power.

In late 1994 and early 1995 a new, almost charismatic image of Chernomyrdin began to take shape as a responsible statesman and someone with his feet firmly on the ground. Such home-grown capitalism with a human face, which "values your home" — not "Gazprom" but Russia. No "ifs" there at all. The premier-leader's "moral actions," of which NDR campaign director S. Belyayev speaks, were crowned by his dramatic intervention in the course of events in Budennovsk. The episode with NTV's sensational "Kukli" program, at first sight not very significant, when the premier "chatted" with a television caricature of himself in his own office, showed a person so different from the images of power-based arrogance and political hypocrisy. On top of everything else, he has a favorable attitude to the "fourth estate."

After June Chernomyrdin the politician emerged from the president's shadow and the shady politics of his multilayer entourage. Attempts were made to "cut him down to size" — in the matter of negotiations with Chechnya. He is now waging a struggle for the electorate of "the duped," pensioners, and have-nots — this chief reserve of the left-wing, radical forces' command — and is seeking and, so he maintains, finding funds for them in an attempt to correct the dangerous listing of desecrated "social justice."

The "No. 2" on the NDR list — Nikita Sergeyevich Mikhalkov — came to participate in this movement after a half-century life rich in discoveries in art and a quest for "his own place" in politics. An "Oscar" winner in 1995, in the past he repeatedly approached the prize from various positions. In 1989 he was Metropolitan Pitirim's agent in the elections of USSR people's deputies; following scandalous press exposes of the hierarch, he organized the campaign for his rehabilitation. He worked as adviser to Ivan Silayev, prime minister of the Russian Government, on questions of culture and cultural links with foreign countries. At the time of the attempted coup d'etat in August 1991 he was among the defenders of the White House. For a long time he was a colleague of Aleksandr Rutskoy, but subsequently their paths and views diverged significantly. He explains his joining the NDR movement as a step forced by awareness of the inadmissibility of replacing the system, "for this could lead to revolutionary upheavals and new bloodshed." This admission by an artist, businessman, and politician characterizes very accurately the position and sentiments of that section of the "middle class" which has already become "settled" and does not wish for further "debilitation from the glare of too much sunlight" ["utomleniye solntsem"].

Gen. Lev Yakovlevich Rokhlin was born in 1947. Just one year after graduating from Tashkent Combined-Arms Command School he commanded a company, and one year later he was recommended for early promotion and the order of the Red Star. After graduating with distinction from the Frunze Academy, in the space of five years' service he received two military ranks ahead of schedule — major and lieutenant colonel.

During 1982-1984 he fought in Afghanistan and was wounded twice. In June 1993 he became commander of the 8th Volgograd Army Corps and chief of Volgograd Garrison, and in 1995 he commanded the Northern Grouping of Federal Troops in Chechnya.

The NDR election platform skillfully transforms Stolypin's celebrated maxim "We need a great Russia, they need great upheavals." In the context of the idea of "a great Russia without great upheavals" it proclaims resolute rejection of support for any "radical forces, either right-wing or left-wing, which seek to destroy the order and stability which Russia is starting to acquire with incredible difficulty." Here the emphasis is placed on strong power.

The movement's priorities include the country's unity and the development of free and equal peoples and regions within the framework of the unified Federation. "We see the guarantee of the Russian State's unity and integrity in the strengthening of the principles of federalism, the development of the single market, and equal rights for all citizens on the country's territory," the "Platform" states. It is also geared to "establishing civil peace, ending ethnic conflicts, and achieving interethnic accord."

The program thesis about "strong federal power headed by the president" is supplemented by "an efficient government free from petty tutelage by parliament" and "a professional parliament which must adopt laws and not hold aimless debates on political questions."

Another program demand is also not without interest — "reform the ideology of reforms," for "the liberal stage of the reforming of the Russian economy is over, and the main economic tasks today are the encouragement of the accumulation of national capital to ensure Russia's steady economic growth and the building of a mixed, socially oriented economic system."

The foreign policy section of the program proceeds from the premise that Russia "was, is, and will be a great world power." In fact, operating in the same ideological field as the opposition, the NDR proclaims a foreign policy which will abandon "the practice of unilateral concessions," naturally to the West. At the same time the movement emphasizes "the development of the CIS countries' strong integration," also, of course, under Russia's auspices.

"We are conscious of ourselves as a movement of the broad center," the authors of the "Platform" declare, developing their leader's idea of the NDR as the center of attraction of all truly democratic reformist forces. In a certain sense, as the "center" which he personifies.

Probably the chief question for Russia and for all of us now is this: How great is the force of attraction of this "center," and is it capable of effectively countering the alliance of the left-wing radical opposition which is taking shape?

Expert Appraisal. Analysis. Prognosis

As distinct from the preelection fall of 1993, when conditions for forming coalitions were complicated by a general shortage of time and when a number of potential participants in the election marathon were "knocked out" as a result of the events of 3-4 October, the spectrum of the participants in the present elections is far more subdivided in all its sectors. It is now clear what kind of a list will face the voters 17 December — over 40 titles, which mean little, could predetermine the "chance" vote accounting for a significant percentage. Normal scores are only possible in those instances where the corresponding parties and movements (and their leaders above all) have somehow managed to "set lights flashing" in the mass consciousness.

For the NDR process of "setting lights flashing" has been primarily unfavorable to it. Despite the closeness to the present authorities of several parties and political structures which are going into the elections in December, only the NDR openly assumes responsibility for the state of affairs in the country. Along with the burden of extensive discontent at the situation that has taken shape. Russians' actual material position "votes" against the NDR: During the period from January through September 1995 the income per family fell 12 percent compared with the corresponding period of last year.

"We understand perfectly the whole complexity of the election campaign of the movement headed by the prime minister," the coordinators of the NDR campaign declare. "It cannot be otherwise. The cabinet, to whose lot has fallen the most complex period in the life of the country, cannot be very popular.... And yet Chernomyrdin has gotten things moving. The worst is behind us...."

But it is far harder for the "Home" to fight for the electorate than it is for its main rivals, which are boosting their popularity rating by criticizing the powers that be. The opinion of Russia's chief expert — Yeltsin, who at first promised the NDR 8-12 percent of the votes but then a whole 20 percent — is highly questionable. But the NDR's "harvest" could prove quite sufficient to try to form a coalition of "moderate" groupings and independent deputies in order to preserve the backbone of the government team. This is extremely important from the viewpoint of stability and the predictability of Russian policy in the critical first half of 1996, when the upcoming presidential election will exert an increasingly strong influence on the actions of the executive and the legislature.

What is important is not the extent to which the voices of "left-wingers" and "patriots" will grow stronger in the Duma but precisely the ability of the desired coalition to strengthen the government's parliamentary positions so as to ensure that it is sufficiently stable to overcome the pressure of the clans competing within the executive itself. Will the future factions of the parties in the democratic spectrum be able to cooperate worthily with it? If so, we will have an opportunity — with a serious projection into the future — to see how Chernomyrdin the premier will implement the program aims of Chernomyrdin the NDR leader. On the whole, they seem perfectly realizable — on condition that there is stability and no "revolutionary upheavals."

Russian Mediator Views Karabakh Talks in Bonn

LD2911134395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1225 GMT 29 Nov 95

[By Gennadiy Temnenkov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] BONN, November 29 (ITAR-TASS) — A Minsk group of the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) continues its "painstaking work to find ways to overcome disagreements between conflicting sides" in a long-lasting dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the mountainous Nagorno-Karabakh region, Valentin Lozinskiy, Russian co-chairman of the Minsk Group, said on Wednesday.

Lozinskiy told ITAR-TASS that the Group had already considered a draft agreement and its four enclosures, and the co-chairpersons are working on a report for the forthcoming OSCE Foreign Ministers meeting in Budapest.

The Russian diplomat pointed out that the talks had passed their preliminary stage, and that it was the time to discuss key issues of the deal.

However, "it is too early to talk about any results. The talks are rather tense", Lozinskiy noted.

ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 1 Dec

LD0112075095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0736 GMT 1 Dec 95

["Press Review" — ITAR-TASS headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, December 1 (ITAR-TASS) — KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA frontpages an interview with Zaki Zainulin, Dr of Science (Technology), former staff member of the Defence Ministry and an expert on nuclear weapons.

Zainulin maintains that Chechnya is full of nuclear weapons which are reconned as dozens if not hundreds. He said he saw weapons left behind by Russian troops in Chechnya with his own eyes.

ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA comments on the dismissal of deputy Minister of Defence.

In an article headlined "Minister Grachev does not play military games. Which is no less dangerous" the newspaper points out that the Defence Minister, it turns out, does not know that his deputy Vorobev was dismissed. In response to a question asked at a meeting of the Ministry collegium Grachev said he had no complaints about General Vorobev and that he did not dismiss him. He said he did not know why, what for the General has been penalised and put on retirement. This is reportedly give rise to a strong reaction from Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin who was utterly surprised at such a gesture of the Defence Minister.

ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA on the chosen representatives of the people.

Natalya Bachurina writes in an article that Duma members swap factions, transfer from faction to faction at ease. Without a risk to be dismissed from parliament they part with parties and blocs on whose tickets they had been elected to the parliament. At the vanity fair of the election struggle too many represent not so much Russia as themselves with their own interests, the woman journalist concludes.

IZVESTIYA on the spinning of 60,000 million roubles by financial entities.

Yuriy Chernichenko who has returned from the Altay writes that the funds assigned to the territory by the state for a purchase of 100,000 tonnes of weat disappeared and recently turned up at a New York bank. The Federal Security Service has been unable to find the culbrits. The Altay farmers blame Moscow and democrats on all such things, the journalist quoted.

IZVESTIYA carries an interview with Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev.

The interviewer Leonid Mlechin enquired about Kozyrev's morale following of the perturbations connected with his near dismissal by the President and then his remaining at the post.

Kozyrev in the government is the last radical democrat of the first involvement and elightened and educated Westerniser liberal and intellectual. Not withstanding that he managed to querel even with those who use to sympathise with him at one time he is infinitely alone: all friends disappeared and he did not make new ones, the journalist concluded.

ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI carried out its own inquiry into the case connected with the unlawful manipulations with a nature reserve of the Baltic sea shore. An article by Natalya Vdovina describes how a "wonderful nature reserve of the Baltic sea shore" was nearly sold to a German firm with a knowledge of the administration of Kaliningrad region.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA today runs the first article in honour of great military leader Georgiy Zhukov whose birth centinary will be marked next year. "With the help of readers we plan to describe the life and combat of Georgiy Zhukov and reveal more fully the facets of his military talents. His elder daughter Margarita Zhukova is the first to describe him.

Newspapers report that Boris Yeltsin has been officially nominated as a candidate for the presidency for the second term.

Moscow Not Satisfied With Explanations of Article

LD3011184695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1802 GMT 30 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, November 30 (Itar-Tass) — The Russian side is not fully satisfied with explanations submitted by the United States regarding a recently published article written on the political situation in Russia by an American diplomat.

Russian foreign ministry spokesman Mikhail Demurin confirmed the receipt of demanded explanations from the U.S. State Department. He was replying to a query by Itar-Tass as to whether or not any official response has been received to the protest lodged with the U.S. embassy in Moscow on Friday regarding an article published by the embassy's first secretary Thomas Graham in the Russian newspaper "Nezavisimaya Gazeta" (Independent newspaper).

Demurin, however, emphasized "the Russian side does not regard them fully satisfactory". "Nonetheless, at the present stage, we deem it fit to restrict ourselves to warnings given to the American side", he said.

The Russian foreign ministry official spokesman once again reiterated "in case of a repetition of such incident most stringent measures will be taken".

Grachev Sends Memo to Yeltsin on NATO Talks

LD3011160695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1413 GMT 30 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Nov 30 (Interfax) — Russian President Boris Yeltsin has received a memorandum on Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev's talks in Brussels, an informed source reported to Interfax today.

The document underlines the expediency of devising "a consultative mechanism" within NATO's Council to politically control actions by Russian peace-keepers in an operation by multinational forces in Bosnia.

Under the agreements Grachev reached with NATO's defense chiefs in Brussels, political control over the operation in Bosnia will be exerted by a special consultative body. Politically, actions by NATO's forces will be controlled through NATO's Council and actions by the Russian contingent through a consultative mechanism, which bring Russia closer to NATO's political structures, the source noted.

It is assumed that this body will have consultative functions with regard to NATO's actions in Bosnia and will have the final say and the right of veto on the use of the Russian contingent.

"If Yeltsin approves the accords Grachev reached with NATO's Defense Ministers in Brussels, the military and foreign departments can be asked soon to prepare recommendations on the issue," the source said.

These recommendations will make up the basis of a memorandum on mutual understanding between NATO and Russia and on the formation of a consultative body. Moscow plans to sign this document in December before a conference on Bosnia in Paris.

Russia's Ambassador in Belgium Vitaly Churkin is expected to take over the consultative mechanism.

Grachev Seen Overshadowing Kozyrev

MK3011132295 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 30 Nov 95 pp 1, 4

[Report by Georgiy Bovt under the "Situation in Ex-Yugoslavia" rubric: "Partnership With NATO Begins With 'European Beirut'"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A NATO contingent has been formed and prepared to be sent to Bosnia so as to force the warring factions to comply with the agreement that was initialed in Dayton a week ago. The peace treaty itself is planned to be signed in Paris in mid-December. A total of 60,000 NATO servicemen — the Americans accounting for one-third of them — will be deployed in Bosnia with the status of an occupying army. Apart from the alliance's 16 countries, at least 10 other countries plan to send in troops. There will also be a small Russian contingent, which prompts politicians once again to argue about the problems of relations between Russia and NATO. Georgiy Bovt comments.

The main forces will be made up of American, British, and French troops. The first will be deployed in the northeast, at Tuzla, as the core of a "multinational division," which will also include the Russians. The second, in Gorni Vakuf in central Bosnia; and the third, in southern Mostar. Yet President Clinton may run into big problems with the Congress over the dispatch of U.S. troops (about 20,000). The Republican majority in both houses directly links its consent to finance the Bosnian operation (for which purpose the president needs at least $7 billion) to the White House's concessions on the stalled budget talks. The critics of such a massive American landing force (this will be the United States' largest military operation since the Gulf war), who are fairly numerous in America, recall Reagan's ill-starred operation in Lebanon. At the time the dispatch of 2,000 U.S. Marines ended in their ignominious evacuation from Beirut after a terrorist attack perpetrated against the U.S. troops (18 American soldiers were killed in the blast). This time, Clinton vowed publicly before the country that he would be responsible for every American soldier killed in the Balkans.

Meanwhile, losses among both American and non-American servicemen may turn out to be considerable. The issue is not only that after many years of war the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims will find it difficult to utter a sacramental "A Farewell to Arms," but also that the "peace plan" whose drafting took such pains in Dayton looks too unreliable. Radovan Karadzic, militant leader of the Bosnian Serbs, said immediately that the Dayton accords are unacceptable to him. Later he clarified his stance, however, saying that he is only in favor of further negotiations on Sarajevo, not of resuming the war. A lack of agreements acceptable to all conflicting sides on this or that question (history has shown that there has never been a "territorial consensus" in the "patchwork" Balkans) threatens to turn Sarajevo into a "European Beirut" — and Bosnia, wholly carved up into enclaves, zones, and autonomies, into a "European Lebanon." [passage omitted]

Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, who used to play a more visible role in Russian contacts with NATO, this time around watched the defense minister's successes from Moscow, sometimes accompanying his observations with undiplomatically harsh remarks to the effect that the Foreign Ministry is not consulted and its opinion is no longer sought. The Defense Ministry countered that it has no differences with the Foreign Ministry whatsoever. But Kozyrev insisted that they do have differences. As he said in an interview for the Moscow Television Channel on Tuesday [28 November], there has been "a fairly wide range of views" in the Russian leadership over the past year or year and a half regarding relations with NATO. While "all Russian leaders are opposed to NATO's rash and unwise" eastward expansion, some, as Kozyrev put it, "suggest that an ostrich stance be adopted and NATO be ignored, while others, including me, stand for cooperation and partnership," to which there is no alternative, and there is no arguing with the minister about that.

Generally speaking, recently Andrey Kozyrev has been producing the impression of a person who has achieved a greater degree of inner freedom than he had before. He straightforwardly and calmly talks about his possible resignation after the elections. To all appearances, the idea does not oppress him and does not have an impact on his line of conduct in his present capacity. The minister, who has long been criticized at various levels for his ministry's ineffective coordination of foreign policy activity, finally said aloud what has hitherto been only whispered in Foreign Ministry corridors: Not only does the ministry lack controlling functions in foreign policy, but its coordinating functions, too, are limited, while "the country's leadership itself needs a good deputy to supervise the implementation of the decisions it makes," a supreme arbiter of sorts who can "bang his fist on the table and say: 'So be it!'" While acknowledging the existence of differences inside the Russian political elite, Kozyrev honestly admitted that he is unable to resolve this problem. Coordination and banging one's fist on the table are the president's prerogative.

As for Grachev's mission and the formalization of Russia's role in Bosnia, the head of the Foreign Ministry should have known better than to envy him, for it is difficult even to imagine the outcry the irreconcilable opposition would have raised had Kozyrev himself gone to hold talks with NATO now that Russia is not in a position to insist on a weightier representation in Bosnia. But maybe this is how it was actually conceived by those who carry out the coordinating functions...

Kozyrev Interviewed on NATO, Relations With Yeltsin

MM3011163895 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Dec 95 p 4

[Report on interview with Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev by Leonid Mlechin; place and date not given: "For a Diplomat, Becoming a Minister Is a Disaster. Andrey Kozyrev Realized This Five Years Too Late"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The case of Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev proves that there is life after death. After hearing President Yeltsin's words, the whole world in effect said good-bye to Kozyrev as a minister, but he is still in charge of Russian diplomacy and is trying to assure everyone (and himself too, maybe) that nothing much really happened.

After a talk of nearly two hours with the minister, I can confirm that the official Kozyrev is just as calm and assured of himself as before. He is in excellent form, bright and fresh, and is hoping to become a Duma deputy again and to win the president's love and attention. Andrey Kozyrev talks in a half-whisper, smiles ironically, looks his interlocutor straight in the eye, and finds a diplomatic answer to any question.

When I called on the minister he was reading a TASS report on the talks between Pavel Grachev and his American colleague Perry in Brussels.

"Do you get your information on these talks from TASS, minister?" I asked in amazement.

"When Pavel Sergeyevich comes back he will provide rather more detail," Kozyrev replied, unperturbed.

When Minister Grachev left for Brussels, Minister Kozyrev said that the Foreign Ministry knew nothing about this trip. By the time of my arrival Minister Kozyrev had regained his accustomed tone:

"When people say that the military have taken on other people's functions, I don't agree with that. It would be absurd if they did not conduct talks on purely military matters."

"Do you ever lose control of yourself and raise your voice? — I asked Kozyrev.

"Rarely. There's absolutely no point in that."

There was one question I had to ask:

"After President Yeltsin stated in intolerable, humiliating terms that he was going to relieve you of the post of minister, why did you yourself not resign immediately?"

[Kozyrev] "The next morning we were due to fly to the United States, and at the airport I said: It's probably no use my going, it would be expedient to resign. The president replied: I was misunderstood, I'm going to explain it all to the journalists myself shortly. I felt that resigning on the eve of the president's visit would mean weakening the state's position in the talks. It would be like soldiers having a showdown during a reconnaissance operation."

[Mlechin] "So you are likening the visit to a combat operation?"

[Kozyrev] "I am very committed to partnership, to cooperation, but I am a statesman and I regard partnership as a means of defending national, state interests.

"During the trip the president and I were in close and perfectly friendly contact, but I decided to clear the air on our return. But Boris Nikolayevich fell ill, and our talk took place in the Central Clinical Hospital. The result was the president's statement that he supports the foreign minister."

[Mlechin] "So you came to the conclusion that the president's words were a slip of the tongue, rather than a firm decision to remove you?"

[Kozyrev] "I will have to examine calmly what was behind those words and what was behind the later expression of support for me. It will take time."

Andrey Kozyrev says that, of course, sooner or later he will have to leave his rather gloomy office, which is still furnished with Molotov's furniture. But he wants it to be as late as possible. He can probably find plenty of arguments in favor of his decision to stay on as minister. It is not yet known who will be put in his place, and while he is minister he can, after all, still influence policy in a sensible direction and safeguard the country from obvious stupidities....

[Mlechin] "Do you feel confident within the ministry? Your former first deputy, who is now ambassador to Britain, writes a memorandum to the president proposing a change in foreign policy; the president himself appoints another deputy under you; your adviser General Boris Gromov is conducting an election campaign with different slogans from yours...."

[Kozyrev] "Look at my colleagues. Take the Armed Forces — every general has his own party. We still have a long way to go before we reach that level."

There is a feeling that Russian foreign policy is rushing to and fro like a nervous young girl. First Moscow agrees to sign NATO's "Partnership for Peace" program, then it refuses. First it threatens the Americans, then it embraces them. First it says: We will not be under NATO in Bosnia, then it backtracks. What is this: incompetence on the part of the Russian diplomatic service? Inability on the part of the president to formulate a foreign policy?

[Kozyrev] "There is no consensus in society, and that is projected onto politics. For instance, as far as NATO is concerned, the fundamental question has not yet been decided: Do we want partnership, or do we not know ourselves what we want, or do we want confrontation? Mutually exclusive positions are constantly coming into conflict. One of the three possible positions is chosen today, another tomorrow."

[Mlechin] "What three positions do you mean?"

[Kozyrev] "First: to threaten NATO. Such threats are being made. For instance, there is the call for the creation of an anti- NATO, that is, a bloc of states to counterpose the North Atlantic bloc. The states belonging to the CIS told us immediately that they do not want to join such a bloc. The second position: to do nothing, and to ignore NATO, so to speak, in consideration of internal disagreements.

"I hold the third point of view: to develop partnership relations with NATO, while objecting to the bloc's expansion.

"Our usual grievance against NATO is: You don't consult us! How are they going to consult us, unless we ourselves create a consultation mechanism and create a climate of confidence.

"But that is a two-way street. If we want NATO to know our viewpoint and take it into account, then we must be prepared to take account of NATO's positions to the same extent."

Kozyrev is not the only person who would like to understand why Boris Yeltsin suddenly stated his intention of dismissing his minister. Maybe it was only a manifestation of the unlimited eccentricity that is characteristic of our president. But for all his eccentricity, the president knew very well that nobody would stand up for Kozyrev, he has no support.

The national socialist flank has always hated the minister. Not counting Yeltsin himself, Andrey Kozyrev is the last of the first batch of radical democrats in the government, and he is, moreover, an educated and cultivated Westernizer, a liberal, an intellectual, and smart with it. Kozyrev said to me:

"The Western democracies are Russia's natural partners and allies. I have never given up that idea, and I will keep it until I die."

But Kozyrev has contrived in the past two or three years to quarrel even with those who have always been sympathetic to him.

[Mlechin] "After you left 'Russia's Choice,' having parted with your recent comrades over attitudes to the Chechen war, you have been left in total isolation as a politician. Doesn't that frighten you?"

[Kozyrev] "It doesn't frighten me or worry me. I am left in isolation among the groupings in Moscow political life. But these are elite groups that have no firm base in the country. The fact that various groupings are not going to vote for me does not worry me much. What is more important is how the voters in my district vote."

Kozyrev read me a little lecture on how politics cannot be stagnant and dogmatic, how it must take realities into account and react to them.

[Kozyrev] "But my political views have essentially not changed."

And it is true: Kozyrev's views have not changed. From year to year he has only "corrected," as he puts it, his political line and his vocabulary. He calls himself a "statesman" more often than a "democrat." The new terminology has put his old friends off, and apparently he has acquired no new friends.

[Kozyrev] "We have more than 40 electoral blocs. And they all criticize government policy. And they will criticize, whatever I say to them. It would be odd if they did not criticize the government, because then the question would arise: Why vote for you, if the present cabinet is not bad?"

But the few surviving radical democrats deemed Kozyrev a renegade who values his job more than anything else. Why didn't he go, like, say, Yegor Gaydar? People would have respected him for his principles. He stayed because he does not want to abandon what he has begun to do. Anatoliy Chubays stayed too. A sort of theory of small achievements. And you don't know whether to blame him for being unprincipled or praise him for being consistent.

Andrey Kozyrev reached the absolute pinnacle of his profession at a relatively young age. What will Andrey Kozyrev do when he stops being a minister?

[Kozyrev] "It's a big problem. When a construction worker, an engineer, or a mathematician enters politics, he can always go back to his trade. My trade is diplomacy, but I can't go back to it. So for a professional diplomat to become foreign minister is not the pinnacle of his career, it's a disaster."

When I switched off the tape recorder Andrey Kozyrev seemed to relax, and for a moment he stopped being a minister. He became nicer and more human. But I saw with sympathy that he is no celestial being, protected from our troubles and fears by his high post, the Kremlin guard, and a sense of ironic imperturbability.

I told the minister I had recently watched an old video newsreel. Five years ago the new minister looked genial and optimistic, although he obviously had character, which was why, in one article, I called him a "teddy bear with an iron heart." Not so many years have passed, but the minister no longer reminds a teddy bear.

"Who could have known it would all turn out this way?" — the minister said sorrowfully as I left.

It was probably not his own fate he was thinking of.

Troops To Remain in Croatia After Mandate Expires

LD3011164195 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1413 GMT 30 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Nov 30 (Interfax) — Russian peacekeepers based in Eastern Slavonia (Croatia) and in the region of Sarajevo (Bosnia) will stay there after November 30 when their mandate expires, a high-ranking Russian diplomat told Interfax Thursday.

"The U.N. security Council is likely to ensure the technical prolongation of these mandates," said the diplomat. "Thus both operations will gradually acquire a new quality."

Under an agreement, the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia is to evolve into a multinational operation under NATO aegis. As to the operation in Eastern Slavonia, its character is to be determined by Zagreb and the Eastern Slavonian Serbs with the active participation of the U.N. security Council and the international contact group (Russia, the United States, Britain, France and Germany), said the source.

"The transitional period will last for about two months," he pointed out. "In these conditions, the technical prolongation of the mandates is to ensure further financing of peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Eastern Slavonia," said the diplomat.

Adamishin Praises Balkan Settlement

LD3011214595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2057 GMT 30 Nov 95

[By diplomatic correspondents Aleksandr Korzun, Igor Porshnev, Yevgeniy Terekhov; from the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Nov 30 (Interfax) — Russian Ambassador in London Anatoliy Adamishin described the agreements reached in Dayton, Ohio, as a big step towards comprehensive settlement in the Balkans. Now it is necessary to move forward and avoid hostilities in the future, he said.

At the same time he expressed concern about the alarming tendency to embellish the role of Russia in the process.

"I think the tendency is alarming because we may eventually suffer from the lack of fair self-esteem and of unbiased estimation of our own abilities, like it happened not long ago," said Adamishin.

Speaking about the assessment of Dayton agreements in Britain, Adamishin said that the British see them as the least of all evils. They see that the Bosnian Serbs are most dissatisfied with the agreements, especially with the territorial division of Bosnia. "However, they missed their chance a year ago and have been eventually bombed into accepting the settlement. If they try to change anything by force now, their fate will be even more sad. They seem to understand that," he said.

Adamishin said that the U.S. involvement was key to reaching the agreements and that the United States has the full right to claim credit for the peace accord.

He pointed out the fact that "the Americans remained rather indifferent towards the participation in such settlements for almost three and a half years" but then got interested.

It is openly admitted that Bosnia became an issue of the U.S. election campaign and that the reelection is at stake.

"As a result, and they say not without western help, Zagreb seized Krajina (Serb-populated part of Croatia — IF Note) and carried out the major ethnic cleansing by expelling tens of thousands of Serbs from the lands where they have lived for centuries," recalled Adamishin.

Then NATO, without consulting with Moscow and despite our protests, carried out massive air strikes against Bosnian Serbs, which in fact was "an armed interference not sanctioned by the U.N. in the internal conflict, and against only one of the sides," said the ambassador. After the NATO bombing, Moslems and Croats launched their offensive, he said.

After the Serbs were neutralized, the talks entered their decisive phase, said Adamishin.

According to the British, the talks were conducted "in the purely American style, on a large scale," he said.

"I was stricken by one detail — the relief map of Bosnia, a computer miracle worth millions of dollars, in Dayton. The map had been used to teach pilots who would carry out air strikes, and in Dayton a team of several dozens of computer experts and topographers immediately marked on the map the changes agreed on by the sides," said Adamishin.

"Some say that Americans did not allow even their NATO allies to get close to the map," he said. Small wonder that the role of other Contact Group members, including that of Russia, seemed relatively insignificant, said Adamishin.

The U.S. involvement must not be underestimated, he said. Perhaps, the agreements could have not been reached without it and they could not be of a different nature. "But anyway, even the suspension of war is a good thing," said the ambassador.

Adamishin believes that Russia must have a clear view of all the components of the settlement, plan all its possible actions in advance and not limit itself to a single variant.

According to him, Moscow must not "be ashamed to say what is unsuitable for it." Currently, post-confrontation models of relations between Russia and the United States and between Russia and NATO are being created, and the future will largely depend on how we show ourselves now," said Adamishin.

Paper Acknowledges U.S. Leadership on Bosnia

MM0112103295 Moscow TRUD-7 in Russian 1-7 Dec 95 p 2

[Article by Erik Alekseyev: "The Balkans. Asserting Leadership. Washington's Bosnia Operation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] There is still shooting going on somewhere in Bosnia, and in Sarajevo the Serbs are demonstrating, but the prevailing opinion is that on the whole the conflagration of war has been dampened down and it is very important not to let it flare up again.

Right now the sides are thrashing out the details of the measures which are supposed to ensure implementation of the Bosnia peace settlement agreements initialed in the United States. They will be signed in Paris 14 December.

U.S. President Bill Clinton is trying to convince Congress of the need to send 20,000 U.S. officers and men to Bosnia. In an address on national television from the Oval Office Monday evening he once more argued that case and outlined the general U.S. aims in the region. First, the participation of U.S. servicemen in NATO's operations, he stated, will help end the war in the former Yugoslavia. Second, it will help protect the main democratic values in the world. Third, and without feigning naive altruism, the U.S. President stressed that all this **serves U.S. national strategic interests.** To fulfill these tasks **the United States must take the lead in the Bosnian settlement. Unless U.S. troops are sent,** he said, **"our ability to act as leader in relations with our European allies and in the world as a whole will be questioned."**

To be fair to Washington, it has not asserted its role as leader in "forible peacemaking" in various parts of the world without cost to itself in the literal sense. That point among others is made by THE BOSTON GLOBE, which lists eight instances in which U.S. troops have been sent to other countries in the 20 years since the Vietnam War defeat. Here are some of them.

1982-1984. Some 1,900 U.S. officers and men were deployed in Lebanon. The result of their participation in the international forces — 266 Americans dead, 169 wounded.

1989-1990. Around 23,000 U.S. servicemen sent into action in Panama. Losses: 23 dead, 324 wounded.

1990-1991. The major U.S. operation in the war against Iraq. Some 541,000 officers and men were sent. Losses during the Desert Shield and Desert Storm campaigns: 392 Americans dead, 467 wounded.

1992-1993. The humanitarian operation in Somalia involving 25,800 U.S. servicemen: 25 dead, 153 wounded.

Not all of the U.S. operations ended victoriously. Regarding the present operation in Bosnia, President Clinton has given an assurance that it "will be conducted successfully because our mission has clear and limited goals and our troops have the power and are very well trained."

Russia is also clarifying its place and role in the Bosnia peace settlement. Russian Federation Defense Minister Pavel Grachev has held talks at NATO's Brussels headquarters in the past few days. His main partner, of course, was U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry.

On the question of elaborating the mechanism for the Russian contingent's participation in the Bosnia operation, it is reported that the sides' experts "have entered the home straight." That means there is still some way to go before the finish line, and therefore the final decision has still to be made. At the same time it has been confirmed that General Leontiy Shevtsov, the commander of the Russian brigade, will be deputy to the commander of the international forces under the NATO banner.

Meanwhile a consultative mechanism is being established which envisages consultations between the NATO Council and Russia's representative before decisions are made on the Bosnia operation at the NATO Council. But Russia's opinion will be taken into account only on matters relating to the use of the Russian troops. The whole course of the operation will be under the NATO Council's political control.

On this occasion Pavel Grachev confirmed Russia's adherence to the Olympian principle: The main thing is to take part. "The important thing," he stressed, "is Russia's very presence in NATO's top political body, even with only a consultative voice, the right to express its opinion."

Expert Doubts Wisdom of Bosnia Involvement

MK3011141395 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 28 Nov 95 p 2

[Analysis by Vladimir Frolov, candidate of historical sciences: "What Are We To Do in Bosnia When There Is Chechnya? The State Should Primarily Take Care of Its Own Citizens"]

[FBIS Translated Text] President Yeltsin and Defense Minister Grachev are animatedly discussing with the Americans the question of participation of the Russian military contingent in the upcoming peace implementation operation in Bosnia. Great passions have arisen over a minor problem: Will Russian soldiers take their orders from NATO generals or will they remain loyal to their domestic fathers/commanders? Meanwhile, none of the top Russian officials will give the Russian public an answer to the two most important questions: Why send our troops to Bosnia in the first place, and how much will this cost — in terms of the lives of Russian soldiers and the percentage of state budget expenditures?

Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev in a TV interview was literally forced by the persistent program host Boris Notkin to make some explanations on this count. Russia's interest in Bosnia, according to Kozyrev, is to stop the bloodshed and reconcile the warring sides. To be sure, this sounds lofty. But it is not clear how the bloodshed in Bosnia affects the lives of ordinary Russians. Unlike the Bosnian conflict, the ongoing bloodshed in Chechnya, where Russian soldiers are dying every day, affects the lives of Russians very directly.

Even less understandable to a common citizen are the attempts to justify the dispatch of our troops to Bosnia with the purported need to support Russia's involvement in resolving this most important issue of European politics and also to maintain and consolidate Russian influence in the region. It would not be amiss in this connection to recall that Russia continues to be kept in the anteroom of the European Council not owing to [its] insufficient activity in the Bosnian settlement process, but because of its somewhat "un-European" methods of treating its own population in Chechnya. "Maintaining involvement" is too vague a policy goal to justify the quite probable deaths of our military servicemen in Bosnia.

It seems that deliveries of Russian natural gas to Sarajevo and gasoline to Belgrade can do more for "preserving involvement in European affairs" and "consolidating Moscow's influence in the region" than 2,000 lightly armed paratroopers in the Posavin corridor, exposed to fire from all sides.

The following arguments in favor of Russian military involvement in the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia, often cited by the enlightened elite, are downright remarkable for their disrespect for the immediate interests of the Russian people. We are told that this will be a "useful experience" of direct military interaction between Russia and NATO, united by a common goal, which will presumably help develop strategic partnership between Moscow and Brussels, which embodies the entire West.

It appears, therefore, that Russia is in fact indifferent as to how the Bosnian issue will be resolved in the end. It is more important that this process should lead to a strengthening of partnership with NATO.

The West will certainly benefit from Russia's sharing responsibility for the course and outcome of the peace implementation operation planned predominantly in Brussels. In a certain sense Russia's participation is necessary to the West in order to dilute its NATO content somewhat, making the whole undertaking acceptable to the Serbs.

The West's interest is understandable and legitimate. It reflects the calculation — often performed publicly — of the possible dividends and costs of the upcoming operation. But the results of such a calculation for Russia — if it has ever been done — are unknown.

Nor is there any clarity in the question — important not only from a purely military point of view — of which specific tasks the Russian peacekeepers are to address in Bosnia.

The West is making no secret that NATO troops will, if necessary, force the warring sides toward peace. Anticipating the possibility of large-scale combat action by peacekeepers in Bosnia, the United States and other states of the alliance insist on a pure NATO command of operations and are categorically against any "dual key" arrangements. Russia's rejection of NATO should presumably exclude our peacekeepers from performing combat missions; otherwise, the problem of command becomes insoluble in principle.

There are reports that something resembling a Russian military construction battalion of approximately 2,000 servicemen is planned to be sent to Bosnia — however, not engineers or construction workers but paratroopers who, jointly with analogous U.S. units, will engage in "restoration work," i.e. clearing mines on roads, bridges, and so forth. Even so, Defense Minister Pavel Grachev said recently that the Russian contingent will be committed at all stages of the operation, including the disengagement of the sides. So what is the real risk for our military servicemen and what options will Moscow have to minimize possible losses? It is known that NATO intends to protect its troops with all available means, including air strikes. Who will defend the Russian peacekeepers if they are attacked by superior enemy forces?

And finally, yet another question calls for an answer. What will happen with the Russian troops should the peace implementation operation in Bosnia fail? Does Moscow have a coherent plan for the evacuation of our military servicemen from the zone of conflict should one flare up? In spite of the West's resolve to enforce peace with NATO troops, the continuing imbalance of forces in the Bosnian theater makes a future peace settlement rather precarious. Without NATO and the regular Croatian army, Muslims are in no position to offset the military power of the Serbs.

On the other hand, in the event of "reinforcement" or the lifting of the embargo on weapon supplies to the Bosnian Government, Muslims have every reason to try to change the balance of force in their favor. Furthermore, the peace agreement does not envision effective action to disarm the sides or at least to limit the combat capabilities of their armed formations. This, combined with the planned lifting of the current limitations on trade with the warring Bosnian sides, could easily lead to an internal Bosnian arms race, turning the entire peacekeeping process into a period of intensive preparations for a new war for a territorial redivision of Bosnia.

If peace in Bosnia does not hold, the multilateral forces, including the Russian contingent, will become an enemy to all three warring sides at once. Russia will share with the West the burden of responsibility for the failure of the Bosnian peacekeeping effort and will not acquire additional influence with any of the parties to the conflict. In the worst-case scenario the peacekeepers themselves could divide: NATO troops will directly or indirectly support Muslims and Croats in order to neutralize the Serbs' military superiority; Russia will seek to use its military presence in Bosnia to prevent anti-Serb actions by the international contingent, as was the case in early 1994 with the dispatch of a Russian airborne battalion to Sarajevo.

Yet another interesting problem arises here. Sometimes you cannot avoid the impression that the real, but not openly declared, aim of Russian military participation in the future Bosnian settlement is the aspiration to prevent any use of force against the Serbs on the part of the NATO force. Russia therefore is ready, as it were, to place its soldiers as a kind of human shield between NATO and the Serbs. This is an extremely dangerous, and moreover, a hypocritical policy, which has little to do with Russia's true interests in the international arena or with a common Russian's concerns.

The intoxication with partnership leaves in the shadow one extremely indecent question: Who will foot the bill? It can be said with certitude that the bill will run into hundreds of millions or maybe even billions of dollars. It is proposed that everybody pay for himself. This is a sensible approach: After all, nobody is being forced to send their troops to Bosnia. Moscow is therefore invited to finance its construction battalion. Defense Minister Grachev has calculated that Russian participation will cost approximately 60 billion rubles. Not very much money, but did anybody envision the Bosnian peace settlement in the 1996 budget?

We are told that involvement in world politics cannot be cheap, especially when such a "normal great power" as Russia is concerned. It is the primary duty of any government in any state first to take care of its own citizens and only then, if any forces and resources are left, of foreign citizens in need of help. And it is downright criminal to send your soldiers to a foreign country to reconcile peoples who do not seem to want to reconcile in principle, when there is a flame of war in your own house — a war which is very reminiscent of the Bosnian war, and where every day, without fail, "Cargo 200" [zinc coffins] is shipped from Chechnya.

The choice between participation in the Bosnian peace implementation operation and the termination of the war in Chechnya is not as far-fetched as might appear at first glance. In fact this is a strategic choice of a foreign policy orientation for our nearly-ruined country between wasteful internationalism and reasonable isolationism. A state's external obligations, no matter how important they might be, cannot be put before its internal obligations. If this happens, the state ceases to unite the nation, and dies. This was the case with the British empire, and it was also the case with the USSR. Governments and rulers who do not understand this simple truth are doomed to historical contempt on the part of their compatriots.

Moscow Begins Work on Iranian Nuclear Plant

LD3011200495 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1413 GMT 30 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Nov 30 (Interfax) — The Russian Atomic Energy Ministry has now begun implementing a deal with Iran to build a Busher-1 nuclear power station there, Deputy Minister Yevgeniy Reshetnikov told Interfax on Thursday [30 November].

He said ground clearing operations were now under way on the site ahead of installation of equipment and water and power supply lines due to start next April. The project is to be completed in five years' time.

Reshetnikov said agreement was reached on training Iranian nuclear experts at the training center of a Russian nuclear power plant 42 kilometers from Voronezh.

The Iranian nuclear deal costing about $800 million and signed in January has been coming under United States criticism since. Russia will install a VVER-1,000 light water reactor at the station which cannot be used to produce weapons grades nuclear materials. It is also to supply nuclear fuel and take back spent fuel for reprocessing.

The ministry has repeatedly stressed the deal is in compliance with Russia's obligations under the nonproliferation treaty. Its provisions on the construction of a centrifuge unit and uranium shaft have been deleted.

Grachev, Peres Sign Military Cooperation Accord

LD0112120095 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1105 GMT 1 Dec 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Anatoliy Kerzhentsev]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tel Aviv, 1 Dec — Shim'on Peres, the Israeli prime minister and defense minister, and Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev signed an agreement "on the framework for military cooperation" between Israel and the Russian Federation after their talks today.

The head of the Russian military department arrived in Israel on Thursday evening [30 November] on a visit that is the first such visit in the history of bilateral relations.

According to the agreement signed, at the present stage it is mainly the development of links and exchange of delegations between the ministries of the two countries and also the expansion of cooperation in the military and technical sphere which are envisaged.

Well-informed sources in Israel report that a draft document was agreed during the visit of the Russian military delegation to Israel in July. Earlier the sides had already signed an agreement "on the principles for technological cooperation" and exchanged military attaches. Israel is interested in jointly with Russia selling arms to third countries and also in acquiring Russian transport aircraft. At the first stage it is planned to buy one such aircraft for $20-$25 million.

During his five-day stay in Israel Pavel Grachev is expected to meet with President Ezer Weizman and Foreign Minister Ehud Baraq and visit a number of military garrisons and defense industry enterprises.

Debt Rescheduling Documents Signed in Tokyo

LD3011144395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1429 GMT 30 Nov 95

[By Aleksandr Kopnov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] TOKYO, November 30 (Itar-Tass) — Documents to reschedule a part of the former USSR's debts to Japan, amounting to about 400 million U.S. dollars, were signed here today. They cover the debts that had to be repaid in the course of 1995 and were put off in keeping with an agreement concluded between Russia and the Paris Club, which unites countries that had granted credits to the former USSR.

In accordance with the present agreement, signed by Russian Ambassador to Tokyo Ludvig Chizhov and Japanese Ambassador to Moscow Koji Watanabe, the repayment of this sum is put off for thirteen years and payments for them will be started only in 1998. However, Itar-Tass has learned from Sergey Storchak, a representative of the Russian Finance Ministry, who attended the signing ceremony, that the Russian government will have to pay Japan interest according "to market prices", the size of which is being kept in strict secret.

Nevertheless, Storchak said, "the game is worth the candle", because Russia, which is the Soviet Union's successor, has thereby officially assumed the debts of the Soviet government and joined the ranks of solvent states.

As to Japan's interests, Itar-Tass was told by Watanabe, the signing of these documents has not only settled the current commercial and financial problems in Japanese-Russian relations, but has made them in general more stable.

The current agreement with the Japanese government to reschedule the debt of the former USSR is the third such document and covers only the official debt, which had accrued from state-guaranteed commercial credits. Moscow and Tokyo have yet to settle the problem of debts to private Japanese financial institutions, adding up to about one billion U.S. dollars.

Political Issues

Satarov: Yeltsin To Decide on Re-Election Next Year

*LD3011150095 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1413 GMT 30 Nov 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Nov 30 (INTERFAX) — President Boris Yeltsin does not think the presidential race should be launched before the returns of parliamentary elections are summed up, presidential political advisor Georgiy Satarov told a Thursday briefing at the INTERFAX central office in Moscow.

He said Yeltsin will decide whether to run for reelection only next year. According to him, the head of state finds any moves related to presidential elections inappropriate while Duma elections have not been held. "As it is we have sent voters into a trance by this hyper competition, vague differences between the programs of 43 groups and a miserable propaganda campaign," Satarov said.

In this context Satarov said the president was dissatisfied with the initiative of Federation Council Chairman Vladimir Shumeyko to lead the Russian Regions for a New Course movement, the adviser said. "We must spare the voters," he stressed.

Further on Yeltsin's Nomination

*LD3011132595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1302 GMT 30 Nov 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW November 30 (ITAR-TASS) — President Boris Yeltsin has been officially nominated for presidency in 1996 on Thursday by a Moscow meeting of his former comrades-in-arms who together with the head of state succeeded in defeating the hard-line anti-Gorbachev coup in 1991.

The meeting was attended by over 200 people who arrived from 25 Russian regions.

Addressing the meeting, Vladimir Komchatov, who denied that he was a Yeltsin's representative and said he acted as an ordinary Russian citizen, stressed that he was convinced that "the only political figure which unites Russia is President Yeltsin who took on his shoulders the responsibility for political and economic reforms in the country".

Former governor of the island of Sakhalin in the Far East, Valentin Fedorov, admitted that "not everything went smooth, there were mistakes" in Yeltsin's policy, however "the state course into the future should be paved by he who had launched it".

The meeting created a group which would collect signatures in support of Yeltsin as a candidate at 1996 elections.

Yeltsin himself has not yet announced whether he was going to run for the second term of office at elections on June 16, 1996.

Komchatov told Tass that the committee for nominating Yeltsin for the second term of office was created yet in summer and that "the initiative enjoyed support in most Russian regions".

"A change in power in present-day conditions may trigger unpredictable consequences. It is the wish for stability, the understanding of the choice, as well as the desire to support the course of reforms in the country that was the main motive for the expression of the will of the people", Komchatov said referring to the meeting.

Yeltsin Sums Up 30 Nov Meeting on Economic Issues

*LD3011153595 Moscow Russian Public Television
First Channel Network in Russian
1200 GMT 30 Nov 95*

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] As we have already reported, President Yeltsin held a meeting today [30 November] on economic problems at the Barvikha sanatorium. This is how Boris Nikolayevich summed up the meeting.

[Begin recording] [Yeltsin] We [as heard] usually hold meetings like this behind closed doors, but today we decided that the people of Russia, and those from abroad who are involved in our market, should learn quickly about the currency rate decisions adopted at the small meetings the president holds. The previous decision comes to the end of its validity on 1 January. A month before then we should adopt a decision. Today, a decision was adopted. And either today or tomorrow it will be published; that is exactly one month before the previous decision ceases to be valid.

[Unidentified voice] What is it about?

[Yeltsin] We had a bit of discussion, of course. You are bound to have that. Opinions differed over the figure for the [currency] corridor. It was indisputable that the currency corridor should be kept. Everyone agreed on this, but, as far as the sum was concerned, there were some doubts about the lower figure of 4,550 rubles [R], in particular, but later, thanks to the discussion, so to speak, everyone agreed the corridor should not be increased or expanded. The upper limit could not be raised, either. Therefore, we decided that it would be [?less risky] to set the lower limit as R4,550, and the upper limit should be set at R5,150. This will be the corridor. Moreover, we decided to set a fairly long term — six months — up to 30 June next year, so that all those who are participating in the market, so to speak, should be confident that, we, in making the decision, are sure that there will be a sufficiently unfluctuating and low inflation rate, and that we will not go outside this currency corridor. We feel confident of this. And naturally, this is directly linked with it: After Chernomyrdin and Dubinin, chairman of the Central Bank, reached an accord and signed the agreement on this corridor, I signed an edict on support to exporters, because exporters, especially those in machine building, have suffered very greatly from the fact that the dollar rate was low. They are interested in it being higher. Then they get more profits, and in general life is not bad for them. Incidentally, they started off Russia's stabilization. You understand, it started with their enterprises. Therefore, one cannot fail to support them. Not only with customs tariffs, and so forth, but with other things, other matters as well. Therefore, I will sign — have signed — an edict supporting exporters, which envisages a number of measures, and at the same time instructs the government within a short time to add more specific, possibly more all-embracing issues, to a decision of the government. This means that further to this edict there will also be a government decision supporting exporters. These are fairly important issues that we discussed today in a very amicable atmosphere. At least, no one protested, so to speak. It was unanimously adopted. No one objected to it. I think that this is a good step. It indicates that we ourselves are becoming confident that the market is stabilizing, finances are stabilizing, the economy is stabilizing, inflation, industry, and so forth [are stabilizing]. [end recording]

[video shows Yeltsin standing in a room, dressed in a suit and looking fit]

Yeltsin Approves Work on National Security Concept

LD3011172095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1608 GMT 30 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Nov 30 (INTERFAX) — President Boris Yeltsin approved the progress of work on a concept for Russia's national security at a meeting with his aide for national security, Yuriy Baturin, the presidential press office reported to INTERFAX Thursday.

According to the press office, Baturin briefed the president on the positions of the government, Federation Council, Defense Ministry, Interior Ministry and Federal Border Service as to the proposed amendments to the law on military service.

Yeltsin also read telegrams from Russia's regions about the State Duma's amendments to this law to extend the term of service in the ranks from one and a half to two years. The president kept the package of documents on his table meaning to make a decision on them within the next few days.

Yeltsin and Baturin also discussed the situation in the Russian contingent in Transdnestr. The president was satisfied with reforms in the former 14th Army supervised by Lt. Gen. Valeriy Yevnevich. The former army will be transformed into an operations group with the Kramatorsk Guards Division as its core.

Yeltsin Sends Letter To Head of Constitutional Court

LD0112002095 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 2255 GMT 30 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 1 Dec (ITAR-TASS) — Russian President Boris Yeltsin sent a message to the chairman of the Russian Constitutional Court, V. Tumanov. This was stated in a communique distributed by the press service of the Russian president.

The text of the message is as follows:

"In connection with the Russian Constitutional Court's examination of requests to interpret the term in part 2 of Article 96 of the Russian Constitution, "The procedure of forming the Federation Council", and to interpret the provisions of Article 95, part 2 of Article 96, clauses 7 and 8 of the second section, the "concluding and transitional provisions" of the Russian Constitution. Under this, the representatives of the Russian president will be Kutafin Oleg Yemelyanovich, rector of the Moscow State Judicial Academy and doctor of judicial sciences; Glushko Yelena Konstantinovna, research aide to the Russian president and candidate of judicial sciences; Tsivilev Robert Markovich, aide to the leader of the Russian presidential administration and candidate of judicial sciences."

Proposes Commission To 'Hammer Out' Law

LD3011193095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1413 GMT 30 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Nov 30 (INTERFAX) — Russian President Boris Yeltsin on Thursday sent a letter to both houses of parliament expressing concern over the fact that a much disputed law on principles for forming the Federation Council, the upper house, had still not become a reality, one of his aides said.

The president believes a quadripartite conciliation commission, representing himself, both houses of parliament and the Central Electoral Commission, would be able to hammer out a compromise law, Yeltsin's political aide Georgy Satarov told reporters at INTERFAX headquarters in Moscow.

In his letter, the president suggested basing the compromise version on one he originally proposed himself, and he urged the legislators "not to shelve the matter for too long," the aide said.

Yeltsin Rejects Additions to RSFSR Criminal Code

LD2911233395 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1656 GMT 29 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 29 Nov — In accordance with Part 3 of Article 107 of the Russian Federation Constitution, President Boris Yeltsin has rejected the federal law "On Making Additions to the Criminal Code of the RSFSR," which was adopted by the State Duma on 27 October and was considered as approved by the Federation Council under Part 4 of Article 105 of the Constitution. The press service of the Russian president reported this to ITAR-TASS today.

Yeltsin Approves Sale of Holdings in Stock Company

LD3011225795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1843 GMT 30 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, November 30 (ITAR-TASS) — Russian President Boris Yeltsin today signed a decree on the joint-stock company Svyazinvest, approving the government's decision to sell up to 49 per cent of its holding in the company, says a release from the presidential press service.

The shares will be sold in a commercial tender on investment terms, which spells commitment of winners to invest in subsidiaries of Svyazinvest, a communications company.

Experts put the state holding in Svyazinvest at ten billion dollars, which is a sixth of a total investment which is estimated to be required for Russia's telecommunications sector to catch up with rich nations' within 12-15 years.

All telephone owners in the former Soviet Union were subscribers to a single state-run network, but 1994 converted them into clients of commercial telephone companies, all former state-owned communications and information enterprises (SCIS) serving urban and rural telephone networks.

However, under Russia's privatisation programme the state has a 51 per cent stake in any SCIS. With time the state-owned stakes converged in the Svyazinvest company.

Yeltsin Signs Law on Russia's Continental Shelf

LD0112115695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1106 GMT 1 Dec 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, December 1 (ITAR-TASS) — Russian President Boris Yeltsin has signed the law "On the Continental Shelf of the Russian Federation," ITAR-TASS learnt at the Russian president's press service.

The law defines the status of the continental shelf of Russia, sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the Russian Federation on the continental shelf and their implementation in accordance with the Russian Consitution, generally accepted priciples and norms of international law and international treaties of the Russian Federation.

Premier Interviewed on Election, Yeltsin, Chechnya

BR3011152895 Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 30 Nov 95 p 13

[Interview with Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin by Enrico Franceschini in Moscow; date not given: "Everyone With Yeltsin To Halt the Reds"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted] At the age of 56, Chernomyrdin, former head of Gazprom (the Soviet hydrocarbons agency) and prime minister since 1993, has become a convert to capitalism, has built a reputation for efficiency and pragmatism, and is being identified as a pretender to the presidency. This, even though for the present he prefers not to appear like a pretender to Yeltsin's throne, as he stressed in this interview with LA REPUBBLICA.

[Franceschini] Viktor Stepanovich, are you surprised that the Communist Party is the favorite in the preelection opinion polls?

[Chernomyrdin] True, Russians' lifestyle could not remotely be described as decent. The paradox is that the protest at harsh living conditions should bring to power the very people who bequeathed this life to us — the people responsible for the former political, moral, and material bankruptcy. But new forces are growing up in the country, the private sector is expanding, the crisis is coming to an end, and the government is acting to protect the sectors worst hit by the transition. So I think I have good reason to doubt the supposed communist landslide.

[Franceschini] But let us assume that they do win and that, together with the nationalists, they command a broad majority in the Duma...

[Chernomyrdin] I fear that in that case we will witness a reversal of the reforms. It would be tragic, because, despite the difficulties with which we are grappling, we are at last emerging from the tunnel. The communists and nationalists would bring a new tide of militarization, of confrontation with the world community, of threats to the economy. Sooner or later Russia would be pushed back toward the civilized world, but the path could be long and dangerous.

[Franceschini] Did you expect more support when you founded "Russia Is Our Home"?

[Chernomyrdin] I expected more or less what we have. The opposition promptly labeled us the "ruling party," but I have better evidence of our strength than opinion polls: A minimum of 200,000 signatures were needed in order to take part in the elections, and we gathered 2 million (the same as the Communist Party — LA REPUBBLICA editor's note).

[Franceschini] How many of the 450 seats being contested in the elections would you have to win in order to consider yourself satisfied?

[Chernomyrdin] The elections will be a success for us if we gain 120-140 deputies. That would enable us to form a majority coalition and to carry out our program.

[Franceschini] What record do you have to present to voters?

[Chernomyrdin] Unlike the opposition, I think that my government has achieved good results. This is shown by the latest statistics: production growth, a rise in real incomes, a slowing of inflation. But you cannot achieve prosperity for everyone within the space of a few years.

[Franceschini] In your first press conference as prime minister, you said: "I am in favor of the market economy, but not in favor of a complete lack of controls; I am in favor of reforms, but not at the price of causing poverty for the mass of the population." And yet now there are some people who do see a Russia lacking any kind of controls, in which the majority of the population are poorer...

[Chernomyrdin] The transition from "everything is forbidden" to "everything is permitted" is inevitably accompanied by excesses, heavy handedness, abuses of power, criminal phenomena. But in transforming the monolith that the Soviet economy used to be, we have succeeded in averting disasters such as mass unemployment and famine, and a total halt in production. This result is consistent with what I said then.

[Franceschini] Are you satisfied with relations with the West?

[Chernomyrdin] We must understand that we cannot expect any disinterested altruism from the West. But on the basis of mutual interests, it is possible to achieve many things useful both to the West and to Russia.

[Franceschini] The West is frightened by the nationalism that is emerging again in Russia...

[Chernomyrdin] It worries me too, because nationalism is an ideology that leads to political, economic, and cultural isolation — an isolation that already produced its results during the Soviet regime. But once the economic difficulties are overcome, nationalism will decline. It will be replaced by patriotism, which means creating a prosperous Russia, politically stable and open to cooperation, a Russia that commands respect but which people must not fear.

[Franceschini] Will there be peace in Chechnya, or will war resume there?

[Chernomyrdin] There are no alternatives to peace. The government does not intend to give in to the provocations, which are exerting pressure in the direction of another conflict. Negotiations must be stepped up, society's healthy forces must be involved, what has been destroyed must be rebuilt, and further bloodshed must be averted.

[Franceschini] What is the most important lesson that you have learned as prime minister?

[Chernomyrdin] To think about who will take over your post, and not to leave him a heap of problems.

[Franceschini] There is said to be a rivalry between you and Yeltsin's men, that there is both a Kremlin party and a government party...

[Chernomyrdin] It would be ridiculous to say that there are no debates or divergences. We have already tried a "unanimous" society, and we know what happened to that. But our debates take place within the framework of normal working relations. The rumors of internecine conflicts stem from sensation-seeking newspapers .

[Franceschini]. The newspapers also report rivalries between you and Yeltsin...

[Chernomyrdin] In reailty our relations are characterized by mutual trust. We may defend our own viewpoints, or on the contrary we may strive to implement one of the president's plans. His huge responsibility to Russia and the world is a stimulus to helping him.

[Franceschini] You have said several times that you do not intend to stand as a candidate in the presidential elections next June. Would you change your mind if Yeltsin did not stand again?

[Chernomyrdin] I repeat Yeltsin is the president. I will not stand as a candidate. I refuse to talk about ifs and maybes.

Shumeyko: Yeltsin Stands For Democratic Change

LD3011135695 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1156 GMT 30 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Nov 30 (INTERFAX) — Russian President Boris Yeltsin stands for "changing government in the country democratically, no matter what happens," said Federation Council chairman Vladimir Shumeyko in the Versii TV program presented Wednesday night.

"Boris Yeltsin is the man who has steadily and consistently insisted on holding presidential elections," Shumeyko said.

According to him, "those who can be referred to as a collective presidency — a certain circle of people — agree that Boris Yeltsin should be nominated for a second term in office to prevent destabilization."

If Yeltsin declines to be nominated for a second term, Shumeyko said, change of government will take place "only through elections, not otherwise."

"No other way is possible," Shumeyko stressed.

Commenting on the situation regarding the law on the procedure of forming the Federation Council, he said "all disputes will cease after December 7, when the Constitutional Court makes its ruling on the president's and Federation Council's inquiries, gives its interpretation of the term "forming" and decides when the Federation Council's term in office expires.

"Any answer will suit us, since we need certainty and clarity," Shumeyko pointed out. "Constitutional Court rulings will not stir up nervousness among the political elite, but put an end to it," he said.

Premier Upset by Grachev Remarks on Fired Finance Chief

MM0112120595 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 1 Dec 95 p 2

[Own information report under the "Corridors of Power" rubric: "Minister Grachev Playing Games Which Are Not Military. Which Is No Less Dangerous"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As the ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA editorial office has learned from Defense Ministry sources, Pavel Sergeyevich Grachev, while visiting first Sochi and then NATO in recent days, left the generals a riddle for while he is away which everybody is free to resolve as he wishes. In response to a question put to him at the time of a valedictory collegium session — as to the reason why his deputy Vasiliy Vorobyev had been removed from his job — Pavel Sergeyevich noted that he had no complaints about Vasiliy Vorobyev, that he had not removed him from his post, and he did not know why he had been punished and sent into retirement.

This information got to Government Chairman Viktor Chernomyrdin. Viktor Stepanovich was extremely surprised at this gesture by a high-ranking soldier. Because he felt and continues to feel that General Vorobyev's culpability merits not an intradepartmental but a prosecutor's office investigation. And maybe even criminal proceedings. After all, there is an appropriate article of the Criminal Code designed to punish contemptuous officials for this kind of thing — "sitting" on large amounts of money earmarked for maintaining the officer corps, providing social protection for officers' families, and so forth and using it as he wants and for a different purpose. Incidentally, the same source reported, just before the chief Army financier was removed from duty V. Chernomyrdin had a long man-to-man conversation with him during which General Vorobyev repented and begged forgiveness. And only a humane attitude toward the former front-line soldier and Armed Forces veteran prevented tougher measures being taken against the offender.

Defense Minister Pavel Grachev's remarks, if they were indeed of that nature, have caused the premier sincere bewilderment.

FSB Arrests 'Terrorist' in Moscow

LD3011232195 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1918 GMT 30 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Nov 30 (INTERFAX) — A terrorist detained in Moscow Thursday [30 November] is a farmer from the Perm region, the Moscow department of the Federal Security Service (FSB) told INTERFAX Thursday. Prior to his arrest, the terrorist had exploded a bomb on 5th Parkovaya street and threatened to explode another 21 bombs in crowded places. According to preliminary information, the blast did not hurt anyone.

Boris Andryukov, 31, blackmailed Alfa Bank for a loan to repay his debts.

According to the FSB, he is wanted by the Perm police for misappropriation of state property.

The FSB said one of Andryukov's bombs was to blow up at 3 p.m. and another one at 5 p.m. near a commercial kiosk. Still another bomb was deactivated at Andryukov's rented apartment.

Military Issues

Military Prosecutor Panichev Interviewed

MM2911165395 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Nov 95 p 2

[Interview with Chief Military Prosecutor Valentin Panichev by Ivan Ivanyuk under the "Topical Theme" rubric; place and date not given: "Valentin Panichev: State Has Still Not Learned Lessons of Russkiy" — first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text]

From KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Files

Lieutenant General of Justice Valentin Nikolayevich Panichev was born in 1941 in Vologda Oblast. He worked in prosecutor's office organs after graduating from Leningrad State University Legal Faculty in 1967. He was prosecutor of Pskov and Rostov Oblasts. He has been chief military prosecutor since 1992.

[Ivanyuk] Valentin Nikolayevich, our readers' opinions on the reasons for the violations of law and order in the country and Army are divided. Some believe that bad laws are to blame for everything, others are convinced that the laws are correct but that they are simply being ignored. What do you think?

[Panichev] Of course, a high-quality legal base is the real foundation of legality. But ensuring law and order depends on a multitude of other factors, including political and social factors. As regards new Russian laws, I would not wish to dramatize the situation. There have always been, there are, and there always will be flaws. Major changes are taking place in society, and in such cases the law does not as a rule have time to enshrine the changes "in black and white." In addition, the practice of applying the law always brings its own adjustments.

More serious, I believe, is the situation regarding law-abidingness. There is nothing worse than when the law is merely a declaration. In this case people's legal consciousness is eroded. Legal nihilism was strong in our country previously and now seems to be getting stronger. The main reason, I think, is the general weakening of the principles of statehood. The corrosiveness of the administrative-command system has disappeared but the new system of implementation and control has still not gotten onto its feet. The result is a mass of negative phenomena, and on the whole the situation regarding the maintenance of law and order in society and in the Army can be evaluated as rather alarming.

[Ivanyuk] How in your opinion is this manifesting itself?

[Panichev] Usually figures reflecting the increase in crime are cited in order to prove the postulate, which has already penetrated the public consciousness fairly deeply, that our society has become criminalized. I do not propose to do that. Especially if you take the Armed Forces, the statistics are not so revealing here: For some types of crime a sharp increase is being observed and for others a reduction is being observed. What concerns me personally is something else — the cases of legally outrageous treatment which came to light recently and which illustrate extremely graphically how bad the general state of affairs is. I am referring primarily to what happened on Russkiy Island, when four sailors starved to death. Another terrible incident came to light recently. The Russian Federation Supreme Court Military Collegium considered an appeal by Captain First Rank V. Rudzik, commander of the cruiser Admiral Gorshkov. Let me remind you that last year we took criminal proceedings against him because he was to blame for the fact that seven sailors were practically boiled alive in one of the ship's hold compartments adapted as a brig. The court sentenced the commander to five years' imprisonment. The military collegium not only left the sentence unchanged but also instituted criminal proceedings against another three officers and a warrant officer.

[Ivanyuk] Can you tell us how the investigation into what happened on Russkiy is going? When will the investigation be completed?

[Panichev] At present criminal proceedings have been taken against a Navy employee and a number of servicemen, including five seamen and senior seamen, 15 petty officers, two warrant officers, and five officers, three of them senior. In the case concerning the deaths of sailors on Russkiy Island convictions have already been obtained against Warrant Officer Vytrishchak — five years' imprisonment and confiscation of property, stripped of rank and awards; Medical Service Lieutenant Kramar — two years' suspended; Medical Service Colonel Feoktistov — three years' suspended; and employee Kosyanenko — four years' suspended. Captain Second Rank Geshelev, former chief of a radiotechnical school; Captain First Rank Denisenko, former assistant to the Pacific Fleet commander; and eight seamen and petty officers have been amnestied in connection with the 50th anniversary of victory. A preliminary investigation in relation to a number of officials, including the former commander of a military unit with the rank of captain first rank and his deputy for material and technical supply, is now being completed. I hope that the case will have been fully completed by the end of the year. It is still too early to draw the final conclusions, but one thing can be said right now: The reasons for the tragedy that occurred on Russkiy Island lie not only in violations by military chiefs and commanders but also in the state's attitude toward the Army. What happened should be a serious lesson to all of us.

[Ivanyuk] Valentin Nikolayevich, we have come right up against a problem which, judging from our readers' letters, worries a great many people. Can we talk about the protection of each individual serviceman's rights if many laws according to which all Armed Forces must live are not being implemented: the Law on the Status of Servicemen, the Law on the Federal Budget, and others?

[Panichev] These problems are indeed very acute, and they are undoubtedly interconnected. But this is not grounds for saying that, since the rights of people in uniform are being violated in a big way, a blind eye can be turned to "trivialities." Just imagine if a unit commander allowed arbitrariness. Such an approach cannot be permitted. We deal with and will continue to deal with complaints of officials' wrongful actions. Lately people have increasingly been going to court for the truth, and in this case we are also giving them all the support we can.

But on the other hand how can social and legal protection for servicemen and members of their families be ensured if Army and Navy funding catastrophically lags behind its requirements. Soldiers are forced to live on rusks from emergency rations and officers, who have not received any pay for months, are working as night watchmen and trading from kiosks just to feed their families. Troops' combat readiness is also suffering since combat training has been disrupted to a considerable extent because of the shortage of fuel and other resources. Ships are standing idle at their moorings, aircraft are stand idle at airfields, officers and warrant officers are losing their skills. The state is obliged to solve these problems, no matter how difficult that may be. Because without a solution to them, the many legal questions which servicemen and Army and Navy civilian personnel are referring to us will naturally be left up in the air.

[Ivanyuk] What can the Military Prosecutor's Office do to ensure that the package of "military" laws and other normative acts affecting the Armed Forces' interests are implemented? Recently we received a letter from a reader who was displeased that you had forwarded his letter to the Defense Ministry so that specific measures could be taken. He had hoped that the prosecutor's office would apply some sanctions to the officials who are to blame for the nonimplementation of laws. Can you exert any influence on, for example, the Finance Ministry?

[Panichev] We are involved in this kind of work too. I sent the appropriate letters to both the deputy finance minister and the minister himself, the Federal Assembly, and the government, in which I drew attention to, in particular, the violation of the Armed Forces funding procedure. But the Finance Ministry is not accountable to us and an inspection is needed in order to take measures in a specific case, therefore in certain matters we are applying to the General Prosecutor's Office.

[Ivanyuk] Another question in passing. The Law on the Federal Budget for 1995 envisages the organization of a labor payment system in the power structures. But this question has still not been solved either.

[Panichev] In accordance with Russian Federation Government Decree No. 1032 of 30 October this year the departments involved in this question have one month to submit proposals on amending existing legislative or other normative decisions on questions of servicemen's pay. It is to be hoped that the problem of indexing the pay of the people in uniform is eradicated at the same time.

[Ivanyuk] Valentin Nikolayevich, lately problems of social protection for servicemen who have fulfilled their military duty on Chechen Republic territory have become very acute. The father of soldier Vyacheslav Fedorovich Smyslov from Fryazin in Moscow Oblast writes that at his unit his son was given information about his entitlement to privileges but the military commissariat explained that he has no privileges for having participated in the Chechen events....

[Panichev] Again, in my view the whole trouble lies in the insufficiently clearly formulated legal position of the servicemen who are being sent to Chechnya. Currently it is defined not only by the Law "On Additional Guarantees and Compensation for Servicemen Performing Military Service on the Territory of the Transcaucasian and Baltic States and the Republic of Tajikistan and Carrying Out Missions in State of Emergency Conditions and During Armed Conflicts" and the Russian Federation Law "On the Status of Servicemen" but also by a number of government decrees. Specifically, Decree No. 240 of 31 March 1994 "On a Procedure for Establishing That Servicemen and Other Persons Have Carried Out Missions in State of Emergency Conditions and During Armed Conflicts and for Granting Them Additional Guarantees and Compensation" and Decree No. 1360 of 9 December 1994 "On Ensuring the State Security and Territorial Integrity of the Russian Federation, Legality, Citizens' Rights and Freedoms, and the Disarmament of Illegal Armed Formations on Chechen Republic Territory and the North Caucasus Regions Adjacent to It." I have deliberately quoted these documents' full titles because most servicemen are unlikely to be aware of them. Understanding them is another problem. I believe that there should be one "personally signed" document, preferably a law, on the status of servicemen in Chechnya which should specify everything, including guarantees and privileges.

[Ivanyuk] Let us continue the Chechen theme. People who judge events from reports from certain mass media are forming the impression that military prosecutors are taking criminal proceedings only against servicemen there while the bandits who are killing our soldiers and officers are going unpunished. Please tell us how matters really stand.

[Panichev] The Military Prosecutor's Office is carrying out its mission in Chechnya as it is throughout the country as a whole: to ensure legality and law and order among troops. This means that we monitor not only, for instance, disciplinary offenses in units and subunits but also the safeguarding of property, ecology, etc. Groznyy Garrison Prosecutor's Office has instituted a total of 375 criminal cases this year. Almost one-third of them are for evading military service, but there are also cases involving the loss or theft of weapons and murder. The garrison prosecutor's office staff has now been expanded because of the large volume of work. Our staffers there, like all servicemen, are in extreme conditions. Thus, Captain of Justice Oleg Nadmidov was wounded recently. But under the law we are not authorized to investigate fully and refer to court cases involving crimes committed by gunmen and other civilian persons against servicemen. The only thing we can do and are doing is to institute criminal proceedings in such cases and we refer them to the Caucasus Interregional Prosecutor's Office after the immediate investigative actions have been carried out. As of today 50 files and 14 criminal cases have been handed over to it. As far as I know work is being carried out extremely intensively there too, it should simply be borne in mind that gunmen disappear into the hills without waiting for an investigator to call on them. Nevertheless, according to General Prosecutor's Office data, a total of several dozen criminal cases have been instituted against local criminals. It is bad that little is written about this in newspapers, which is why the false impression of prosecutor's office activity is being created.

[Ivanyuk] The last question. The latest attempt at carrying out military legal reform is now being made. In your opinion what must be done first of all within its framework?

[Panichev] I believe that the starting point for legal reform in the Armed Forces should be the Russian Federation President's Edict "On Elaborating a Concept for Legal Reform in the Russian Federation" signed in July. And, which is very important to us, the Law on the Prosecutor's Office that has just been adopted.

I would single out another two very important aspects of military legal reform. First, it is necessary once again to return to strengthening the legal service's role in the Army and Navy. It is more or less up to strength only in the center, while at local level it has no substantial effect on the level of legal consciousness. Second, several times already we have raised the question of creating military police, which would replace the currently existing inquiry organs made up of nonprofessionals and frontline officers. Although the cadre question — where to get professional lawyers from, there is a shortage of them as it is — arises here, it will have to be solved one way or another. The role of law in the society which is now being created is increasing immeasurably and the number of lawyers must also increase. They must be trained. There must be no legal vacuum in the Armed Forces, whose activity is based on the strict observance of laws and orders.

Federal Assembly

Shumeyko: Yeltsin For Smooth Handover of Power

LD3011190595

[FBIS Editorial Report] Moscow NTV in Russian at 2120 GMT on 29 November 95 carries the "Versions" program featuring Vladimir Shumeyko, chairman of the Federation Council, hosted by Sergey Dorenko. The program lasts 15 minutes.

Dorenko notes "In the absence of a president, Shumeyko would control the election of the country's new leader. In spite of the shakiness of his position — Vladimir Shumeyko will not necessarily head the new Federation Council — today it is he who decides what is virtually the main task for the ruling elite, that of a smooth handover of power, or succession of power. Only two of today's well-known politicians will definitely mean no shake-ups for the elite: Chernomyrdin and Shumeyko. In any event, they are the ones who will compete in the fight for the Kremlin if Yeltsin decides to step aside. Neither of them will crudely work against Yeltsin if the latter decides to stay on.

"It has been suggested that Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, following Chubays, cannot satisfy the demands of the military industrial complex; and that in parallel with Chernomyrdin, the Soskovets-Ilyushin-Korzhakov group is actively preparing to launch Vladimir Shumeyko onto the political market. Up to now, this job has not been done with any particular vigor, and some reckon it has actually been done pretty sloppily. Perhaps it is not worth doing it now at all, all the more so, in that real deeds are to be expected only once the president gives the command."

Interviewing Vladimir Shumeyko in a study, Dorenko asked whether "some kind of agreement exists about a handover of power in case something happens." Shumeyko replies:"Well, you know, in the first place, any change of power leads to a deterioration" in the situation. This deterioration is due to "a certain fear on the part of the current ruling elite. But as far as I understand — and the president and I pretty frequently exchange opinions on fundamental issues of state — the president is a supporter of a democratic change of power, whatever happens. That's the whole point: The president insists — consistently, purposefully, and constantly insists on holding presidential elections. It is another matter whether Boris Nikolayevich [Yeltsin] himself will run.

"The group that can be called the collective president, a specific group of personalities, posts, and so on, are all agreed that Boris Nikolayevich should run for a second term, precisely for the reasons you mentioned: in order that there should be no shake-ups and so on and so forth."

If Boris Yeltsin does not run for a second term, Shumeyko went on, a successor will be found, "but this will happen only through elections and in no other way, no other way is possible."

In a separate interview, Duma deputy Boris Zolotukhin says the Russian Constitution makes it quite clear that the Duma is elected, and the Federation Council formed — that is, it is constituted on a different basis from the Duma. Commenting on this in a continuation of his interview with Dorenko, Shumeyko emphasizes the need for accord between the Duma and the Federation Council on the principle of Russia as a federative state; Shumeyko quotes the relevant articles of the Federation Treaty. The Constitutional Court is to rule on 7 December on a number of issues relating to how the Federation Council is formed and when, under the Constitution, its term of office expires. The court's decision is final and subject to no appeal: "After 7 December all disputes will cease," Shumeyko says, emphasizing that the Federation Council needs a clear and definite judgement.

"The regional elites," Dorenko adds in the studio, "need the Federation Council so that they can play their game in Moscow. And the center needs it because while the regional leaders are represented in Moscow and are playing their game here rather than elsewhere, they will not pull Russia apart. Then the military industrial complex and industry needs the Federation Council as a means of exerting pressure on the small number of fuel-rich regions. And it objectively ensures that the leader of the military industrial complex will back whoever might head the senate, whether that be Soskovets or Shumeyko."

Regional Affairs

Chechnya Reportage: Elections, Politics, Military

Khasbulatov Agrees To Run for President

LD3011160995 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1413 GMT 30 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYY, Nov 30 (Interfax) — Former speaker of Russia's Supreme Council Ruslan Khasbulatov officially agreed on Thursday to be nominated as a candidate for the elections to head of republic to be held in Chechnya on December 17.

Khasbulatov has already submitted the necessary documents, said a source at the headquarters of the People's Union for Chechnya's Revival, which supports Khasbulatov, and they will be presented to the local electoral commission by December 1. The deadline for presenting candidates' documents for the head of republic elections is 6:00 p.m. on December 2.

"Voters' signatures will pose no problem, since 26,000 have already been collected instead of the required 5,000, and they continue to arrive," the source said.

The Union's opponents are doing all they can to prevent Khasbulatov from being elected, he said. The commercial Terek bank, for one, froze the Union's account without any serious grounds to complicate Khasbulatov's election campaign. "However we won't be hindered by this, since we do not buy votes," the source pointed out.

Khasbulatov Claims To Have 'Peace Plan'

LD0112120195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1125 GMT 1 Dec 95

[By Tamara Zamyatina]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, December 1 (Itar-Tass) — Ruslan Khasbulatov, former speaker of the Russian parliament and one of candidates for the post of head of the Chechen Republic, will fly to Groznyy on Saturday, December 2, to organise his election campaign under the slogan of reconciliation, he said in an interview with Itar-Tass here on Friday.

According to Khasbulatov, 26,000 signatures of Chechen residents (necessary minimum is 5,000 signatures) were collected in his support. He intends live in Chechnya till the results of the polls are summed up.

Khasbulatov is sure of his victory at the elections, claiming that he has no "serious contenders" in Chechnya.

Asked whether Khasbulatov should compete Doku Zavgayev (Eds: incumbent head of the Chechen Republic) in the interests of reconciliation of the Chechen people, Khasbulatov replied: "We differed on the question of principle: we had agreed to put to the foreground the question of continuing the talks (Eds: with separatist leader Dudayev's supporters) as the necessary condition for holding elections. However, after coming to Groznyy, Doku Zavgayev put precisely the elections to the fore."

Khasbulatov expressed apprehension that "the holding of the elections in Chechnya on December 17 without creating conditions for reconciliation of the conflicting sides may, far from ending the war, provoke a new round of bloodshed".

In Khasbulatov's opinion, "transition from war to peace is the most difficult issue, and it should be settled not at polling stations but at the negotiating table".

Asked why then he agreed to run for the post of head of the Chechen Republic, Khasbulatov replied: "I have a peace plan".

Communists To Support Zavgayev

LD3011203795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1612 GMT 30 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYY, Nov 30 (Interfax) — The first congress of the Chechen Communist Party in Groznyy Thursday declared its intention to support Doku Zavgayev in the Dec. 17 elections of the head of the republic.

Some 50 delegates took part in the congress. According to party chairman Ruslan Murtayev, many provincial delegates failed to attend as they were stopped at checkpoints by federal troops.

He said his party with a membership of over 5,000 is not a branch of the Russian Communist Party of Gennadiy Zyuganov.

In Murtayev's opinion, Zavgayev would be a uniting figure for the Chechen people. "Most Chechens attach their hopes for the restoration of peace and accord to him," Murtayev said.

Daily Assesses Offer To Let Dudayev Run

MM0112102795 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 30 Nov 95 pp 1, 2

["Subjective remarks" by Anatoliy Yurkov: "What Are Zavgayev's Chances? Was Doku Zavgayev in Earnest in Inviting His Rival, the General, to Participate in the Presidential Election in Chechnya on Equal Terms?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the end of last week Doku Zavgayev, the current leader of Chechnya, made an unexpected statement: He considers it possible for Dzhokhar Dudayev to participate on equal terms as a candidate for the post of head of the republic in the election scheduled for 17 December. And not Dudayev alone, but Basayev as well. For this to happen, Zavgayev said, they would have to be included in the amnesty.

Then a report appeared suggesting that a spokesman for Dudayev had already set out for Moscow to thrash out this issue.

Zavgayev's statement provoked a quiet commotion in his supporters' camp in both Groznyy and Moscow. What is this — confidence in his own strength, or the notorious Caucasian posturing? Or a subtle political game aimed at morally annihilating Dudayev as a politician?

So far there is no straightforward answer to these questions, but Zavgayev himself is not disavowing his words, thereby engendering conjecture and theoretical versions of possible developments.

Tuesday's edition of ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA published my commentary, "A Chance for Dudayev?" It touched on the election situation in Chechnya as a fragment of the wider picture of the election strategy of the 1996 presidential race. And on Dudayev as a figure capable of influencing the development of this situation in a radical way.

But facts are facts: Less than three weeks remain until the forthcoming election, and so far only Zavgayev has put forward his candidacy for the vacant post of president of the Chechen Republic. And from people close to Zavgayev and currently working shoulder to shoulder with him comes the news that Zavgayev is absolutely certain of victory.

At the same time, they add that Zavgayev's prospects have significantly increased following his meeting with President Yeltsin. Chechnya sees that Russia considers Doku a strong politician, capable not only of offering strong competition to the outlawed Dudayev, but also of leading the republic assuredly toward peace.

Indeed, President Yeltsin will not be meeting with just anyone. Especially while he is in hospital. All his meetings during the period of his illness have not only been rationed, but have been thoroughly checked by the strategists and tacticians in his closest circle. And if Zavgayev proved to be among the people whose meeting with the president could not wait or be "shelved", that means that he is becoming a key figure in Russian calculations. And, it would appear, a figure with whom considerable hopes for the peaceful settlement of the Chechen conflict are now linked.

Today it is clear to everyone that two views exist on the problem — the strong-arm view and the peaceful view. As unlike as ice and fire, they are tearing Chechnya into two warring camps. Moreover, it is hard to say where these two mutually exclusive approaches are stronger — in Groznyy or in Moscow. But the logic of the development of the Chechen conflict unambiguously shows that strong- arm opposition gave birth to Dudayev and is the breeding ground fostering his influence.

Dudayev thrives and functions when blood is shed. Peace in Chechnya spells the end for Dudayev. This formula is not something that I have dreamed up; it is being increasingly heard both in Groznyy and in Moscow.

In my previous remarks I wrote that the logic of developments in Russia would be increasingly determined by the election interests of the powerful of this world as time went on. Even the current Duma election squabbles cannot camouflage the fact that the "leaders" are not trying to sink each other's parties and programs, but are attempting to prejudice voters against their future rivals for the presidential throne. No one in Russia today has such absolute power as the president. And what politician does not repeat the presidential oath every night, albeit in a whisper?!

B. Yeltsin's team needs peace in Chechnya more than peace in the Balkans. Viktor Chernomyrdin has shown by proof and example that in critical situations it is possible to negotiate even with terrorists, and therefore there is a chance to end the Chechen conflict peacefully. All that is needed is a political figure capable of becoming a world figure.

If not Dudayev, then who?

Doku Zavgayev, according to Minister of Internal Affairs Anatoliy Kulikov and Minister for Nationalities Affairs Vyacheslav Mikhaylov. They have been "brooding" on the Chechen problem for many a month; they also know the situation and the mood in the republic. But even for them Zavgayev's statement about an amnesty for Dudayev and the proposal that he participate in the election was a surprise on the scale of a Chechen invasion of Zamoskvorechye. And here the question arises: Did Zavgayev reach this conclusion regarding Dudayev himself?

Is Zavgayev 100-percent independent in his actions? Seriously speaking, of course he is not: Who has ever felt himself the complete master when there is a military force at his back?

But is he sufficiently independent to propose the participation of the outlawed Dudayev in the election for the post of head of republic? If only after a mythical amnesty?

If Zavgayev is a serious politician, it is doubtful that he has started engaging in myth-making. His active supporter Anatoliy Kulikov, a convinced champion of a peaceful resolution of the Chechen conflict, rates Doku Zavgayev on the highest scale of human values: bold, decisive, honest, well-educated, possessing extraordinary organizational abilities, and enjoying the unconditional support of a sizable proportion of the Chechen population, its influential people, and diaspora.

By way of confirming his description, Anatoliy Sergeyevich cites a most weighty argument: Only a politician who was absolutely confident in himself and confident of victory in the election could state on entering the election campaign that he does not see the Chechen Republic outside the framework of the Russian Federation.

It can be assumed that this is the precise calculation of a politician banking on the weariness of his people. Chechens are weary of war, of fratricide, and of uncertainty. Perhaps of uncertainty most of all. The sovereignty that they were initially offered possibly seemed to some people something like the communism which Khrushchev in his time bequeathed to "the present generation of Soviet people." But the year of bloodshed in which a full generation of the nation is being consumed has sobered up both old and young. Unfortunately, the politicians' ambitions have not cooled. And people have begun to understand at what price Dudayev offered to build for them "Islamic communism in a separate republic of Ichkeria." And also the price of what those in Moscow who "sympathize" with him as far as the idea of strong-arm opposition "until a victorious conclusion" is concerned are offering.

Perhaps it is on the Chechens' ever-increasing understanding, their awareness of themselves as the unwilling puppets in a dishonest political game played by politicians, that Doku Zagayev — undoubtedly a subtle expert in the workings of the soul — is counting? Anything is possible. After all, if he triumphs in the election in honorable single combat with Dudayev and other possible rivals, the sentence for the mutinous general will be final. Without the right of appeal or pardon.

And for Chechnya this would be a dignified way out of the political confrontation which subsequently escalated into military conflict — to sign a treaty with Russia on the delimitation of powers. As Zavgayev is insisting, basing his election platform on the idea.

All the same, Doku Zavgayev has chosen a risky option (whether of his own accord or at the suggestion of Boris Yeltsin — it was after meeting Yeltsin in the Central Clinical Hospital that he announced this project of his), so risky that its consequences could turn out to be yet more bloodshed.

True, it does contain a hidden spring which could, whatever the election outcome, turn the war into a strictly internal conflict. But I would not like to even think about that scenario....

Although in big-time politics people do not consider their own head [golovy ne schitayut] when the integrity and fate of the state are at stake.

P.S. It is true that, from his very first independent steps in the post of head of republic, Zavgayev has not tried to ingratiate himself with his people. When a tragedy occurred the other day — a Russian man and his wife were found murdered — he ordered a thorough investigation. It pointed to two policemen, both Chechens. Zavgayev asked the law enforcement organs to act in strict accordance with the law.

The Chechens suspected of the murder were arrested. As soon as the investigation ends, the case will be sent to court. Zavgayev is monitoring it personally.

Authorities Set Conditions for Talks

LD3011141195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1313 GMT 30 Nov 95

[By Nadezhda Anisimova and Gennadiy Yezhov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, November 30 (Itar-Tass) — The federal authorities of Russia are ready to resume the talks in Groznyy on two conditions: firstly, they should be held at a "roundtable" with the participation of all the Chechen sides concerned and, secondly, only after the kidnapped Russian servicemen Maksimenko and Moroz are returned to the Russian side.

This statement was made today to Itar-Tass by Russian Minister for Nationalities and Regional Policy Vyacheslav Mikhaylov, leader of the federal delegation to the talks.

As earlier reported, two Russian servicemen, who were ensuring the passage of Dudayev's delegation through federal-block posts, had disappeared at the end of October.

Mikhaylov stressed that the dialogue on the political and economic packages of problems should be conducted only in the form of a "roundtable".

The Chechens must first complete their internal dialogue, should work out a common approach to the relations between their republic and the federal centre. Such a debate is now going on in the course of preparations for the Chechen elections. As to working consultations, they are being held regularly at the level of the Special Observers Commission, Mikhail stated.

Mikhaylov: Talks To Start With Roundtable

LD3011161495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1449 GMT 30 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Nov 30 (Interfax) — Political talks between the federal center and Chechnya will start with a round table discussion at the end of an inter-Chechen political dialogue, Russia's Minister for Nationalities Vyacheslav Mikhaylov, the chief Russian negotiator in Chechnya, declared in an interview with Interfax on Thursday.

The on-going election campaign in Chechnya, Mikhaylov said, shows that various Chechen political forces see eye to eye on many issues of a settlement and agree that the Chechen Republic and Russia should work out basic principles of relations between them. "Such common proposals can be drafted," he stressed, adding that if they are worked out, bilateral talks on political and economic issues could get underway.

Although working contacts between the federal authorities and representatives of various Chechen forces have been continuing, talks within the framework of the Special Observer Commission, monitoring compliance with the military accords, will not resume unless the separatists return the Russian servicemen Maximenko and Morozov.

The two Russians disappeared about a month ago near the village of Roshni-Chu where they escorted the chief of staff of separatist forces, Aslan Maskhadov.

"We know that they are being held by the Chechen side, and although we have repeatedly asked Maskhadov about the men, nothing has been done," Mikhaylov said.

Dudayev Possession of Nuclear Weapons Denied

LD0112104195 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1000 GMT 1 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Reports that Dzhokar Dudayev possesses nuclear weapons are not in accord with reality. This was stated in an interview to our correspondent by a spokesman of the directorate of information of the Russian Defense Ministry commenting on an article in today's KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA newspaper. The article in question was an interview with a certain Zaiki Zaynullin whom the newspaper presents as a nuclear weapons specialist and a high- ranking official in the Defense Ministry. This man had allegedly himself seen atomic bombs in Dudayev's possession in 1992. Zaynullin said that the nuclear weapons are located near the settlements of Shali and Bamut. In connection with this the spokesman of the Defense Ministry stated that in the above-named places there had never been any nuclear weapons.

The article in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA about the alleged existence of nuclear weapons in Chechnya, and in Dzhokar Dudayev's possession, in particular, were described as the fruits of the author's fantasies by a spokesman of the public relations center of the Russian Federal Security Service. In an interview to our correspondent he stated unambiguously that Dudayev has not had, does not have, and could not have any mass destruction weapons.

Local Official, Journalist Kidnapped

LD3011225395 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1900 GMT 30 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] On 30 November (Sultan Shatoyev), head of Groznyy's Oktyabrskiy district internal affairs department, was kidnapped by Dudayev militants in Urus-Martan region of Chechnya. Our correspondent Anton Grishin reports:

[Grishin] Competent sources in the Internal Affairs Ministry of the Chechen Republic claim that the VAZ car was carrying Musa Akhmadov, deputy director of television and a well known Chechen writer and journalist; Gikalo Dadayev, a cameraman; Sultan Shatoyev, head of department of the Oktaybrskiy district of the town of Groznyy; and a driver.

Chechnya's Internal Affairs Ministry Khamid Ilanov said that an operational investigation group of the republic's Internal Affairs Ministry is working in the area of the kidnap. It is possible that in the very near future the militants will be putting forward certain demands for the exchange of the hostages. A ransom option is not being ruled out.

I remind you that back on 21 November the field commanders received Dudayev's order to conduct active operations aimed at wrecking the republican elections that are being prepared. At the conference of field commanders, territorial spheres of influence were divided. The order was to step up rally activity, to bring pressure to bear on local authorities, and openly intimidate the Russophone population of Urus-Martan and Vedeno regions of the republic. Considerable dollar awards were promised to persons prepared to cooperate.

As regards the last taking of hostages in Urus-Martan, Dudayev has for a long time been nursing a grudge against Groznyy television. Musa Akhmadov personally and repeatedly received threats demanding that he stop work for Zavgayev's team and heed Allah's call. Sultan Shatoyev, head of the Oktyabrskiy district internal affairs department, was at one time outlawed. [passage omitted]

Education Minister Kidnapped in Groznyy

LD0112113395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1107 GMT 1 Dec 95

[By Aleksandr Kharchenko]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYY December 1 (Itar-Tass) — The Moscow-backed Education minister of Chechnya, Efim Gelman, was kidnapped in a Groznyy street on Thursday night, Tass learned from the republican Prosecutor's office on Friday.

There were no eye witnesses, according to a spokesman of the office. The kidnapping took place in Victory street. No other details were available.

Ministry's Latest Operations Summarized

LD3011200095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1413 GMT 30 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYY, Nov 30 (Interfax) — Interior Ministry troops killed 459 and detained 18 militants in Chechnya in the past two months, the Groznyy-based federal command told Interfax.

At present, Chechen formations number 6,500 men, including about 300 mercenaries, a spokesman for the command said. They are armed with tanks, armored vehicles, missile installations, self-propelled anti-aircraft installations and anti-missile complexes.

In the course of their operations designed to neutralize illegal formations, federal troops destroyed seven mortars, seven anti-tank installations, 35 automobiles, two armored vehicles, two arms depots, and a great quantity of explosives and ammunition, the spokesman said.

In the meantime, Interior Ministry and other Russian forces deployed in Chechnya were fired at from different types of arms and attacked on 1,500 occasions — about 1,200 times directly in Grozny. The militants carried out three terrorist acts on the railways and blasted railway tracks on six occasions.

In the past two months, Russian Interior Ministry troops and police units lost 35 men, and 105 men were wounded.

Khabarovsk Governor Discusses Decentralization

MM3011145995 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Nov 95 pp 1,2

[Interview with Khabarovsk Kray Governor Viktor Ishayev by Boris Reznik in Khabarovsk Kray; date not given: "Separatism in Russia Is Being Provoked by Moscow. That Is the Opinion of Khabarovsk Kray Governor Viktor Ishayev"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Reznik] Until recently the idea of creating a Far East Republic was only being supported by certain ambitious local politicians. Now it is capturing the masses. The broad masses. In entrepreneurial circles, at plants, at lumber industry plants, and mines — everywhere a protest is growing against the Moscow officials who are "pumping out" almost all funds and resources from the territories without giving anything back in return. In this situation the hypothesis about "your own" republic does not seem all that absurd. What do you think about this?

[Ishayev] At one time I not only fought actively against the creation of a Far East Republic, but I was even fervently opposed to any discussion of the subject. In spring 1992 Valeriy Makharadze, then vice premier, came here to a sitting of the Far East Association for Economic Interaction Between Federation Components, whose council I chair. He said that the government and the president are very worried about increasingly frequent talk by officials about the creation of a Far East Republic. He wondered what principles lie at the heart of these sentiments, whether they are economic or political. The heads of administration of the Far East territories then answered in a friendly and sincere manner that we are involved in real economics and on that level you cannot break the Far East off from Russia. If a Far East Republic is created, the region itself may seriously lose out and become the object of redivision by our influential foreign neighbors. And all in all, this extravagant idea has been thought up by officials involved in intrigue who sit in soviets, but not by people who are involved in practical matters.

Makharadze was apparently satisfied and organized something along the lines of our oath to federalism: Together we signed the address to the president, assuring Boris Nikolayevich that we have absolutely no intention of separating from Russia. Three years went by, and I have to admit with pain and profound distress that Moscow is doing all it can, and sometimes the impossible, to detach from itself the outlying regions of Russia and kick them out of the country's economic area. I would like to recall that we are talking about 40 percent of Russia's territory, where the population is small — in the region of 7-8 million people, but the greatest raw materials resources in the country are concentrated in these boundless expanses.

We have done absolutely everything to attract the attention of the government the president himself, and his entourage to our economic problems! We have written countless letters, telegrams, and coded messages.... We have invited the highest-ranking officials in the state so that they could be familiarized on the spot with problems which essentially are not particularly complex. It is just that because of the remoteness of our krays, oblasts, and republics the output we produce becomes uncompetitive on the domestic market — everything is "eaten up" by the unbelievable transportation tariffs. We have asked for them to be regulated just for the delivery of petroleum, petroleum products, and grain. Countless promises have been made. Exactly one year ago President Yeltsin received all the heads of administration of the Far East Region. Boris Nikolayevich probed our problems and signed a very serious document: Personal instructions to individual members of the government with specific dates indicated for solving fundamental problems concerning the Far East territory. These instructions contained 15 points, whose implementation would have acted as a very strong impetus in the development of the region's economy. They included balancing out transportation tariffs and creating a single wholesale electric power market.... Need I say how inspired the heads of administration were when they returned home! They tried to ensure that all the inhabitants of the Far East found out about the president's instructions.

Now we feel ashamed to look into people's eyes because we have become kind of accomplices in a gigantic delusion: Not a single one of the president's instructions has been carried out. I have addressed Chernomyrdin, Chubays, and other leaders of the cabinet of ministers: I have said to them, let us hold a conference and discuss why there is such a couldn't-care-less attitude toward the president's instructions. The response was indifferent silence.

But I think how offensive his subordinates' attitude must be to Boris Nikolayevich himself. Maybe he does not know about the complete negligence in respect of the implementation of his decisions? We have no hope as regards his entourage: There are many cases when they have deliberately given the president false information.

[Reznik] Viktor Ivanovich, the Far East also constitutes Russia's gateway to the countries of the Asia-Pacific Region. Couldn't the obvious "gaps" in our domestic market be somehow compensated by means of mutually advantageous cooperation with neighboring states?

[Ishayev] Alas, no. And once again this is because of the center's endless machinations. I can demonstrate this with just one example. We know what great reserves of valuable timber the Far East has. In the past decade Khabarovsk Kray alone has built up stocks of 14-15 million cubic meters of timber. Practically all the republics of the former Union used to be its customers. Now they have gone, and lumber procurement has fallen to one-third. We could develop the supply of timber to Japan, South Korea, and other countries instead. But we are losing the market and potential partners because some "wise guy" in the capital thought up the advance payment of customs duties. This is unbelievable nonsense! Think about it, how can an enterprise pay enormous sums of money in currency even before...the contract is implemented? It is not given state credit for this. Instead of available resources, foreigners offer obsolete logging equipment which will have to be paid for in commercial lumber for a long time. As a result, timber procurement establishments are standing idle and the economy is suffering.

We asked that the payment of customs duty be postponed, if only for a month, and that we settle up after the contract has been carried out, rather than before. I spoke about this to the prime minister himself, to his deputies, and to ministers. Everyone agreed, and said: "Yes, this really is ridiculous." But nothing has changed.

That is the root of the depression of the territories' leadership. We are simply being provoked and forced to seek new ways of organizing the economy.

[Reznik] And you see the creation of a Far East Republic as the solution?

[Ishayev] Possibly. The Russian Constitution contains an article on the equality of Federation components. But for some reason we have to transfer over half of all our profits to the country's budget, while the republics pay no more than one-fourth. This is almost Orwellian: "All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others."

Moscow frequently reproaches us, saying that we should establish order in our krays and oblasts ourselves. There is no point in blaming the central authorities for everything! But in fact the heads of administration have very few rights. Take our kray, where over one-third of all the Far East's industry is concentrated, and where there are major hubs of transportation. For every kray administration official there are five or six officials in their federal services: customs officials, tax inspectors, and so on. They are working for Moscow and for themselves, and they are no use to the kray. This is impossible in a republic, there everyone works for a common result. Now, in terms of economic potential and strategic significance to Russia, compare either Maritime Kray, for example, or Khabarovsk, with, let's say, an autonomous republic — I do not want to offend any of them. A difference of several orders of magnitude. But the credits, subsidies, and budget funds we receive are in inverse proportion.

What can we say about republics, when sometimes the method of redistributing resources between krays and oblasts is not explained in any way. It is folly when you can manage to get into the president's office and persuade him to sign an edict on personal economic support for an individual plant, as was the case with Rosselmash, or an individual territory, such as Krasnodar Kray.

We must have rights which will ensure that we can develop our own economy and use our natural resources for the good of the region and its inhabitants and the whole of Russia. For this we need our own network of banks, not, like now, dozens of branches of Moscow bankswhich merely gobble up our money, our own customs service, and our own tax police and inspectorate. And as you can see, these are the attributes of a republic.

Incidentally, the antagonism of the territories is in many respects generated by the lack of openness and glasnost in their mutual relations with the center, in the division into favorites and the unloved. A few days ago my colleague Eduard Rossel from Yekaterinburg agreed with the president about the division of powers between the oblast and the center. The question is: Can everyone do this? What do you have to do to be allowed to do this? We are prepared to wait in line....

Or, for instance, the president determines that elections of heads of administration will be held in fall of next year. With his other hand he allows several governors to be elected now, in December. How must the others feel in this situation?

It is not hard to imagine a situation where some administrators are elected while others are appointed. The central power structures, alas, have no administrative effect on the elected ones. To suit their own populism they will start doing with impunity what some of them have already completely approved: seizing and appropriating other people's cargo, dictating whatever terms they like to Moscow, adopting decisions to suit their own territories alone.... This will do nothing but create chaos and anarchy.

[Reznik] Are you not afraid to announce at the top of your voice in the pages of a newspaper that you are advocating the creation of a Far East Republic? After all, you will be accused of separatism...

[Ishayev] Separatism is departure. We have no intention of leaving Russia. We are trying to achieve one thing: If the center does not help us to develop the economy and solve social problems, let it not get in our way.

Cesium-137 Thief Arrested in Chelyabinsk Oblast

MM3011140695 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 30 Nov 95 p 2

[POSTFACTUM report: "Cesium-137 Thief Arrested"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A 28-year-old mine electrician who stole four containers of cesium-137 has been arrested by members of the Criminal Investigations Department of the city of Bakal, Chelyabinsk Oblast, the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs has reported. The loss of the radioactive material was discovered last week during stocktaking at the Bakal mining administration's agglomerate shop.

Economic Issues

Banks Cautioned on Undermining Securities Market

LD3011201895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1845 GMT 30 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, November 30 (Itar-Tass) — Russian Central Bank has warned that it "will take adequate measures" if three commercial banks, including "Inkombank", "Rossiysky Credit" Bank and "Alfa" Bank, make a move to bring about a collapse of the market of short-term state securities. This was announced by deputy chairman of the Central Bank, Aleksandr Khandruyev, who declined to say what concrete measures might be taken.

The press service of the Russian State bank reported today that the Central Bank possesses all the necessary resources in order to ensure stability on the currency market and the market of securities. The press service described threats made by the managers of these three commercial banks as "irresponsible."

According to the Central Bank, the overall resources of these three banks in state securities and foreign currency are insignificant against the overall market resources, and the banks' opinion of their power to influence the currency and securities market was "obviously exaggerated."

Chubays, Others on 'Major' Economic Decisions

LD3011150495 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1400 GMT 30 Nov 95

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] Immediately after leaving a meeting with the president, three men who are among those most responsible for our economy immediately informed journalists of three major items of economic news.

Anatoliy Chubays announced the limits of the currency corridor which has just been confirmed. The lower limit is 4,550 rubles [R], the upper is R5,150. The width of the corridor remains the same as before — R600. It will maintain these figures from 1 January to 30 June 1996.

Sergey Dubinin is now particularly confident of the stability of the currency and other markets in Russia and announced a lowering of the Central Bank annual interest rate from 170 percent to 160 percent as from 1 December.

Finally, Aleksandr Livshits announced that the president today signed an edict which from next year removes export duties from almost all goods apart from oil, gas, and a small number of raw materials; however, the duties on these will be approximately halved.

Chubays Announces New Ruble Exchange Rate Band

LD3011132095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1251 GMT 30 Nov 95

[By Andrey Shtorkh]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, November 30 (Itar-Tass) — Russia imposes a new rouble exchange rate band fixing it between 4,550 and 5,150 roubles per dollar from January 1 to June 30, 1996, first vice-premier Anatoliy Chubays said on Thursday.

The decision to impose the new "rouble corridor" was taken at Thursday's meeting of Russian President Boris Yeltsin with Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and a group of federal ministers in charge of economic matters.

Yeltsin is currently recovering from heart trouble in Barvikha suburban Moscow sanatorium.

The previous "rouble corridor" expiring on December 31, was fixed between 4,300 and 4,900 roubles per dollar.

At the Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange on Thursday rouble closed at 4,580 against the greenback.

The Central Bank of Russia has downed the rediscount rate from 170 to 160 per cent from December 1, bank's chairman Sergey Dubinin said. This is the fourth cut of the rate this year which is used for setting other major interest rates.

The previous ten-point cut was announced on October 24 and was viewed by economists as a cautious stabilisation sign.

Government Considers Plan To Clear Internal Debt

LD3011195495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1413 GMT 30 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Nov 30 (FIA-Interfax) — The Russian government on Thursday considered a three-year plan for clearing internal debt, mainly commodity obligations to the public.

First Deputy Finance Minister Andrey Vavilov told a government meeting that at least 30 trillion rubles in October prices would have to be raised to do so.

He said the so-called unconditional commitments including 1990 interest-free bonds, special purpose cheques and deposits for car purchases are to be redeemed first.

The plan provides for settling government debt to Harvest-90 cheque holders and grain sellers as part of the privatization scheme as well as conversion of debt into government securities to be paid either in cash or kind.

Bond holders are to get a full redemption at consumer prices on the day of compensation.

Car bond holders will get a redemption of 60 percent of the vehicle's cost in 1995 and first half of 1996 at prices to be agreed by the finance ministry and car makers. The ministry is to issue special purpose three-year bonds to cover the remaining cost of 40 percent.

To meet its obligations to grain sellers and Harvest-90 bond holders (pending renewed registration), the ministry will issue five-year special bonds in 1996 to the sum of its debt at prices on the day of issue.

Central Bank To Toughen Regulations

LD3011151395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1455 GMT 30 Nov 95

[By Nadezhda Anisimova, Gennadiy Yezhov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow November 30 (Itar-Tass) — From the beginning of next year the Central Bank of Russia intends to toughen the legislation regulating the activity of commercial banks, specifically, to set the limits on deposits they can accept. Aleksandr Khandruyev first Deputy Chairman of the Central Bank, announced this at the cabinet meeting on Thursday. He delivered a report "On the Basic Trends of the State Monetary Policy in 1996."

The maximum volume of deposits accepted by commercial banks should not surpass the registered capital of banks. In this way, the bank's prosperity will be determined not by the amount of funds collected, for instance, from the population but by successful banking activities.

Khandruyev believes that the largely imperfect banking legislation, adopted in a hurry, was a serious mistake of the first years of economic transformations. "This led to the emergence of a huge number of banks which did not last long. Khandruyev said the country needs large and reliable commercial banks.

The Central Bank is going to be more careful about registering documents of new commercial banks. There will be strict responsibility of the founders of a bank. They will be obliged to give financial aid to such a bank if it meets with a crisis.

The Central Bank is going to approach most seriously the creation of new mechanisms of forming reserves of commercial banks in 1996. They are now obliged to contribute 20 per cent of their capital toward the reserve of the Central Bank, but some 30 per cent of commercial banks do not comply with this demand.

Central Bank Addresses Currency, Refinancing Rates

MK0112074295 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 21 Nov 95 p 1

[Report by Yaroslav Skvortsov: "Sergey Dubinin Will Start Off with the 'Corridor' and the Prime Rate"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday Russian Central Bank Chairman Sergey Dubinin conducted the first session of the Central Bank Board after his election.

According to KOMMERSANT-DAILY sources, the session planned to discuss a number of questions, the main ones being the bank's refinancing rate and the future of the currency corridor. It will be recalled that earlier Central Bank Chairman Sergey Dubinin said that the Central Bank's currency reserves — about $11 billion — will allow to maintain the currency corridor. On this assumption, Sergey Dubinin promised that the bank's policy in this sphere will not undergo any substantial changes in the near future. At the same time, he believes that it is necessary to adjust the corridor's limits. It is not ruled out that such an adjustment will be made today: As is known, a Russian government session will discuss the question of extending the currency corridor.

Experts believe that the corridor limits can be shifted toward a reduction of the ruble rate. If implemented, this measure can be seen as indirect support of Russian exporters. At the same time, Dubinin admitted that the market is dominated by a directly opposite trend. "If the

Central Bank leaves the currency market, the rate of the dollar will drop to the 3,000-ruble mark [per $1]," he said a few days ago.

According to KOMMERSANT-DAILY sources, apart from the currency corridor, the Central Bank Board session also discussed the refinancing rate. In Dubinin's opinion, the current rate — 170 percent — is too high, which hinders a lowering of the rates of commercial bank credits to industrial and agricultural enterprises. The Central Bank chairman considers reducing short state bond yields, which are now 110-115 percent annualized, among the measures of cutting commercial bank credit rates. However, yesterday board members failed to discuss the entire range of questions: Soon after it began, the session was interrupted, and Sergey Dubinin left for Barvikha [sanitarium] outside Moscow to meet with President Yeltsin.

International Affairs

Kiev, Bulgaria Want 'Priority Role' in Former Yugoslavia

*LD3011171395 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian
1300 GMT 30 Nov 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev — "Ukraine and Bulgaria should join efforts in demanding a priority role in the economic reconstruction of former Yugoslavia," the chairman of the Bulgarian National Assembly, Blagovest Sendov, told a news conference on 30 November. "Our countries have every moral reason to do so, having suffered great losses from the UN sanctions against Yugoslavia," he said.

Sofia has ended its own ban on arms sale to the region, following the recent lifting of the UN sanctions, the speaker revealed.

Sendov said Bulgaria had no plans to join the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Parliamentary Assembly [BSECPA], while "concentrating on accession to European organizations", and preferred to step up economic cooperation without "getting locked in political alliances" such as the BSECPA.

The Ukrainian parliament chairman, Oleksandr Moroz, expressed a different view, stressing that "participation in the BSECPA provided a legal framework to meet economic interests".

Both speakers called for more frequent meetings between the two countries' parliament members, "who share the same views and interests".

Defense Minister Discusses Meeting With Grachev

*MM0112110695 Moscow TRUD-7 in Russian
1-7 Dec 95*

[Report from UKRINFORM-TASS from Ukrainian Edition p 11: "There Is Chance of Trying on 'Blue Helmets'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev — "The Ukrainian delegation did not feel any pressure from the Russian side during the talks with Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev. It was a dialogue of equal partners." This was stated at a press conference by Ukrainian Defense Minister Valeriy Shmarov. "Our states have a very powerful military-industrial potential and it should be used in the interests of both countries." V. Shmarov also stated that Ukraine will insist on expanding the numerical strength of its military forces. This is connected with the fact that Russia has lifted financial restrictions in the North Caucasus district. According to the Ukrainian minister the Transcaucasus is an "unsafe zone" for Ukraine too. "Whether people like it or not we are also obliged to defend our national interests," V. Shmarov said.

Moreover, Ukraine has given its consent to the UN request to send an engineer battalion to Angola as part of the peacekeeping forces. The battalion will include about 1,200 peacekeepers. This week a group of forces returned from Angola where they had carried out a reconnaissance. They gave a positive assessment of the possibility of the participation of Ukrainian "blue helmets" as part of the UN peacekeeping forces in Angola. According to Valeriy Shmarov the Ukrainian engineering battalion's participation within the UN troops will be paid for entirely by that international organization.

Polish Priests Expelled on Spying Charge

*MM3011144495 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
30 Nov 95 p 1*

[Unattributed report under the "PRAVDA News Bureau" rubric: "Either Priests or Spies"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Two Roman Catholic priests, Piotr Buk and Jozef Trel, who are Polish citizens, have been expelled from Ukraine by the law enforcement agencies. The priests attracted the attention of the special services owing to their excessive interest in military units stationed in the west of the country.

Reason Given for Expulsion

*MM0112112795 Moscow TRUD-7 in Russian
1-7 Dec 95*

[Report by Galina Nekrasova from Ukrainian Edition p 14: "Whom Were Pastors in Soutanes Serving?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Lvov — The law enforcement organs have expelled two Roman Catholic priests — Piotr Buk and Jozef Trel , who are Polish citizens — from Ukraine. They were working in Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast.

No one would have known of this incident, which occurred 20 November, had the Polish mass media and the Vatican administration not deemed this step illegal, aimed against the Roman Catholic church and against this faith in Ukraine itself.

The Ukrainian security service press center announced that the priests were of interest to the special services because of their excessive curiosity regarding military units stationed in the West Ukraine region and in particular regarding those which contained electronic warfare subunits and contacted the Ukrainian servicemen of these units [as published]. This behavior of the "brothers in Christ" could damage Ukraine's defense capability, in connection with which under the law on the legal state of foreigners the Ukrainian security service suggest they leave the state's territory.

Minister Criticizes West's 'Strange Behavior' on Chernobyl

WS0112120695 Kiev INTELNEWS in English 0755 GMT 1 Dec 95

[By Olha Burda, "special to INTELNEWS"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV, Nov. 30. Ukraine's leaders have stiffened their resistance to closing the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, scene of the world's worst nuclear disaster in 1986.

As talks began Thursday in Vienna between G-7 leaders and a Ukrainian negotiating team over how to implement Ukraine's pledge to shut down the plant by the year 2000, many of the country's top leaders are expressing skepticism over the West's aid commitments and calling for extended operation of the facility in the event promised compensation for the closure proves inadequate.

Environment Protection Minister Yuriy Kostenko said before departing for Vienna that there were many questions that needed to be answered before Ukraine could agree to shut the troubled plant. "In order to close Chernobyl by the year 2000 there are necessary costs for preparatory works we must already perform," he said. "It's a long-term and very complicated technical process."

"The (G-7) Memorandum doesn't have any concreteness," said Kostenko. According to Kostenko, the West's proposals fall far short of the US$ 4 billion the shutdown would cost Ukraine's economy. The Ukrainian delegation, Kostenko says, will initiate the question about the contribution of Ukraine into implementation of the G-7 Chernobyl program.

"Our contribution is significantly understated. Ukraine already today has contributed big costs to increase the safety of Chernobyl, and also the other nuclear power plants, which work in Ukraine," he said.

According to Ukrainian calculations, this contribution reaches more than US$2 billion. In the Memorandum, the contribution of Ukraine is indicated at US$ 800 million.

"The behavior of the West, which obliged to give Ukraine the costs, is very strange today," said Kostenko.

"They say, that the amount of US$3-4 billion requested by Ukraine (although we don't request anything) is very big. For the USA this amount is simply funny, when they give US$ 3 billion of assistance to Israel," he added.

Kostenko said he "does not see the big tragedy if the Memorandum is not signed this year."

"But we won't any more pull the plow by ourselves," said the minister. "We didn't get a kopeck for having refused nuclear weapons."

In a related development, Parliament Speaker Oleksandr Moroz stated that Ukraine hasn't taken a decision on the state level to shut down Chernobyl nuclear power plant. The closure, he told a Thursday gathering of domestic and foreign journalists, "was not considered in Parliament and on the governmental level."

UN Accused of Ignoring Chernobyl Problem

LD0112103295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0942 GMT 1 Dec 95

[By Boris Sitnikov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] UNITED NATIONS December 1 (Itar-Tass) — Now that Chernobyl has become the synonym for the greatest tragedy from the humanitarian point of view and a major technological disaster of the 20th century, one is surprised at the following contradiction. On the one hand, the global nature of the Chernobyl problem is recognised and solidarity statements are issued, while, on the other hand, there is a desire to forget about the universal human aspects of the problem and whittle down to nought the international humanitarian support for the stricken population, Ivan Kenik, Belarus Minister for Emergency Situations and the Protection of Population from the Chernobyl disaster aftermath, told a press conference at the U.N. headquarters on Thursday.

Kenik pointed out that Belarus "has to assign a quarter of the national income and introduce a 12-percent Chernobyl tax to resolve the post-Chernobyl problems". "According to international estimates, Belarus accounts for 70 percent of the Chernobyl radiactive fall- out," he said.

Over nine years that have passed since the Chernobyl disaster, the U.N. has spent only 20 million U.S. dollars through the World Health Organisation on Chernobyl clean-up, or six million dollars per stricken country, Kenik said.

"To Russia, the Chernobyl nuclear power station breakdown became a national tragedy, just as to Belarus and Ukraine," Viktor Vladimirov, Russian Deputy Minister for Civil Defence, Emergency Situations and the Elimination of the Aftermath of Natural Calamities, told the press conference.

Vladimirov said that almost 60,000 square kilometres of Russia's territory have been exposed to radiactive contamination as a result of the Chernobyl disaster, with about three million people living on the contaminated territories.

"At present, about 100,000 people in Russia are exposed to additional radiation and an increased sickness rate is observed in contaminated territories," Vladimirov pointed out.

"In Ukraine, radiation has affected the health of more than 3.2 million people. Over 2.5 million people, including about 500,000 children, continue to live in more than 2,000 built-up areas on territories affected by the disaster aftermath. More than 4 percent of Ukraine's state budget is used to finance Chernobyl clean-up operations," Boris Gudima, Deputy Permanent Representative of Ukraine at the U.N., told the press conference.

"The world community's interest in the Chernobyl-related issues has markedly declined. This trend continues from year to year despite the obvious increase in the incidence of diseases in the stricken countries," Gudima emphasised.

Pipeline Accident Halts Gas Supply to Hungary

LD3011135095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1056 GMT 30 Nov 95

["INTERFAX-UKRAINE Business Review"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, Nov 30 (Interfax-Ukraine) — An outburst of ethylene occurred Wednesday on the gas pipeline linking the Carpathian city of Kalush and Hungary.

The accident occurred near the populated areas of Gorodok and Nove in the Irshava region, Ukraine's Civil Defense Department told Interfax-Ukraine. Gas has been temporarily cut off and the pipeline is expected to be mended later on Thursday.

The pipeline, with a diameter of 300 millimeters, is laid at a depth of more than 1 meter.

Udovenko Signs Documents on Cooperation With South Korea

LD3011155295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1420 GMT 30 Nov 95

[By Nikolay Geronin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] SEOUL, November 30 (Itar-Tass) — Ukraine and South Korea signed a package of documents envisaging measures to establish diplomatic relations, commercial, economic and transport ties. The documents were signed in Seoul on Thursday by Ukrainian foreign minister Hennadiy Udovenko and his South Korean counterpart KONG No-myong.

During the negotiations Ukraine positively responded to Seoul's request to refrain from selling arms to North Korea, a spokesman for the South Korean Foreign Ministry said. On his part Hennadiy Udovenko who is here on a five-day visit offered to Seoul a number of projects for South Korean investment into the Ukrainian economy.

The sides agreed to set up a bilateral committee on trade called upon to promote the establishment and widening of trade between the two countries. An agreement on direct air services was also concluded.

A protocol on cooperation between the foreign ministries of the two countries was also signed. It envisages consultations of the foreign ministers.

Ukraine will soon open its diplomatic mission in Seoul, Udovenko reported.

Russian Sailors To Withdraw From Yevpatoriya by 19 Dec

AU3011130395 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 29 Nov 95 p 8

[Unattributed report from Yevpatoriya: "Russian Sailors Are Leaving the City"]

[FBIS Translated Text] By 19 December, the last Russian sailor from military unit 77,115, which has been deployed here for the last 40 years, has to leave Yevpatoriya. The Black Sea Fleet marine regiment will be disbanded. Some of the young officers and junior officers will go to Russia. Those who remain — the overwhelming majority — will be able to continue working here. The cantonment will be handed over to a police school. A company of Ukraine's National Guard will also be stationed on this territory.

National Affairs

Finance To Determine Status of Bosnia Peacekeepers

LD3011201295 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1900 GMT 30 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kharkov — Finance is the main problem which underpins Ukraine's position on the subordination of its peacekeepers in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Volodymyr Mukhin, chairman of the Supreme Council Commission for Defense and State Security, told UNIAN.

"If the Ukrainian unit is transferred under NATO command, Ukraine has to fund its upkeep. If it stays under the UN mandate, it will continue to be financed by the United Nations," he said.

"The parliament is unlikely to endorse peacekeeping at Ukraine's expense, especially now that it is faced with a pauper's budget for next year."

According to the commission chairman, the cost of the Russian peacekeeping unit, operating outside NATO command, is estimated at several tens of millions of dollars per month. "Ukraine has no such money," he said.

Kuchma Addresses Council of Regions on Draft Constitution

LD3011234995 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1918 GMT 30 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV, Nov 30 (Interfax-Ukraine) — The Constitution shall be an "incentive for unity" rather than an apple of discord, said Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma. He was addressing a meeting of the Council of Regions Thursday [30 November] on the subject of the main provisions of the draft new Constitution.

President Kuchma emphasized that the draft prepared by the ad hoc group is a preliminary version and, hence, can under no circumstances be treated as the final one.

"There shall be no protraction of the constitutional process," President Kuchma stressed, Yet, as he put it, "however much we may be willing to do that as soon as possible, this process is going to be a long one." "Reaching a consensus on the provisions of the draft Constitution at the Constitutional Committee is a very difficult job," he said.

The Ukrainian President noted that the Constitution is not a time-serving paper, and it is not created to fit President Kuchma."

Speaking on the procedure of appointing the Prime Minister, President Kuchma expressed readines to accept a procedure, according to which a parliamentary coalition will name the candidate. Meanwhile, Kuchma said, the current Parliament "is unable to form a coalition."

The President has also voiced support for the idea of forming a two-chamber Parliament in Ukraine, contained in the draft new Constitution. He described the idea as a "step forward", since such a structure of Partliament will make possible a direct representation of the regions. President Kuchma declared for "a more active participation of the heads of adminisrations in the constitutional process."

The participants in the meeting decided to address the Constitutional Committee with the request that it forward the draft Constitution to the regional state administrations to study the provisions determining the status, organization, and functioning of the local bodies of government.

The resolution adopted at the end of the meeting noted that the 'Council of the Regions deems it necessary to urge the Constitutional Committee to use every opportunity to accelerate and complete the process of drafting the Fundamental Law and adopt it.

On November 23 this year, the Constitutional Committee adopted as a basis for "further deliberations" the draft paper prepared by the ad hoc group of the Constitutional Committee. It has been decided to set up a new working group to finalize the paper. The ten-men-strong team will include four representatives from the President and Parliament each, and two — from the judicial authority.

Kuchma Appoints Crimean Internal Affairs Ministry Chief

WS0112102695 Kiev INTELNEWS in English 0755 GMT 1 Dec 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV, Nov. 29. President Leonid Kuchma issued a decree Wednesday appointing militia major Mykhaylo Korniyenko as the Crimean Internal Affairs Ministry Chief. Commenting on a new appointment, Deputy Internal Affairs Minister Leonid Borodich said in an interview with Ukrainian national radio that Korniyenko is a quick decision-maker and a good organizer. Before this appointment Korniyenko worked as internal affairs ministry administrative service senior department chief. Borodich said Crimea "needs a man like Korniyenko."

President Criticizes Cabinet for Poor Army Financing

LD3011225595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1754 GMT 30 Nov 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature: Compiled by Anna Kovaleva, Nikolay Zherebtsov, Andrey Petrovskiy, Boris Yunanov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] President Leonid Kuchma has said the financing of the Ukrainian army is unsatisfactory and placed the responsibility on the cabinet. This was stated at a Wednesday meeting in Kiev by the Chief of the General Staff Col.Gen. Anatoliy Lopata.

According to him, Kuchma said that in the absence of funding the army is forced to survive instead of developing.

Besides, the head of state thinks the process of building the Armed Forces has been practically stopped primarily in the absence of a clear distribution of functions between a civilian defense minister and the General Staff.

At an earlier conference of the Defense Ministry leadership Kuchma said he gave instructions to the cabinet to check the implementation of the program of housing construction for army officers and to improve the financing of the armed forces. "The situation can be changed for the better and modern armed forces can be built only with due attention to the army on the part of all government institutions," Kuchma stressed.

Prime Minister Chastises Ministers' Productivity

LD3011172895 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 0930 GMT 30 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev — The Ministries of Communications, Environment and Nuclear Safety, Coal Industry, Internal Affairs, and Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, the Committee for Defense of Ukrainian State Borders, the Fund of State Property of Ukraine, and the HQ of Civil Defense have not implemented the measures, planned for November, directed at ensuring submission of draft legislative acts to the Cabinet of Ministers. The heads of these ministries and departments are to send a letter to the prime minister of Ukraine, in which they should outline relevant measures, which they are going to take, said Prime Minister Yevheniy Marchuk on 30 November at a Cabinet of Ministers meeting.

According to him, the failure by the ministries and departments to implement the measures envisaged by the government action plan will be seen as inability of the leaders of such departments to head them. Some members of the government have not grasped the new situation. It has not sunk in with them that the government is beginning to work according to a new regime. The old pace cannot ensure the implementation of the government program, noted the prime minister of Ukraine.

Yevheniy Marchuk stated that responsibility for the state of an industry and the implementation of the government program as regards that industry will be borne by respective ministers personally. He said that due to lack of responsibility the government program is now "skidding".

The prime minister noted that the minister of the Cabinet of Ministers, Valeriy Pustovoytenko, must turn his attention to the strengthening of control over the implementation of the decisions of the Cabinet of Ministers and must also consider the position of the heads of the control Department of the Cabinet of Ministers.

Crimea, Krasnodar Sign Cooperation Agreement

LD3011235095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2048 GMT 30 Nov 95

["INTERFAX-UKRAINE" news item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Simferopol, November 30 (Interfax-Ukraine) — The government of the Republic of Crimea and the administration of the Krasnodar territory (Russian Federation) have signed an agreement on principles of economic, scientific-technical, and cultural cooperation.

The cooperation agreement was signed in the course of the visit to Krasnodar of the Crimean delegation led by Prime Minister of Crimea Anatol Franchuk, Interfax-Ukraine was told at the press service of the autonomy's government Thursday.

In the course of the visit, the members of the Crimean delegation held talks with Yevgeniy Kharitonov, Head of the Krasnodar territory administration, and Nikolay Kryazhevskikh, head of the administration of the city of Krasnodar.

In the course of the talks, the sides reached agreement on regular bilateral consultations and on concluding treaties on cooperation in trade, transport, power engineering, and the agri-industrial complex.

It has been decided to set up a "Crimea-Krasnodar" coordination committee to examine a liberalization of customs control between Kerch and Temryuk district of Krasondar territory and prospects for transoprtation across the Kerch Strait.

The government of Crimea and the administration of the Krasnodar territory have reached agreement on addressing to the governments of Ukraine and Russia with the initiative on resumption of cargo-ferry service Crimea-Caucasus and in the future of building a bridge to span the Kerch Strait.

On top of it, the sides intend to initiate the creation of free and special economic zones along the border.

Chernobyl Official Concerned About State of 'Sarcophagus'

LD3011234795 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1210 GMT 30 Nov 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Mikhail Melnikov]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Kiev, 30 Nov — Work to build the "sarcophagus", or cover, over generating unit No. 4 at the Chernobyl nuclear power station was completed exactly nine years ago. But over time it has become a potential hazard to staff, to the public, and to the environment. An international gathering of scientists and practitioners opened today at Chernobyl to find a solution to the problem.

The main danger is that radioactive dust might escape from within the sarcophagus during storm winds or an earthquake, or from a spontaneous chain reaction or other such cataclysm, ITAR-TASS was told by Chernobyl's deputy managing director, Valentin Kupnyy. He could not rule out the possibility of solid or liquid-phase radioactivity escaping from the site into groundwater or the catchment area of the River Pripyat. Expert opinion is that beams or struts could collapse from metal fatigue and trigger an emergency scenario.

Worst of all, according to Kupnyy, nobody knows for sure where the fuel-containing masses are. Neither is it known which chemical elements were mixed with uranium during the Chernobyl accident, and how the masses will behave in the future. [passage omitted]

Director Urges New Image for Plant

*LD3011173895 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian
1200 GMT 30 Nov 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Slavutych — "We have to dispel myths surrounding the Shelter facility and Chernobyl," the Chernobyl nuclear plant director, Serhiy Parashyn, told an international conference in Slavutych. The conference is held to commemorate the ninth anniversary since the construction of the Shelter facility encasing the plant's crippled reactor No.4.

According to Parashyn, the plant currently produces 9,085.3 kWh of electric power, accounting for 16.1 percent of the total nuclear plant output in Ukraine.

The Chernobyl plant is operating at 69.2 percent of its normal capacity, with two active generating sets, No.1 and 3. The second power unit is down for maintenance.

The plant director refuted a recent Ukrainian television report which alleged there were around 200 cracks in the main structure of the Shelter facility.

He spoke of the need to change Chernobyl's public image, saying that 1986 should not be described as the year of disaster, but as the year of victory over the accident.

Official: Kiev Never Ordered Shutdown

*LD3011221095 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1918 GMT 30 Nov 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV, Nov 30 (Interfax - Ukraine) — Ukraine has never made a state-level decision to shut down the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Chairman Oleksandr Moroz told a press conference in Kiev Thursday [30 November].

"This issue has never been considered either in parliament or by the government," he stated.

Prior to this, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma had announced Ukraine's intention to shut down Chernobyl by the year 2000. However, Ukraine insists the G7 countries immediately make a decision about financial assistance to the shutdown.

If the countries seeking the Chernobyl shutdown do not give Ukraine the necessary funds, "this issue will have to be done away with," Moroz said.

According to Moroz, "it is necessary to urgently develop plans for upgrading the plant so it can work well beyond 2000.

Economic Issues

Privatization Revenue Falls Short of Goal

*LD3011234295 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1918 GMT 30 Nov 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] DONETSK, Nov 30 (Interfax-Ukraine) — Ukraine's budget received only 2 trillion karbovantsy instead of the 90 trillion expected as privatization revenues for the first 10 months of 1995, the chairman of the parliamentary commission for budget issues, Nikolay Azarov, told the Donetsk region administration Thursday [30 November]. (1,000 Ukrainian karbovantsy are currently trading for 25 Russian rubles — IF note).

According to Azarov, Ukraine's State Property Fund had "envisioned absolutely unrealistic privatization revenues in the state budget."

Among other reasons for the underfinanced budget, Azarov stressed "poor awareness of the State Property Fund leadership of the progress of privatization in the regions and the lack of control of this process."

Azarov said expected budget revenues had been fulfilled by 62.5 percent and expenditures by 61.7 percent since the start of 1995.

The State Committee of Oil and Gas still remains the biggest budget debtor, its debt standing at 160 trillion karbovantsy, he added.

Azarov called on his colleagues to vote in favor of the proposed amendments to this year's budget. In particular, he said that the amendments "will help better regulate budget settlements between the center and the regions."

Belarus

Election Official Announces Plans for Next Round

LD3011182595 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 1700 GMT 30 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The elections to the Belarusian Supreme Soviet which took place yesterday, 29 November, are undoubtedly the main theme of today. [passage omitted] There were three news conferences devoted to the event held in the capital today. They were attended by our special correspondents. Volga Yushkevich reports:

[Yushkevich] [passage omitted] Alyaksandr Abramovich, the chairman of the Central Electoral Commission, thanked Belarusians for making their choice for the benefit of parliamentarianism, and called on them to do the same thing in the second round of voting on 10 December. Meanwhile, Mr. Abramovich gave these preliminary figures:

[Begin Abramovich recording, in Russian] I am pleased to tell you that in all 141 constituencies the elections for the Supreme Soviet were valid. During the first round of voting 20 deputies to parliament were elected. In 119 constituencies the elections were valid, but a second round of voting will be held there on 10 December. Thus at 119 constituencies there will be 238 candidates running, i.e. two per constituency, who gathered the greatest number of votes. In two constituencies elections were valid, but none of the candidates gained sufficient votes to be elected. And since in both these constituencies there were only two candidates running, in accordance with current rules there will not be elections there on 10 December. [passage omitted]

I am pleased to say that among those through to the second round of voting, there are 32 women. Of the candidates remaining, 152 belong to various political parties. Of those MPs elected in the first round, there are five Communists, three from the Agrarian Party, one from the United Democratic Party, and 11 independents.

Overall, I can say that the elections in the first round were held at a sufficiently high organizational level. In order for parliament to be able to start operating, we still have to elect 35 MPs. Since elections are being held in 119 constituencies, this task is completely achievable. [passage omitted]

Of the candidates in the second round of voting there are 72 from the Party of Communists of Belarus, 23 from the Party of the Belarusian People's Front, nine from the Agrarian Party, four from the Civic Party, three from the Belarusian Social Democratic Gramada, six from the Party of People's Accord, 10 from the Party of All-Belarusian Unity and Accord, seven from the United Democratic Party, three from the Women's Party 'Hope', five from the Republican Party of Labor and Justice, and two from the Belarusian Labor Party. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Foreign Observers Call Elections 'Free and Fair'

WS3011141095 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 1300 GMT 30 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Foreign observers who were present at 29-November elections held a news conference in the Belarusian National press center today.

The first news conference was held by representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. According to the chief of their group [name indistinct], a European Council delegation wanted to learn whether elections were held according to the Constitution and if voters obtained data on candidates. Observers stressed that elections must be regarded as free and fair, despite the fact that the situation was difficult.

The representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly have met with voters and have not registered any serious violations.

A group of observers from the European Parliament visited polling stations in Minsk, Brest, Hrodna, and Mahilew. The fact that 61 percent of voters participated in elections is a good sign. As they put it, the people began to realize that there is no democratic state without a strong, democratically elected parliament.

Only 20 Deputies' Elections Valid in First Round

LD3011172195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1517 GMT 30 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MINSK November 30 (Itar-Tass) — The destiny of the Belarusian parliament remains in question. Although the elections to the Belarusian parliament on Wednesday were valid, the 20 deputies elected in the first round are not enough for the Supreme Soviet to be effective. At least 35 more deputies should be elected in the second round so that the new parliament could get down to work. The second round of elections will be held on December 10. With taking into account the returns of the May elections, 139 parliamentarians have been elected to the 260-seat parliament.

61.2 per cent of Belarusian citizens participated in the elections on Wednesday. Voter turnout in the Brest region was 64 per cent, Vitebsk region 60.8 per cent, Gomel region 62.7 per cent, Grodno region 61.3 per cent, Mogilyov region 63.9 per cent, Minsk region 65.7 per cent and the city of Minsk 56.6 per cent.

Most prominent among the 20 candidates who won the elections are Aleksey Kamay, former secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarusia, now member of the Communist Party of Belarusia, and Aleksandr Dobrovolskiy, deputy chairman of the United civil Party.

As to other 18 deputies, four of them are Communists, three agrarians and eleven non-party people.

Representatives of Democratic party who suffered a setback in the elections in May are not going to surrender this time. Among those who qualified for the second round of elections are representatives of Belarusian popular front Valentrin Golubev, Sergey Antonchik, Yuriy Khadyko, Leonid Borshchevsky and a number of others. Zenon Poznyak who had an advantage over his rival lacked three per cent of votes to become deputy.

The bloc of the United civil party will be broadly represented in the second round of elections. Among those who won over the rivals by a large margin are ex-speaker Stanislav Shushkevich, former chairman of the National Bank Stanislav Bogdanevich, former Belarusian ambassador to Poland Georgiy Tarazevich, politicians Gennadiy Karpenko, Viktor Gonchar.

Moldova

Chisinau-Tiraspol Summit Postponed Indefinitely

AU3011140595 Chisinau INFOTAG in English 1930 GMT 29 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau, November 29 (INFOTAG) — The Wednesday-scheduled meeting between the Moldovan leadership and Dniester administration has been put off until unspecified time. Its date will be agreed upon between Chisinau and Tiraspol expert teams, INFOTAG was told by a Tiraspol official.

The leaders of the unrecognized Dniester republic have blamed Chisinau of upsetting the meeting, having stated that "the Russian State Duma's decision cannot influence the negotiation process, and Chisinau should not have refused to meet only for that reason." Speaking over the Tiraspol television last weekend, the Dniester Parliament chairman, Grigore Maracuta, stated that "the Moldovan leadership is suggesting to meet in Chisinau, but according to the regulations agreed upon by the sides, this summit is supposed to be organized in Tiraspol. If not here, there will be no meeting at all, because we shall not go to Chisinau."

The Dniester media have published Igor Smirnov's letter to President Mircea Snegur which was handed in to Chisinau experts during the last meeting of the status drafting teams. In particular, the Tiraspol leader wrote that "due to the absence of Moldova's official confirmation of readiness to hold a meeting, and taking into consideration our previous agreement to meet once a month and your request to postpone the next summit to end-November, the leadership of the Dniester Moldovan Republic is hereby inviting you for the next meeting to be held on November 29 at 11.00 a.m. [0900 GMT] in Tiraspol."

In his message, Igor Smirnov suggested to the Moldovan president to discuss at the summit the draft memorandum "On the Statehood of the Dniester Moldovan Republic and on Establishing State Legal Relations with the Republic of Moldova," a draft treaty "On Joint Competence of the Dniester Moldovan Republic and the Republic of Moldova," a protocol of issues agreed upon by the sides' experts, a draft agreement on the interaction of customs organs, draft agreements on the media and communications, on a Russian consular office in Tiraspol, on interaction of monetary and credit systems of Moldova and Dniester.

The Chisinau-Tiraspol summit postponement should not be considered as negotiation process wrecking, Mr. Victor Josu, adviser to President Snegur, stated at today's briefing.

The November 29 summit has not taken place because the Tiraspol leaders had deviated from the positions worked out and agreed upon by the sides, and appealed to the Russian State Duma begging to recognize Dniester's independence, which resulted in Duma's adoption of the known scandalous resolution, the adviser said.

"The expert teams shall continue their work. The official Chisinau's position remains unchanged: The eastern region issue must be resolved through granting a special legal status to Dniester in the framework of a unified state — the Republic of Moldova. Our propositions and draft status law shall be published soon," Victor Josu said.

He stressed, it would be wrong to say that the negotiations are conducted by President Snegur alone. All the previous meetings involved Prime Minister Andrei Sangheli and Parliament Chairman Petru Lucinschi. The Chisinau's position at the talks has always reflected the unified viewpoint of the Moldovan leadership.

Answering journalists' questions on the role of intermediaries at the negotiations, the president's press secretary, Vasile Grozavu, said, "The head of state has always distinguished the priority role played by the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] at the talks, as the rest two mediators, Russia and Ukraine, are also members of this international organization," though, he remarked, one should not underestimate the role of Russia and Ukraine in maintaining the stability in the region.

Mr. Grozavu pointed out, Moldova remains faithful to its external political line, and "its joining the CIS Military-Political Union, or deployment of foreign military bases on its territory is absolutely out of the question, as that would contradict to the Moldovan Constitution."

He said, the president has always spoken for realization of the Moldovan-Russian Agreement on removal of Russian troops from the Moldovan territory, and welcomed the agreement signed this week by the Russian and Ukrainian defence ministers on the transit of Russian armaments via Ukraine.

According to the press secretary, nothing is clear yet about a new summit between the Moldovan leader and the Russian president Boris Yeltsin.

Chisinau Not To Join CIS Military-Political Union

LD3011225695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1650 GMT 30 Nov 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] [no dateline as received] Moldovan presidential spokesman Vasily Grozavu told a briefing in Chisinau today that Moldova did not intend to join the CIS military-political union or other military-political blocs.

Moldova will not join military blocs because this would contradict the Moldovan Constitution which reads that the country is neutral, Grozavu said.

"Moldova's membership in the CIS consists in participation in comprehensive mutually beneficial economic cooperation with all CIS member-states," he said.

With regard to the role of mediators at talks on settlement in the Transdniestr region, Grozavu said that "President Mircea Snegur emphasizes the OSCE's priority role." (The Transdniestr region is a self-proclaimed republic in Moldova).

"However, the role of Russia and Ukraine in maintaining stability in the region on the whole could not be disregarded," Grozavu said.

A meeting of Moldovan leaders and the administration of the unrecognized Transdniestr Republic, scheduled for Wednesday, has been postponed for an indefinite time, head of the expert team and Transdnestr State Secretary Valeriy Litskay told Interfax.

He said the summit date will be fixed by working expert teams of Chisinau and Tiraspol.

Transdniestr leaders have blamed Chisinau for postponing the summit. Tiraspol Parliament Speaker Grigoriy Marakutsa told the local TV last weekend the Moldovan leaders are refusing to meet under the pretext Transdniestr keeps appealing to the Russian State Duma for recognition.

In their turn, Transdniestr representatives do not agree with Moldovan leaders on the need to hold the summit in Chisinau, said the speaker. The summit was due to be held in Tiraspol, he noted.

Radio Transdinestr circulated a letter by President of the unrecognized Transdniestr Republic Igor Smirnov to Moldovan leader Mircea Snegur this morning. The letter urged Snegur to discuss a draft memorandum on statehood of the Transdniestr Moldovan Republic and its state-legal relations with Moldova on November 29 in Tiraspol.

At the latest summit on September 13, Moldovan leaders rejected these documents. President Snegur said it is senseless to have meetings if Tiraspol refuses to abandon the idea of its own statehood.

General Says Russian Troops Ready for Peacekeeping

LD0112000795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2112 GMT 30 Nov 95

[By Valeriy Demidetskiy]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] CHISINAU November 30 (Itar-Tass) — The Russian operational group of troops stationed in Moldova's breakaway Dniester enclave is ready to take up peacekeeping tasks in the region should the leadership of Russia and Moldova draw such an agreement, the group's commander General Valeriy Yevnevich said today.

Addressing a press conference in Tiraspol, the enclave's "capital", Yevnevich said the group's taking over peacekeeping functions in the area of the previous armed conflict between Moldova and the Dniester enclave would save Russia's spending on keeping peace-policing batallions in the area.

Only Russian nationals make the troops temporarily stationed in Moldova, Yevnevich stressed, referring to a sizable proportion of indigenous officers in the former Russian 14th Army of which the operational group is a rump.

Yevnevich took the army over from General Aleksandr Lebed, who retired in protest of the crippling reform of the army.

Yevnevich voiced surprise over media "ado" about the sacking of Lebed's former comrade-in-arms, military commandant Mikhail Bergman.

He said Bergman had been relived of his post but offered a new job to consider during his present vacation.

Snegur Calls For Release of Moldovan POWs in Afghanistan

AU3011144595 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 1930 GMT 29 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau 29/11/1995 (BASA-press) — President Mircea Snegur asked Kabul authorities to help release four Moldovan citizens during the 1979-1988 military actions conducted by the USSR in Afghanistan.

The president handed his request to the Afghan Ambassador, 'Abdolvahhab Asefi, after yesterday's presentation of credentials by the Afghan diplomat, according to a presidential press service release. Afghan authorities were given the names of the four Moldovan citizens.

Mircea Snegur declared that he closely watches the developments in Afghanistan and hopes that Afghan authorities, with the UN support, will establish a lasting peace.

Kazakhstan

Moscow, Almaty Sign Protocol To Protect Baykonur Complex

LD3011160795 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1317 GMT 30 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A protocol on cooperation between the Russian and Kazakh counter-intelligence bodies aimed at ensuring the security of the Baykonur space complex has been signed in the town of Leninsk, Kzyl-Orda Region in Kazakhstan. This was reported today by the public relations center of the Russian Federal Security Service.

Officers Arrest Spy Working for 'Western Country'

MM2911154295 Moscow TRUD in Russian 29 Nov 95 p 2

[Report by Oleg Kvyatkovskiy: "Spy on the Cheap"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Almaty — On the territory of Atyrau Oblast officers of the Kazakhstan National Security Committee have arrested a spy who was working for the intelligence service of a Western country. He was a citizen of Kazakhstan with the opportunity to make frequent trips abroad. He was recruited during one such trip. On three occasions he was able to sell secret information, mostly economic in nature. He was also set the task of actively studying the personalities of the leaders of various Kazakhstani oblasts. The Almaty security officers refused to name the arrestee or the country for which he was trying to spy. However, they emphasized that the traitor's reward was a laughable sum. Particularly compared with the information expected from him.

Nazarbayev Lengthens Military Service Term to 2 Years

LD3011225095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1650 GMT 30 Nov 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] President Nursultan Nazarbayev has signed a decree to prolong the term of compulsory army service from 18 months to two years.

Deputy Defense Minister Aitkali Isengulov told a Wednesday news conference the decree will apply to conscripts who will be drafted in spring 1996. He said those doing their army service now will remain unaffected.

The deputy minister thinks the prolongation of the term will allow to reduce the number of conscripts by 25,000-30,000 every year.

He said the president also signed decrees amending the laws on defense and the armed forces, on the status and social security of servicemen. Isengulov said the documents conform with the new constitution and agreements with other countries, including Russia.

He said the army has only two thirds of the necessary number of officers, but by 1999 the shortage will be overcome.

Isengulov also said that nationals of other countries will now also be allowed to serve in the Kazakh army. Regulations on contract army service are now in the making.

Kyrgyzstan

Bishkek Opposes Creating Military Bloc To Counter NATO

LD3011220695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2100 GMT 30 Nov 95

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature: by correspondents Aleksandr Korzun, Igor Porshnev, Yevgeniy Terekhov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Nov 30 (Interfax) — Now it is impossible "to speak about the creation of a military-political bloc to counter NATO," Deputy Kyrgyz Foreign Minister Tolgat Chinetov told Interfax in Moscow Thursday, before the consultations of CIS deputy foreign ministers on the upcoming meeting of OSCE foreign ministers, to be held in Budapest on December 7-8.

"We only recently managed to avoid the confrontation of blocs and we would not like to return to the past," he stressed.

Chinetov said that the issue of NATO eastward expansion "must be resolved on the bilateral basis." If a country wants to join NATO and the Alliance is prepared to admit it, the issue can be resolved in principle," he said.

At the same time, he believes that NATO will not admit new members in the near future. The expansion "will, perhaps, take years," said Chinetov.

He said that Kyrgyzstan is not going to join NATO. "We do not count on it so far," he said.

However, he believes that cooperation with NATO, "especially in non-military areas," is very useful for Kyrgyzstan.

He said that Bishkek and NATO can cooperate in such areas as the economy, the conversion of defense industry enterprises, tackling the consequences of emergency situations and in the environment protection.

Speaking about the Kyrgyz position on the upcoming Budapest meeting, Chinetov said that Bishkek understands the European cooperation as the cooperation on the territory of all OSCE countries, not limited to Europe.

Ex-Communist Leader Running for Presidency

LD3011201995 Bishkek Kyrgyz Radio First Program Network in Kyrgyz 0600 GMT 30 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Presidential elections will be held in the Kyrgyz Republic on 24 December. At exactly 1300 on 29 November, application forms for registering the former communist leader, Dzhumgalbek Amanbayev, were brought to the central commission for elections and referendums. After checking all the documents, the central commission will pass an appropriate verdict. In three days, if they conform to the norms of the election law, Amanbayev will become a candidate for the post of head of state and will be able to start his election campaign. Proxies will also get registration certificates.

Application forms for registering Imebet Sherimkulov were brought in yesterday evening.

Tajikistan

Russian Soldier Shot Dead by Unknown Attackers

LD3011124495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1046 GMT 30 Nov 95

[By Galina Gridneva]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Dushanbe, November 30 (Itar-Tass) — A Russian serviceman, Vladimir Dovbnya, died in Dushanbe today three hours after he was shot five times with the handgun by unknown attackers at about 5 a.m. on his way home. He died without regaining consciousness.

Dovbnya, 37, was on contract service in the Russian motorised infantry division stationed in the Tajik capital.

Tajik police and representatives of the division's command have started an investigation.

More than 30 soldiers and officers of Dushanbe-stationed collective peacekeeping forces of the CIS have been killed by terrorists since the start of this year.

'Tension Persists' on Tajik-Afghan Border

LD3011134395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1056 GMT 30 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Dushanbe, Nov 30 (Interfax) - Inter-Tajik talks on settlement in Tajikistan start in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, today.

Meanwhile, tension persists on the Tajik-Afghan border. Russian border guards from the Pyanj border unit detained six persons who had illegally crossed into Tajikistan from Afghanistan. The detention took place at a section of the 9th post of the Pyanj border unit at 11:40 a.m. on November 29th, the press center of the Group of Russian Border Troops in Tajikistan reported to Interfax.

Yet another violator was arrested on the same day in similar circumstances on a section of the 4th post of the Ishkashim border unit in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region. He surrendered 200 grams of drugs.

The arrested were brought to border units. An investigation is underway.

Turkmenistan

Fifth Round of Inter-Tajik Talks Begins in Dushanbe

LD3011172595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1519 GMT 30 Nov 95

[By Lyudmila Glazovskaya]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] ASHGABAT, November 30 (Itar-Tass) — The 5th round of inter-Tajik talks held under U.N. auspices has begun in Ashgabat on Thursday night. The talks began several hours later than scheduled because an official delegation from Dushanbe, led by first deputy Prime Minister Mahmadsaid Ubaydullayev, was late for the talks.

Prior to the delegation's departure, Dushanbe stated its readiness for a constructive discussion. Head of State Emomali Rakhmanov stated there that "the 5th round of the talks should be final in the difficult inter-Tajik negotiating process," the Tajik news agency KHOVAR reported.

Ramiro Piris Ballon, the U.N. Secretary-General's special envoy, who takes part in the negotiations, told Itar-Tass that a compromise was unlikely to be reached soon.

"This is why it is very important that both parties to the talks, no less than the countries which influence the outcome of the talks — Russia, Iran and other contiguous states — jointly foster an intent to reach accord in Tajikistan," Mr Ballon said.

The readiness to resume the dialogue on a constructive basis was confirmed on Thursday morning by Tajik opposition representative Hodja Agbar Turan Zhon Zoda during a meeting with President Saparmurad Niyazov of Turkmenistan.

Azerbaijan

Baku To Sign Documents on Cooperation With NATO

LD3011141495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1352 GMT 30 Nov 95

[By Andrey Urban]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] LONDON, November 30 (Itar-Tass) — Azerbaijan will shortly sign documents on cooperation with NATO in accordance with the "Partnership for Peace" programme, Itar-Tass was told today by Azeri Foreign Minister Hasan Hasanov, who is currently staying in London as member of the Azeri delegation led by President Heydar Aliyev.

"We see nothing wrong in our interaction with the North Atlantic Alliance within the frameworks of this programme," the Azeri Foreign Minister said. "We believe that this does not interfere at all with the efforts to deepen our cooperation with the Russian Federation," he added.

Aliyev Says Caspian Belongs to Littoral States

LD3011221495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1724 GMT 30 Nov 95

[By Andrey Urban]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] LONDON, November 30 (Itar-Tass) — The Caspian Sea belongs to the littoral states, and each of them should have equal rights to use their share of it, Azerbaijani President Geydar Aliyev, currently on a visit to Britain, said here today.

"We advocate the dividing of the Caspian bottom into sectors for the littoral states," Aliyev said.

He added that the sectoral division had been carried out in the Soviet Union era, and Azerbaijan now uses its rights to its part of the Caspian, referring to Azerbaijan's landmark oil project with an international consortium of companies.

"We are ready to discuss the Caspian issue with all littoral states," Aliyev said.

Georgia

Abkhazia Offers To Join 'Union' With Georgia

LD3011164595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1530 GMT 30 Nov 95

[By Irina Shchyogoleva]

[FBIS Translated Text] SOCHI, November 30 (Itar-Tass) — Abkhazia, Georgia's breakaway enclave, is ready to return to make a union state with Georgia, says a statement from Abkhazian leader Vladislav Ardzinba circulated today by the Abkhazpress news agency.

The statement comes as Abkhazia's new initiative at its talks with Georgia now in progress in Moscow.

The statement says Abkhazia "sees the restoration of such a union state in which each of the sides would retain its constitution."

Ardzinba quoted the Abkhazian constitution which proclaims the Georgian province a sovereign state.

It follows, the statement of the Abkhazian "president" goes on, that the union state should be made of two equal subjects, and these might agree to concede part of their equal rights under a common jurisdiction.

Informed sources in Ardzinba's entourage told Itar-Tass that the Abkhazian side proposes a protocol on the creation of the single union state with Georgia.

Abkhazia does not claim an equal share of seats in the union parliament, but wants its delegates to the parliament to be entitled to the right of veto in decisions concerning Abkhazia.

Abkhazia also voiced a readiness to conduct a common defence policy with Georgia, with the reservation that its own army may co-exist with Georgia's.

Ardzinba admitted that his proposal meets with opposition by part of the Abkhazian parliament, but voiced readiness "to sign it just now."

Sources in Ardzinba's entourage explained that the protocol in question has "a provisional character and for this reason the Abkhazian president has the power to sign it without putting it for ratification."

Three Parliamentary Deputy Chairmen Elected

LD3011200895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1454 GMT 30 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] TBILISI, Nov 30 (Interfax) — Georgian deputies elected three parliamentary deputy chairmen Thursday. The parliamentary majority is represented by well-known film director Eldar Shengelaya, the opposition by member of the National-Democratic Party Georgy Gobakhidze and the Adzharian Autonomous Republic by Deputy Eduard Tsurmanidze.

Candidate to the post of deputy chairman, ex-leader of Abkhazia's Gali region Vakhtang Kobalia did not score the required number of votes. A second vote on his candidacy is likely to be held later on Thursday. The Georgian parliament is to have four deputy chairmen in accordance with the parliament's new rules, representing the parliamentary majority, the opposition, Adzharia and Abkhazia.

In Georgia's new parliament elected November 5, Abkhazia is represented by 12 deputies who worked in the previous parliament. Their powers were prolonged because it is impossible to hold elections in Abkhazia at the moment as it is not under Georgia's jurisdiction.

Previously, a leader of the ruling Union of Georgian Citizens Zurab Zhvania was elected to the post of parliament chairman.

Speaker Addresses Parliamentary Session

LD3011125195 Tbilisi IPRINDA in Russian 1115 GMT 30 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Tbilisi, 30 Nov — According to an agency correspondent, a session of the Georgian parliament took place on 30 November. [passage omitted]

Parliament Chairman Zurab Zhvania addressed the session. He said: "A majority has come to parliament in order to carry out Eduard Shevardnadze's political course. The views and rights of a parliamentary minority must be taken into consideration. We must cooperate with the constructive part of the opposition which has been left outside parliament. Schoolchildren and their parents must attend parliament sessions so that we can educate future electors."

The parliament then adopted a draft resolution on amendments and addenda to the parliament regulations.

The following persons were elected deputy chairmen of parliament: Eduard Surmanidze, a representative of the deputies from the Autonomous Republic of Ajaria; Eldar Shengelaia, a representative of the Union of Citizens of Georgia; and Giorgi Kobakhidze, a representative of the National Democrats faction. Vakhtang Qolbaia, a representative of deputies from the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, did not receive enough votes. [passage omitted]

Russia Not To Accept Abkhaz Passports

LD3011235895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1931 GMT 30 Nov 95

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] TBILISI, Nov 30 (Interfax) — Russia will not consider valid on its territory the Soviet passports issued by Sukhumi to the residents of Abkhazia, according to a protocol on cooperation between the consular services of the Russian and Georgian Foreign Ministries. The protocol was signed in Tbilisi Thursday by Georgian Foreign Ministry Consular Department head Gamlet Chipashvili and Russian Foreign Ministry Consular Service head Vinogradov.

Chipashvili told Interfax in Tbilisi Thursday that the Georgian side considers this provision of the protocol to be the most important.

The document envisages that Russian consulates will provide assistance to Georgian citizens in the countries where Russia has no diplomatic missions.

"The assistance will mostly have to do with purely domestic, and not legal or political, issues," he said.

Under the protocol, consular services of the two countries will cooperate in the training of personnel and in the detection of fake passports and other documents.

Estonia

Kallas Asserts EU Entry Based on Merit

LD0112122595 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1100 GMT 1 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Foreign Minister Siim Kallas warns that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania must not compete with each other over entry to the European Union [EU]. We are not competitors in this work, Kallas emphasized at the opening of the Baltic Assembly session in Tallinn. According to the Estonian foreign minister, the EU .will not consider which Baltic state will seem more successful compared with the others but how good the Baltic countries actually are. Estonia and Latvia have already officially submitted their applications for EU membership, and Lithuania is going to do so in the next few days.

Kallas Says Nonalignment Still Possible

BR0112110295 Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 30 Nov 95 p 5

[Report signed "j-ae": "Estonia's Future: Kallas Does Not Rule Out Nonalignment"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In an interview with Finnish newspaper LANSI-SUOMI Estonian Foreign Minister Siim Kallas signalled clear interest in the idea of Estonia, at some time in the future, declaring itself nonaligned in foreign policy matters, like Finland and Sweden.

He said that he did not rule out this possibility, even though current efforts are directed toward NATO membership.

Foreign Minister Kallas admitted in the interview that efforts to join NATO involve certain risks and problems.

"But what is the alternative? If Estonia is not a member of NATO, can you say that its security situation is in order?"

NATO, he said, can really act as a guarantor of its members' security. That is important for Estonia.

But the actual decision on the direction of future foreign and security policy will be made in a situation which takes into account the situation, the relations between the great powers, and the international constellation prevailing at the time. Right now it is difficult to say how things will be.

"Nonalignment in foreign policy of the kind practiced by Finland and Sweden appeals to me, but there is on the other hand a great difference between these countries. Behind Swedish and Finnish policy is a strong military capability which Estonia does not have. Finland has repelled Russia twice by force of arms. That is a further convincing fact."

"I do not rule out nonalignment of the same type, but Estonia's defense capability must be raised considerably before this idea can be realized. When Estonia's military strength reaches the level of Sweden's and Finland's, we can discuss security cooperation in earnest."

In the interview, which was made by LANSI-SUOMI's editor-in-chief Jarmo Virmavirta, Foreign Minister Kallas also called for a security policy debate between Finland and Estonia.

"We are neighbors and we have similar borders with Russia. I do not know how far you can go in security policy cooperation at the concrete level, but that in itself should be discussed. In today's situation new technology allows comprehensive cooperation in many areas; why not also in the area of security?" Kallas said.

Army Chief Rules Out Compromise With Defense Minister

WS0112122095 Tallinn BNS in English 1300 GMT 30 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tallinn, Nov 30, BNS — Estonian army Commander in Chief Aleksander Einseln on Thursday ruled out the possibility of his reconciliation with Defense Minister Andrus Oovel and said the public now has to choose which of the two should continue in office.

The dispute between the army chief and the defense minister gained an openly personal character especially after a failed reconciliation attempt by Prime Minister Tiit Vahi on Sunday.

Ltn. Gen. Aleksander Einseln in a statement to BNS on Thursday said Oovel had severely insulted him after Sunday's meeting and that one of them had to go.

The general said the minister had told him after the brief meeting in the prime minister's office that there was no place for him in Estonia and that his hands were stained with blood from the Korean and Vietnam wars.

Einseln accepted the post with the Estonian army after a long military career in the United States, which included participation in combat missions during the Korean and Vietnam wars.

"Such expressions by Oovel are deeply insulting to all soldiers of the free world who gave their life and health in the fight against Communism and other extremist ideologies," Einseln said.

Oovel in comments to BNS on Thursday said he had said nothing like that to Einseln and that the quote brought by the general in the statement contradicted his way of thinking.

"The defense ministry has kept up respect for the older generation also at moments when they are unable to control their words," Oovel said.

The minister repeated his call on Einseln to give up what he called destructive activity and focus his energy on work.

The general in the statement said attacks by Oovel and defense ministry Chancellor Robert Lepikson against him and the armed forces in general threatened the country's reputation.

Einseln in the statement demands an answer to the question whether or not Oovel's words about the Korean and Vietnam wars represent the government's or the country's position on the issue.

Government spokeswoman Maarika Saarna-Siimann told BNS that prime Minister Tiit Vahi had not heard Einseln and Oovel exchanging the remarks after Sunday's meeting.

BNS has obtained information that Vahi met with President Lennart Meri at the presidential residence immediately after the failed reconciliation attempt in his office.

The discord between the army commander and the defense minister was not discussed at Thursday's Cabinet meeting, the government spokeswoman added.

Latvia

Russian Embassy Reports Algiers Attack on Riga Sailors

LD3011193395 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1800 GMT 30 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A representative of the Russian Embassy in Algiers has announced that an attack took place today on three Latvian sailors during an operation being conducted by Algerian security forces against local terrorist groupings. We have already reported that the terrorists shot dead Oleg Sinaskin and Vitaliy Zolotov of Riga, and injured Boris Kostenko. They were all members of the crew of the Latvian merchant ship (Lesiba) and had arrived in Algeria on Monday [27 November]. It is almost certainly known that the attack was carried out by the Algerian Islamic opposition, which during the past two years has murdered more than 100 foreigners.

Ulmanis Backs Creation of Baltic Military Bloc

LD3011213595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1650 GMT 30 Nov 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature: compiled by Anna Kovaleva, Nikolay Zherebtsov, Andrey Petrovskiy, and Boris Y[illegible]nov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis has supported a call to form a Baltic countries' military bloc, the presidential press service told Interfax on Thursday. IF Note: The idea was put forward by commander of Estonia's Defense Forces Aleksander Einseln at his meeting with Ulmanis on Wednesday, the press service said. The meeting was attended by commander of Lithuania's armed forces Gen. Jonas Andrickevicius and commander of Latvia's armed forces Col. Juris Eihmanis.

Einseln said "individual Baltic states are weak in military terms, and therefore in critical circumstances mutual aid will be needed," the press service reported.

During their conversation they agreed that the idea of forming a military alliance will be discussed at future meetings between the three countries' political and military leaders.

The commanders of the Baltic countries' armed forces gathered in the Latvian city of Jurmala on Tuesday to discuss their countries' participation in NATO's Partnership for Peace program. They ended their conference on Wednesday, having decided to form a joint group of military delegates to the events to be conducted in the framework of the program.

Participants in the conference appointed Alar Lanaman of Estonia as commander of the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion. He will be in command of the battalion from January 8 till the end of 1999. After that a representative of Latvia will take over, and then a representative of Lithuania.

Foreign Minister Notes Worsening Ties With Lithuania

LD3011134195 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1200 GMT 30 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Foreign Minister Valdis Birkavs today was briefing the Saeima [parliament] on the worsening of relations between Latvia and Lithuania following the conclusion of an agreement between the Latvian Government and two oil companies on the possibility of exploration of oil deposits in the Baltic Sea. Birkavs believes that Lithuania's reaction to the signing of the agreement between Latvia and Amoco and OPAB has been caused by the politicization of its economic interests and the internal political situation in the country.

Latvia is ready in the future to tackle the issue of the maritime border by way of talks, founding its stance on norms of international law and other countries' practice.

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